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ABSTRACT
Explaining Medium Run Swings in Unemployment - Shocks, Monetary Policy and
Labour Market Frictions
Ansgar Rannenberg
The literature trying to link the increase in unemployment in many western Euro-
pean countries since the mid of the 1970s to an increase in labour market rigidity has
run into a number of problems. In particular, changes in labour market institutions do
not seem to be able to explain the evolution of unemployment across time.
We conclude that a new theory of medium run unemployment swings should explain
the increase in unemployment in many European countries and the lack thereof in the
United States. Furthermore, it should also help to explain the high degree of endogenous
unemployment persistence in the many European countries and ndings suggesting a
link between disinationary monetary policy and subsequent increases in the NAIRU.
To address these issues, we rst develop an endogenous growth sticky price model.
We subject the model to an uncorrelated cost push shock, in order to mimic a scenario
akin to the one faced by central banks at the end of the 1970s. Monetary policy imple-
ments a disination by following an interest feedback rule calibrated to an estimate of a
Bundesbank reaction function. 40 quarters after the shock has vanished, unemployment
is still about 1.8 percentage points above its steady state.
v
The model also partly explains cross country di¤erences in the unemployment evo-
lution by drawing on di¤erences in the size of the disination, the monetary policy
reaction function and wage setting.
We then draw some conclusions about optimal monetary policy in the presence of
endogenous growth and nd that optimal policy is substantially less hawkish than in
an identical economy without endogenous growth.
The second model introduces duration dependent skill decay among the unemployed
into a New-Keynesian model with hiring frictions developed by Blanchard/Gali (2008).
If the central bank responds only to ination and quarterly skill decay is above a thresh-
old level, determinacy requires a coe¢ cient on ination smaller than one. The threshold
level is plausible with little steady-state hiring and ring ("Continental European Cal-
ibration") but implausibly high in the opposite case ("American calibration"). Neither
interest rate smoothing nor responding to the output gap helps to restore determinacy
if skill decay exceeds the threshold level. However, a modest response to unemployment
guarantees determinacy.
Moreover, under indeterminacy, both an adverse sunspot shock and an adverse
technology shock increase unemployment extremely persistently.
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Introduction
Unemployment is one of the main social evils that a­ ict advanced economies. De-
spite this fact, there are signicant gaps in the economic analysis of unemployment.
Crucially, a detailed understanding of the medium-run evolution of unemployment is
yet to be developed. Farther, it has remained a conundrum why unemployment has
persistently increased in many Western European economies but not in the United
States.
For a long time, the commonly accepted assessment of the European unemployment
problem has put the blame on labour market institutions such as generous and elon-
gated unemployment benets, powerful unions and the tax wedge between the labour
cost of the employer and take home pay. It has been argued that these wage push"
factors increase labour costs and therefore create unemployment. In the terminol-
ogy of the simple wage setting / price setting framework proposed by Jackman et al.
(1991) which can be found in any intermediate macroeconomic textbook to this day
the aforementioned factors push up the wage setting curve. To reconcile the wage
claims of workers and the wage employers are willing to pay, the later of which are
described by the price setting curve, unemployment has to increase. In other words,
the Non-Accelerating-Ination-Rate-of-Unemployment (NAIRU) rises. In contrast, the
low unemployment rate in the United States is attributed to the absence of protective
labour market institutions and labour taxes.
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In recent years, this received view has come under criticism. As the IMF (2003)
notes, "Institutions explain a good deal of the cross-country di¤erences in unemploy-
ment rates. However, they hardly account for the growing trend observed in most Eu-
ropean countries and the dramatic fall in US unemployment in the 1990s."1 Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000) point out that "Many of these institutions were already present
when unemployment was low (and similar across countries), and, while many became
less employment-friendly in the 1970s, the movement since then has been mostly in the
opposite direction. Thus, while labour market institutions can potentially explain cross
country di¤erences today, they do not appear able to explain the general evolution of
unemployment over time."2
This suggests that a new approach to explain unemployment swings is needed. Such
an approach should explain medium run swings in unemployment in advanced OECD
economies without reference to changes in labour market institutions. Furthermore,
such approach should explain a range of empirical ndings associated with the un-
employment nexus. Most prominently among these ndings is the high endogenous
persistence of unemployment in Europe but not in the United States.
To meet these requirements, we introduce an approach that focuses on shifts to
the price setting curve to explain increases in unemployment. Put di¤erently, we will
concentrate on movements in the wage employers are willing to pay at a given level
of employment relative to the wage negotiated by wage setters. This wage will among
other things be a¤ected by total factor productivity or, in a dynamic context, total
factor productivity growth. Roughly speaking, the common feature of the two models
developed in this thesis is that they start o¤ with a general equilibrium sticky price
1IMF (2003), p. 134.
2Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), p. C2.
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model of the economy and then endogenise total factor productivity. This in turn
implies that monetary policy and the monetary policy response to shocks, a¤ect the
NAIRU.
We should note that we do not aim to provide a country-by-country story. Rather,
we aim to shed light on a set of empirical ndings characterising unemployment and
NAIRU dynamics in a number of European economies and on why US-American un-
employment dynamics are di¤erent.
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter one evaluates the two existing main-
stream approaches aiming to explain the medium run evolution of unemployment and
di¤erences in the evolution of unemployment across advanced OECD countries. Having
identied some major problems of the existing approaches, we then discuss additional
evidence associated with the unemployment evolution nexus. We conclude with a list
of ve empirical ndings which we want a new theory of medium run unemployment
swings to explain.
In chapter two, we introduce endogenous growth as a capital stock externality into
a New Keynesian general equilibrium model with unemployment. This feature implies
that total factor productivity growth is driven by investment, which in turn is a¤ected
by monetary policy and aggregate demand. We explore how the introduction of en-
dogenous growth alters the e¤ects of a disination on unemployment, like those seen
in many OECD countries at the beginning of the 1980s. A key nding is that in the
presence of endogenous growth, the disination substantially increases unemployment
for 10 to 20 years after ination has been brought back to target. Furthermore, the way
in which monetary policy induces the disination a¤ects the size of the unemployment
increase over the same horizon. We also investigate how cross country di¤erences in
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wage setting and monetary policy shape the e¤ect of a disination on unemployment
in the presence of endogenous growth.
While the main focus of this thesis is a positive one, chapter three investigates the
consequences of introducing endogenous growth for optimal monetary policy. More
specically, we are interested in whether the conventional wisdom holds that mone-
tary policy should respond aggressively to ination but little to the output gap. Our
main nding is that in the presence of endogenous growth, monetary policy responds
more aggressively to the output gap and less to ination than in an otherwise identical
economy without endogenous growth.
Chapter four analyses the consequences of a di¤erent mechanism to endogenise
labour productivity. It adds duration dependent skill loss among the unemployed to a
New Keynesian model with hiring frictions developed by Blanchard and Gali (2008).
If  for any reason unemployment increases, this will in turn increase the average
unemployment duration and will thus lower the productivity of the average applicant.
It is shown that depending on how uid the labour market is, skill decay a¤ects the
determinacy requirements on the nominal interest feedback rule of the central bank. In
particular, a coe¢ cient on ination larger than one is no longer su¢ cient to guarantee
determinacy. We also look at the dynamics of the model under indeterminacy.
The conclusion discusses to which extent the approach introduced in this thesis can
explain the ve empirical ndings about the medium run evolution of unemployment
stated at the end of chapter one and suggests some directions for future research.
4
CHAPTER 1
The European Unemployment Conundrum
The goal of this chapter is to motivate the theoretical research conducted in the
following chapter. We proceed in two steps. First, we evaluate the two existing main-
stream approaches aiming to explain the medium run evolution of unemployment and
di¤erences in the evolution of unemployment across advanced OECD countries. Thus
section 1.1 deals with multicountry - multiperiod panel data regressions trying to link
the increase in continental European unemployment to changes in labour market rigidi-
ties (or labour market institutions), promoted by Nickell and others. This approach
towards explaining unemployment has probably received the most attention in terms of
empirical testing. Section 1.2 then deals with the e¤orts by Ljungqvist and Sargent to
replicate the increase in European unemployment by varying the degree of "microeco-
nomic turbulence" within a competitive search model. It also discusses the criticism of
their theory by den Haan et al. (2005). Second, having identied some major problems
of the existing approaches, we discuss additional evidence surrounding the unemploy-
ment evolution nexus which the models developed in this thesis aim to shed light on.
Section 1.3 reviews the evidence on endogenous persistence and unit roots in OECD
unemployment. Section 1.4 deals with Balls attempts to link changes in the NAIRU in
the 1980s and beyond to the occurrence and size of disinations and to the behaviour
of central banks during recessions. Section 1.5 concludes and gives a list of ve features
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of the unemployment conundrum arising from the preceding discussion which we aim
to shed light on in the following chapters.1
1.1. Pitfalls of the institutional Approach to explaining European
Unemployment
This section aims to illustrate some of the shortcomings of the empirical literature
trying to explain unemployment with the evolution of labour market institutions. The
theory underlying this literature can be summarised as follows. Following Jackman et
al. (1991), it is assumed that a given level of unemployment can be decomposed into the
cyclical unemployment rate and the Non-Accelerating-Ination-Rate-of-Unemployment
(NAIRU). The former depends on aggregate demand, which can be proxied by the
change in the ination rate (assuming an expectation-augmented-Phillips-Curve type
relationship between the cyclical unemployment rate and the change in ination), the
output gap or the change in the money supply. The NAIRU depends on the factors
determining the real wage as targeted by wage setters and the real wage price setters,
i.e. rms, are willing to pay. The real wage targeted by wage setters depends positively
1A vibrant and fruitful area of macro-labour economics is one which attempts to incorporate search
and matching frictions into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. For instance, the
seminal contribution of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) shows that a real business cycle model with
matching frictions can proxy the cyclical behaviour of job creation and destruction. Hall (2005) shows
that replacing the assumptions of Nash bargained wages with a wage normincreases the volatility of
job creation, thus enhancing the models ability to match the data. Walsh (2003) is the rst attempt
to incorporate sticky prices into a model with matching frictions in the labour market. He shows
that matching frictions help to create a hump shaped response of output to a money growth shock as
suggested by VAR evidence. Ravenna and Walsh (2008) show how a Phillips Curve relating ination
to labour market variables, specically unemployment, can be derived from a similar model. They
estimate this Phillips curve and the canonical New Keynesian Phillips Curve on US data and reject
the latter in favour of the former. Very recently, the success of matching frictions and nominal rigidities
in explaining the business cycle dynamics of important macroeconomic variables has motivated policy
analysis in models with such features. Recent papers include Sala et al. (2008), Thomas (2008) Faia
(2008) and Faia (2009).
The goal of this literature is to jointly explain high frequency movements of unemployment, job creation
and destruction, output and other real variables, and more recently also ination and the money supply.
By contrast, our goal is to shed light on low frequency movements in unemployment, therefore the
following survey refrains from discussing these contributions in detail.
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on variables which induce "wage push", for instance the generosity and duration of
unemployment benets, the power of unions or the tax wedge between the labour cost
of the employer and take home pay. The real wage rms are willing to pay at a given
level of employment depends negatively on the size of the mark-up and thus positively
on the degree of product market competition.
Furthermore, unemployment is also a¤ected by supply shocks which a¤ect the posi-
tion of the price setting relative to the wage setting schedule. For instance, a decline in
productivity growth might decrease the real wage employees are willing to pay relative
to the real wage demanded by wage setters. An increase in the price of imports might
have the same e¤ect by raising the cost of inputs or reducing the purchasing power
of a given wage payment, which wage setters might respond to by demanding higher
wages.2 In addition, the real interest rate is also seen by some (see for instance Blan-
chard (2003)) as a variable which might a¤ect the feasible real wage. An increase in
the real interest rate would discourage capital accumulation, thus lowering the capital
labour ratio and the marginal product of labour.
Thus a reduced form unemployment equation could be written as follows:
(1.1) u = D0b1 + z0b2 + s0b3
where u; D; z and s denote unemployment, vectors of variables representing aggregate
demand, labour market institutions and supply shocks, respectively. Where productiv-
ity growth is assumed to have a temporary e¤ect on unemployment, researchers might
include the deviation of the Solow residual from its trend value or the change in labour
productivity growth. Likewise, if productivity growth is allowed to have a permanent
2There is disagreement about whether the wage setting schedule will ultimately adjust to such shocks,
implying that the NAIRU is only temporarily a¤ected.
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e¤ect, researchers might include the rate of labour productivity growth or total factor
productivity (TFP) growth.
In the following section we discuss several studies conducted by experts in the eld
who implement the approach outlined above. Section 1.1.1 critically appraises several
prominent and widely cited studies quantifying the share of unemployment movements
over time explained by changes in institutions. Accordingly, the main focus is on
the share of unemployment movements these studies do and do not explain. All of
these studies use annual data. Following this discussion, several additional issues are
considered, such as the problem of low robustness of coe¢ cient estimates across di¤erent
studies, to adding observations to the data set and to adding atheoretical variables like
country or xed e¤ects, all of which we discuss in section 1.1.2. Section 1.1.3 deals with
the problem of reverse causality.
1.1.1. Studies quantifying the Share of Unemployment Movements across
Time explained by Changes in Institutions
An early study trying to quantify the share of unemployment movements explained by
labour market institutions is conducted by Elmeskov et al. (1998) in a paper form-
ing part of the OECD research following up the OECDs 1996 "Jobs Study". Their
data stretches from 1983 to 1995 and covers 19 countries. They consider the following
institutions:
 Active labour market programmes: expenditure per person unemployed rela-
tive to GDP per capita
 Unemployment benets, measured as the average of unemployment benet
replacement rates for two earning levels, three family situations, and three
duration categories
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 Employment protection, measured via a simple ranking of countries
 Union density
 The tax wedge, measured as the total value of employersand employees social
security contributions and personal income tax paid divided by gross earnings
plus the employerssocial security contributions
 A minimum wage index, measured as the gross statutory minimum wage rela-
tive to the average wage.3
In addition, they include the output gap to control for demand induced uctuations
in unemployment, where potential output is measured as a Hodrick-Prescott Filter of
actual output levels. Unlike the other studies in this area, they use a random e¤ects
model to account for unobserved heterogeneity between countries.4 The study assesses
the quantitative impact of institutions on unemployment by asking how much of the
change in structural rather than actual unemployment is accounted for by institutional
changes. They proxy the structural unemployment rate by subtracting the impact of
the business cycle, as represented by the output gap times its coe¢ cient, from the
unemployment rate. It goes without saying that in doing so, all the issues arising in
measuring potential output also a¤ect this measure of structural unemployment. The
authors then compare the change in this structural unemployment rate from 1983 to
1995 to the contributions of the individual institutions and the country specic e¤ect.
The country specic e¤ect is calculated as a residual, which follows from the random
e¤ects assumption.5 It turns out that this country specic e¤ect explains most of the
change in structural unemployment in almost every country, with the exception of
3See Elmeskov et. al. (1998), p. 244.
4See Elmeskov et. al (1998), p. 213-214. They test this specication against the alternative of
correlation between the unobserved e¤ects and the explanatory variables.
5See Elmeskov et. al (1998). The country specic e¤ect is the di¤erence between the structural
unemployment rate and the institutional variables times their respective coe¢ cients.
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the Netherlands, the UK, Belgium and Ireland, in the latter of which it still explains
about 50% of the change.6 The authors conclude that "an important fraction of the
estimated changes in structural unemployment cannot be accounted for by changes in
the explanatory variables included in our analysis."7
Nickell (2005, 2002) et al investigate the role of institutions in explaining unemploy-
ment in 20 OECD countries from 1960 to 1995. All countries but the United States,
Canada and Australia are Western European. The institutional variables are
 The benet replacement rate, which is the before tax benet entitlement as a
percentage of previous earnings before tax
 A benet duration index, which equals (0.6*replacement rate in 2nd/3rd year
of an unemployment spell +0.4*replacement rate in 4th/5th year of an unem-
ployment spell)/(replacement rate in the rst year of an unemployment spell)
 Trade union density: ratio of total reported union members (less than retired
and unemployed ones) over total employment, level and change.
 Wage bargaining coordination index on a (1-3) scale. It refers to mechanisms
which make the wage bargainers internalize the e¤ect of a wage deal on aggre-
gate employment. This may be achieved by formally centralized bargaining or
through institutions like employers federations.8
 An Employment protection index on a (0-2) scale
 Labour Taxes, which equal the of the payroll tax rate, the income tax rate
and the consumption tax rate. Note that all of these percentages refer to
di¤erent bases, but they are added up nevertheless. It is not exactly clear
6See Elmeskov et. al (1998), p. 220, Table 3a.
7Elmeskov et. al. (1998), p. 219.
8See Nickell et al (2002), p. 8.
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why consumption taxes are used, as indirect taxes clearly a¤ect unemployment
benets and thus the reservation wage in the same way they a¤ect the real wage.
Nickell et. al argue that unions might temporarily resist the reduction in wages
resulting from an increase in indirect taxes and that this would temporarily
raise unemployment.
 Owner occupation rate: The percentage of the housing stock classied as owner
occupied. This is supposed to measure of labour mobility9
The authors also use various interactions of these institutions in their regression
equation, where interaction refers to the product of two institutions. They also use
time dummies and country specic time trends. The later has been criticised by Baker
et al. (2007), who argue that there is "little theoretical justication for imposing a
common time trend, and even less justication for including a separate time trend for
each country. To the extent that unemployment in OECD economies is trended over
time, the role of this kind of modelling ought to be to explain such a trend, not to
control for it."10
According to the theoretical framework of Nickell et al. as summarised above, in-
stitutions a¤ect the long run level of "equilibrium" unemployment (or the long run
NAIRU) by a¤ecting wage and price setting behaviour, thus determining the real wage
employees demand for a given unemployment level and the real wage employers are
willing to pay. But actual unemployment movements are driven in addition by uc-
tuations of the natural rate originating from supply shocks like productivity or oil
price shocks, and by cyclical unemployment movements induced by demand changes.11
9See Nickel (2005), pp. 23-24.
10Baker et al. (2007), p. 62.
11See Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), pp. 12-18.
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Therefore the following variables representing macroeconomic shocks are also included
in the regression of Nickell et. al.:
 Productivity shocks, measured deviations of Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
Growth from trend
 short run labour demand shocks measured by the residuals from a simple labour
demand model.12
 real import price shocks, measured by proportional changes in real import
prices weighted by the trade share
 the ex-post real interest rate13
 Change in the rate of growth of the nominal money stock to account for ag-
gregate demand uctuations. To us this seems an inadequate way to control
for aggregate demand uctuations. First, monetary policy is not the only force
driving aggregate demand. Furthermore, theory would suggest that the e¤ect
of the money supply on aggregate demand would depend on the elasticity of
money demand as well as on the e¤ect of output on ination, both of which
might be unstable. Postulating an expectation-augmented-Phillips Curve type
relationship between the deviation of unemployment from the NAIRU and the
change in ination would be both a more direct and a more comprehensive way
to capture aggregate demand uctuations. It is also the approach followed by
Nickell (1997) and Jackman et al. (1991).14
12Baker et al. (2002) criticize this way of constructing labour demand shocks because it might imply
regressing unemployment on employment. They argue that if the labour demand model were misspec-
ied, then the residual would simply measure employment movements (which are perhaps driven by
an omitted variable). They see their critique justied by the fact that the coe¢ cient estimate stands
out as extremely high and extremely signicant. See Baker et al, p.67 footnote 8.
13See Nickell (2005), p. 10.
14See Nickell (1997), p. 65, and Jackman et al. (1991).
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Finally, to account for unexplained persistence in unemployment, the equation also
includes the lagged unemployment rate.
The study nds that all institutions but employment protection and the level of
union density are signicant, although the change of union density does have a sig-
nicant e¤ect as well. Labour taxes are insignicant if the owner occupation rate is
included. Bargaining coordination reduces unemployment, especially if it interacts with
employment taxes and union density. The shocks are all signicant except for the real
interest rate and the change in the money supply, though this might have to do with
the fact that the two variables would be expected to be highly correlated: an increase
in the money growth rate would be expected to induce a reduction in the interest rate.
Most notably, however, is that the coe¢ cient on the lagged unemployment rate is as
high as 0.86.15 Hence each variable has a long run multiplier of more than 7 (= 1
1 0:86),
which is multiplied with the on impact coe¢ cient. This means that to a large degree,
unemployment is explaining itself, or as Nickell et al put it: "This reects a high level of
persistence and/or the inability of the included variables to explain what is going on."16
The resulting empirical model explains the persistence in unemployment extremely well.
However, it would certainly be desirable to explain the source of this high endogenous
persistence.
The authors then conduct a dynamic simulation to illustrate the e¤ect of institu-
tions country by country. To do so, they x the institutional variables at their 1965
level and compare the result to the tted value of unemployment using the actual
values of the institutional variables and past unemployment. According to their simu-
lation, they can explain 55% of the rise in unemployment in OECD Europe from the
15See Nickell (2005), p. 14.
16See Nickell et al (2005), p. 15.
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1960s to 1995. This result is not very impressive given the high internal persistence
of unemployment they estimate. Turning to individual countries, institutions explain
virtually nothing for Western Germany (where unemployment rose from about 1% to
about 6%.), Finland and New Zealand. In the case of Germany, this probably has to
do with the fact that institutions have changed very little. However, even among coun-
tries where the institutional variables make some contribution, signicant bits of the
evolution of unemployment are not explained by institutions. For instance, in Spain,
unemployment rose from about 2% in 1960 to about 22% in 1995. According to the
simulation, with institutions remaining xed, there would still have been an increase
in unemployment to about 17%. Though this is the most extreme example, the limits
of the explanatory power of the institutional variables are obvious for other countries
as well. For Ireland, the xed-institution simulation gives a rise in unemployment from
less than 5% to about 15%, which is striking. However, unlike most other countries, in
the 1990s actual unemployment fell below the simulation with institutions being xed.
The simulation with the actual institution values yields an unemployment rate of 11%.
Obviously there has been some favourable institutional reform, but this still leaves an
increase in unemployment of about 6% not explained by institutions.17 To a lesser
degree, similar conclusions can be drawn from looking at the simulations for Australia,
France, the UK and Italy. Baker et al. (2007) draw attention to the role of the inter-
action of the aforementioned country specic time trends and the high coe¢ cient on
the lagged dependent variable in picking up unemployment movements across time. In
most countries, the coe¢ cients of the country specic time trends imply an increase or
decrease in unemployment of at least two percentage points over two decades.18 The size
17See Nickell (2002), pp. 44-45.
18See Baker et al. (2007), pp. 26 and 27, footnote 13, and the regression results of Nickell et al.
(2002), pp. 37-38. With a coe¢ cient on lagged unemployment, of 0.87, to generate a change in
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of unemployment movements driven by interactions between atheoretical variables and
the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable suggests the need for a new theoretical
model able to produce large medium run country specic swings in unemployment and
endogenous unemployment persistence.
In addition, for a number of countries (Austria, Denmark, Japan, Norway, Swe-
den and Switzerland) the simulation with xed institutions actually yields negative
unemployment rates, sometimes substantially so. This sheds doubt on the validity of
the whole simulation exercise: Maybe the "true" coe¢ cients are sensitive to variations
of the independent variables, implying that counterfactual simulations will yield only
crude estimates of what would have actually happened had the exogenous variables
evolved as assumed for the purpose of the xed institution simulation.
The IMF (2003) conducted an empirical study very similar in spirit to the Nickell et
al. approach. It features the same countries and uses Nickell et al.s data, but its scope
extends until 1998. Due to a lack of data on this particular variable, benet duration
is absent from the model. However, it adds an index of central bank independence,
the change in the ination rate (which would seem to us a superior way to control for
aggregate demand uctuations for the reasons given above) and the output gap to the
macroeconomic variables but does not include the change in money-supply growth and
labour demand shocks. Various interaction terms are included as well. The authors
carry out several regressions and also engage in xed institutions simulations like Nickell
et al. do, and the regression forming the basis for these simulations includes lagged
unemployment in order to account for the persistence in unemployment.
unemployment of two percentage points, one needs a coe¢ cient on the country specic time trend
with an absolute value of 0.019. The only time trends with a coe¢ cient with a lower absolute value
are Finland, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
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The rst regression includes only labour market institutions and hence no shocks or
lagged dependent variables. All institutional variables are signicant at the 5% level.
This carries over to the other regressions. The residuals of this regression are interpreted
as "Institution adjusted Unemployment Rates", that means the part of unemployment
in each year not explained by institutions. They are displayed only for a selection
of countries.19 According to the authors, for each country, the "Institution adjusted
Unemployment Rate" uctuates around zero, suggesting it provides an unbiased expla-
nation of the cross-country di¤erences in unemployment. However, due to the way these
residuals are trended over time, i.e. upwards in most of Europe and downwards in the
U.S., institutions "hardly account for the growing trend observed in most European
countries and the dramatic fall in U.S. unemployment in the 90s": The part of the
unemployment rate not explained by institutions increases over time.20 This conrms
similar ndings of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) saying that while institutions might
be able to explain di¤erences in unemployment across countries, they cannot explain
the evolution of unemployment over time.21
Moreover, as in Nickell et. al., the coe¢ cient on unemployment in the regression
that forms the basis for their simulations is pretty high, equalling 0.79, which corre-
sponds to a long-run multiplier of about 4.76. Hence large parts of the evolution of
unemployment remain again unexplained. Concerning the simulation results, these are
only reported for six countries (Germany, France, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and
the UK) to exemplify the impact of labour market institutions. In all of them, unem-
ployment increases over time even when institutions are held xed. As in Nickell et
19See IMF (2003), p. 134.
20IMF (2003), p. 134.
21See Blanchard (2000), p. C2.
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al, institutions do not explain anything for Germany. For France and Italy, deteriora-
tions in institutions contribute about 3.5% and 1.8% to the increase in the tted value
of unemployment in these countries from 1970 to 1998, whereas the increase in the
tted value amounts to about 9% and 5% respectively.22 Thus especially for France,
the institutional approach certainly leaves something to be wished for. This is also
true for those countries which the IMF presents as examples of successful institutional
reform, namely the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Ireland. According to the
simulation, in all these countries successful reform has reduced the unemployment rate
by about 2.5%. Institutions, however, can not account for an increase of 4% in the UK
and Ireland, and 3% in the Netherlands, respectively.
The most recent cross country/ cross time macro econometric estimation of the
e¤ects of policies and institutions on unemployment is conducted by Bassanini and
Duval (2006). Bassanini and Duval consider a sample of 20 OECD countries over the
period from 1982 to 2003. Their Baseline specication features the following variables:
 Tax wedge between labour cost and take home pay (for a single earner couple
with two children, at average earnings levels)
 Unemployment benet generosity, measured by the average of replacement
rates over various earnings levels, family situations and durations of unem-
ployment
 The degree of stringency of employment protection laws
 The average degree of stringency of product market regulation across seven
non-manufacturing industries,
 Union membership rates to measure the bargaining power of unions
22See IMF (2003), pp. 138-141.
17
 The degree of centralisation/ coordination of wage bargaining, referred to as
the degree of corporatism.23
To control for "the unemployment e¤ects of aggregate demand uctuations over the
business cycle", Bassanini and Duval include the output gap measure of the OECD in
addition to the institutional variables. They also include time dummies and country
xed e¤ects.
Bassanini and Duval (2006) nd that lowering the replacement rate and the tax
wedge by ten percentage points, respectively, and reducing product market regulation
by two standard deviations would lower unemployment by 1.2 and 2.8 percentage points,
respectively. Increasing corporatism by one unit lowers unemployment by 1.4 percent-
age points.24 Furthermore, the baseline equation is able to explain a substantial share
of unemployment trends over the estimation period. More specically, it explains 74%
of the cross country variance of unemployment changes for 1982 - 2003. Labour market
institutions explain 47% of the cross country variance of unemployment changes, while
they explain 64% of non-cyclical unemployment changes. The latter are calculated as
the di¤erence between actual changes in unemployment from 1982 to 2003 and the
change in unemployment that can be assigned to the change in the output gap- over
that period.25
The authors also run an alternative specication in which they replace the output
gap with the following shocks:
 A TFP shock, i.e. deviation of logarithm of TFP from its trend, which in turn
was calculated by means of a Hodrick - Prescott lter
23See Bassanini and Duval (2006), p. 12.
24See Bassanini and Duval (2006), p. 16.
25See Bassanini and Duval (2006), p. 16.
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 A Terms of Trade Shock, dened as the ratio of imports to output multiplied
by the logarithm of their relative prices
 The ex-post long term real interest rate
 A labour demand shock, measured labour share purged from short run inu-
ences of factor prices26
They nd that replacing the output gap with these variables has only minor e¤ects
on estimates of the e¤ects of the institutional variables.
Hence the results of Bassanini and Duval seem to provide strong support for the
hypothesis that changes in labour market institutions explain movements in unemploy-
ment across time. However, we believe that two qualifying remarks are in order. The
rst refers to the time period they consider. Of course the choice of a sample period is
always arbitrary. However, it is hard to ignore that in the early 1980s, unemployment
rose substantially across the OECD. From 1980 to 1982, in the countries in Bassanini
and Duvals sample, the average unemployment rate increased by two percentage points.
Only four countries saw their unemployment increase by less than one percentage point.
Unemployment rates in Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Germany, all countries with
a history of high unemployment often blamed on rigid labour markets increased by
3.4, 1.5, 1.3, 3.7 and 2.8 percentage points respectively. The average unemployment
increase from 1980 to its peak during the decade amounted to 3.8 percentage points.
Hence ignoring the years 1980 and 1981 leaves out about 53% of the total average un-
employment increase during that decade, while it leaves out 82%, 42%, 28%, 44% and
57% of the total unemployment increase for the countries just listed.
26See Bassanini and Duval (2006), p.15.
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Explaining the highly persistent and non-cyclical increases in unemployment during
the 1980s constitutes a major part of the European unemployment conundrum. The
omission of 1980 - 1982 not only qualies the conclusions of Bassanini and Duval con-
cerning the power of institutions to explain changes in unemployment, but also raises
the question of whether excluding these years of substantial unemployment variation
a¤ects both the coe¢ cient estimates and the share of the cross country variance of
unemployment changes over the sample period institutions can explain. For instance,
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) show that at the beginning of the 1980s in Italy, Ger-
many or Great Britain, where unemployment rose substantially, unemployment benet
replacement rates either stayed at or fell.27
Our second remark is that the equation is potentially miss-specied. As we have
pointed out above, a reduced form equation to describe unemployment in line with the
approach of Jackman et al. (1991) has to feature a variable controlling for deviations
of unemployment from the NAIRU driven by aggregate demand uctuations and the
variables driving the NAIRU. The latter consists of the institutional variables and
various shocks a¤ecting the supply side. Bassanini and Duval (2006) suggest that it
is possible to control for demand or business cyclee¤ects either by the output gap
or what are essentially supply side shocks. This is even more remarkable since they
suggest that some of these variables might actually be non-stationary and such would
be their e¤ect on unemployment.28
The specication featuring the four supply shocks but no control for aggregate
demand movements is also highly unusual. Almost every study looking for direct e¤ects
of labour market institutions on unemployment controls for deviations of unemployment
27See Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), pp. C14-C16.
28See Bassanini and Duval (2006), p. 16.
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from the NAIRU by either the output gap, the change in ination or (in case of Nickell
(2002)) the change in the money supply, but not by supply shocks. Many studies
 which as far as we know all work with annual data- then include supply shocks
(like productivity growth, TFP shocks, terms of trade shocks. . . ) in addition not as
a replacement, see for instance Baccaro and Rei (2005), the IMF (2003), Nickell et al.
(2002, 2005) and Nunziata (2002).
Hence in two of these four studies, the explanation of unemployment via labour
market institutions has to rely on a high coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable.
As pointed out by Nickell et al. (2005), this could be interpreted as a failure of the
exogenous variables to explain unemployment. Even with the help of the implied high
long run multiplier, these studies leave huge bits of unemployment dynamics to be ex-
plained which are currently only captured by atheoretical variables. The latter is also
true for the Elmeskov et al. study. A number of other criticisms were mentioned above.
Finally, the fourth study estimates a specication which does not feature lagged un-
employment. Here institutions explain almost two thirds of the cross-country variation
of unemployment changes from 1982-2003. However, this result might be sensitive to
the inclusion of the years 1980-1981, since unemployment rose substantially across the
OECD from 1980 - 1982. More seriously, the equation might be misspecied.
1.1.2. Robustness
Coe¢ cients of the institutional variables seem to vary strongly across di¤erent empirical
studies, and seem to be very sensitive to adding new data, to the inclusion of additional
variables and to how unobserved variables are controlled for. Baker et. al survey six
recent papers (Nickell 1997, Elmeskov et al. 1998, Belot and van Ours (2002)29, Nickell
29This was published as Belot and van Ours (2004), which can be found in our list of references.
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et al. (2002), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Bertola et al. (2001)) and nd that labour
taxes and benet duration are signicant in all studies were they are included, and the
replacement rate in all but one. However, the e¤ect a 10 percentage point increase taxes
and the replacement rate on unemployment ranges from 0.9 p.p. to 2.1 and from 0.1-1.3
p.p., respectively. The e¤ect of an increase in benet duration by one year ranges from
0.7% to 1.4%.30 They conclude that "the range of estimated coe¢ cients of the variables
that were generally found to have a signicant relationship with the unemployment rate
is su¢ ciently large to both raise questions about the robustness of this result and also
to obscure the potential trade-o¤s for policy makers."31
It might be argued that the variation of coe¢ cients between studies is hard to avoid
given the fact that the equations estimated often do not include the same institutional
variables, or di¤erent measurements of them (though the Nickell-dataset is now widely
used), cover di¤erent time periods, add di¤erent macroeconomic shocks, use di¤erent
specications of country and time e¤ects etc. Therefore robustness experiments within
a given study, which changes one aspect of the approach but leaving everything else the
same, are of particular interest. Concerning the Nickell et al. study discussed above,
Baker et. al. report that an earlier version (from 2001) of that paper whose data
extended only to 1992 produced very di¤erent estimates of the coe¢ cients of labour
taxes, benet duration, and bargaining coordination. In the 2002, their (long-run)
impacts are reduced by more than 30%, 50% and 40%, respectively, as compared to the
2001 version.32 It is striking that the addition of three years to a study which would
30See Baker et al (2002), pp.43-44.
31Baker et al. (2003), p. 44.
32See Baker et. al (2003), p. 35. These numbers can be easily checked by comparing the coe¢ cients
for the 2001 version of the Nickell et al study reported in Baker et al, p.47, fourth column of the table,
with the coe¢ cients reported in Nickell (2002), p. 37, column 2 of the table, or in Nickell (2005),
column 3, after modifying them for the e¤ects of the long-run multiplier. Sadly, I was not able to get
hold of the earlier version of the Nickell paper.
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otherwise stretch over 32 years using annual data leads to such major revisions in the
coe¢ cient estimates. Nickell et al.s results are apparently not robust to the inclusion
of additional data.
Baker et al. (2004) investigate the robustness of the results from the IMF (2003)
study mentioned above. They re-estimate the specication underlying the simulation
results discussed after modifying it as follows. They remove the country specic time
trends for the reasons given above and introduce common time dummies instead. They
introduce benet duration as an additional variable (which was absent in the IMF
(2003) study due to a lack of data) and replace the interaction terms (between em-
ployment protection and union density, union density and the tax wedge and central
bank independence and bargaining coordination) with the same interactions used in
Nickell et al. (2002, 2005) (i.e. Union density and bargaining coordination, replace-
ment ratio and benet duration, tax wedge and bargaining coordination).33 They also
use slightly di¤erent versions of the union density, replacement ratio and tax wedge
variable.34 When estimating this modied specication, only the tax wedge, the inter-
action between bargaining coordination and union density and between the tax wedge
and bargaining coordination are signicant, although the tax wedge only at the 10%
level.
Belot and van Ours (2004) exemplify the robustness problem with respect to the
inclusion of additional variables. They estimate the e¤ect of labour taxes, the replace-
ment rate, employment protection, centralization, interactions of benets and taxes,
coordination with employment protection and union density. The authors justify the
33See Baker et al. (2004), p. 15, and Nickell et al. (2002), p. 37, table 13.
34Baker et al. (2004) claim that the modications of the variables are minor.
23
use of interactions by recurring to a rigorous model of price and wage setting. Further-
more, they include the change of ination.35 Their data ranges from 1960 to 1999 and
consists of ve year averages. In their rst regression, they include all the variables
but no interactions, and nd that all variables are highly signicant with the expected
sign. They then add country xed e¤ects (recall that Nickel et al used country spe-
cic time trends instead) to account for unobserved heterogeneity between countries.
This renders the replacement rate and union density insignicant, while employment
protection is signicant only at the 10% level. However, t (adjusted R2) improves to
from 0.39 to 0.7 . Adding time period xed e¤ects instead renders again the replace-
ment rate, employment protection, and also coordination insignicant. The tax rate
is signicant only at the 10% level, while t improves to 0.46. Adding both time and
country e¤ects turns all institutional variables insignicant, while t improves to 0.77.36
Hence it seems quite possible that the rst regression did not include the variables truly
driving unemployment, or as the authors put it: "The results with respect to the re-
lationship between labour market institutions and unemployment in the rst column
seem to be caused by xed di¤erences between countries and time periods and not by
within country changes in labor market institutions."37
Adding the interaction terms in addition to the country and time e¤ects leads to
remarkable outcomes. Both union density and the replacement rate and union density
are now signicant, but the replacement rate with the wrong sign: an increase in the
replacement rate by 10 percentage points reduces unemployment by 2.2 percentage
points. The interaction e¤ect of taxes and benets is signicant with a coe¢ cient of
0.57, which is in line with theory. Assuming an about average tax rate of 0.4, this means
35See Belot and van Ours (2004), pp. 630-631 and pp. 634-635.
36See Belot/Van Ours (2004), p. 635.
37Belot and van Ours (2004), p. 636.
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that the net e¤ect of a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate amounts
to a mere 0.08 (=-2.2+0.57*0.4*10) percentage point increase in unemployment. While
this is result is obviously quantitatively small, the fact that it relies on the interaction
of the tax rate with the replacement rate is at odds with conventional wisdom and the
model Belot and van Ours develop in the paper: An increase in the replacement rate
should increase unemployment at any tax rate.38
In conclusion, it seems that robustness of the estimated coe¢ cients represents a
serious problem of the institutional approach, and casts doubt on the policy conclusions
drawn from regressions of unemployment on institutional variables.
1.1.3. Reverse Causality
One of the crucial underlying assumptions of panel data regressions of unemployment
on labour market institutions is that the latter are exogenous and are not a¤ected
by those forces which are a¤ecting unemployment or by unemployment itself. This
assumption might be violated with respect to the tax wedge, but also with respect to
the generosity and duration of unemployment benets. For instance, in some countries
the welfare state is organized as an insurance system, with the bodies providing the
unemployment benets, pensions health and care insurance having to break even at
least in the long run. An economic downturn will result in a twofold worsening of the
nancial position of these institutions. Firstly, expenditure on unemployment benets
will increase with the number claimants, and secondly, as those becoming unemployed
stop contributing and wages fall or rise at a slower pace the revenues of the system
will decrease. This will then almost mechanically lead to an increase in the tax wedge
in order to balance revenues and costs. If the government decides to funnel more
38See Belo and Van Ours (2004), pp. 636-637.
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tax money into the system to prevent a rise in social security contributions, this will
ultimately lead to tax rises elsewhere, given that the government also has to balance its
budget to some extent. Hence an increase in unemployment might cause an increase in
the tax wedge and so part of the estimated coe¢ cient associated with it in empirical
studies might be related to that. Similarly, an increase in unemployment might lead the
government to extend the duration of unemployment benets for certain groups which
nd it especially hard to nd a job, like the elderly, though in this case the link would
certainly be less mechanical. Blanchard (2007) views reverse causality as a major factor
compromising the explanatory power of the macroeconometric evidence: "Asking these
panel data regressions to tell us conclusively about causal e¤ects of institutions, shocks,
and interactions of shocks and institutions on unemployment is beyond what they can
deliver. Causality is next to impossible to establish, as many institutional changes are
triggered by labor market developments."39
Still, the problem is rarely addressed in empirical studies aimed at understanding
the e¤ects of labour market institutions and tends to be downplayed. The Nickell
(2002) study recognizes that there might be an issue but then more or less dismisses it:
"We have not faced up to the problem of the endogeneity of the institutional shifts. In
certain cases this may be important but, overall, we do not feel this problem seriously
distorts our results. In any event, the absence of suitable instruments ensures that we
are unable to deal with the issue."40 The IMF (2003) notes that "In line with the ex-
isting literature, all explanatory variables were assumed exogenous. Admittedly, some
institutional variables like employment protection and benet replacement ratio might
react to higher unemployment as demands for greater insurance against unemployment
39Blanchard (2007), p. 415.
40Nickell et al (2002), p.2.
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risk increase. However, the few existing empirical studies on the determinants of labour
market institutions do not suggest any signicant feedback e¤ect of unemployment on
the institutional framework, rather emphasizing strong complementarities among insti-
tutions and a signicant role for "deeper" aggregate risk factors like the degree of trade
openness."41 However, two of the three studies the IMF cites (Rodrik 1999, Agell 1999)
regress the size of government and general welfare expenditures (Rodrik) and labour
market institutions (Agell) on measures of trade openness but not on unemployment.42
The key argument of these studies is that higher trade openness increases aggregate
risk which increases the desire for insurance which, due to the aggregate nature of the
risk, can only be provided by the government. While these lines of research are inter-
esting in themselves, they clearly address di¤erent issues. The third study listed by the
IMF, which is conducted by Checci and Lucifora (2002), focuses solely on unionization,
whereas the most interesting variables would be benet generosity and duration and the
tax wedge, both because they are the most likely to be a¤ected by unemployment, but
more importantly because these are the most consistently signicant variables through-
out a wide range of empirical studies, as discussed in the previous section.43 Thus the
research on the endogeneity of labour market institutions is clearly still in its early
stages.
The Elmeskov et al. (1998) study discussed above does include a test of whether
unemployment benets as dened in this study and the tax wedge do Granger cause un-
employment. A variable x is said to Granger cause a variable y if in a regression of y on
lagged values of x (the number of lags being determined by suitable criteria) the lagged
41IMF (2003), pp. 146-147.
42See Rodrik (1998), p. 997-1032, and Agell (1999), p. F143-F164.
43See Checci and Lucifora (2002).
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values of x are jointly signicant.44 They conduct the test separately for each coun-
try, with the data ranging from 1970 to 1995. They nd that unemployment Granger
causes unemployment benets in Belgium, France, Italy, the UK, the United States
and the Netherlands, though in the later the result is signicant only at the 10% level.
This is an interesting result because the list includes both high and low unemployment
countries where benet levels have been moving in opposite directions. Unemployment
is found to Granger cause the tax wedge in Austria, Ireland and Norway.45
Baker et al. (2007) look for Granger causality running from unemployment to un-
employment benets and vice versa in a sample of 21 OECD countries and a longer
time period ranging from 1962 to 2004. Unemployment benets are measured as the
Gross Replacement Rate, which is calculated as an average across family types, income
levels and for di¤erent durations of unemployment. It is the same measure used in
the Bassanini and Duval (2006) paper cited above.46 The authors use four lags of un-
employment in the regression. Even if only the rst lag is considered, unemployment
is found to Granger cause unemployment benets at least the 5% level (i.e. the null
that unemployment does not Granger cause unemployment benets is rejected at this
signicance level) in Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal
and the United Kingdom. If the signicance of the remaining lags is considered as well,
unemployment is found to Granger cause unemployment in Australia and the United
States at the 5% level as well.47 Hence in 10 out of 21 countries, unemployment is
found to Granger cause unemployment benets, and again the list includes countries
with varying unemployment performance. By contrast, unemployment benets are
44See Gujarati (2004), p. 698.
45See Elmeskov et. al. (1998), pp. 248-249.
46See Bassanini and Duval (2006), p. 106 for a denition. This represents the latest e¤ort of the
OECD to develop a benet generosity variable available for a large set of countries.
47See Baker et al. (2006), p. 40, Table 6.
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found to Granger cause unemployment only in Australia, Belgium, Finland, Ireland,
the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland at least the 5% level, while it causes unem-
ployment benets in Canada at the 10% level. These results suggest that the consistent
nding of a signicant relationship between unemployment benets and unemployment
is at least partly be due to causality running in the opposite direction.
1.2. Turbulence as a Source of Rising Unemployment in a Welfare State
Economy
The problems of the research program in the spirit of Jackman, Layard and Nickel to
explain the evolution of unemployment across time motivated Ljungqvist and Sargent
to pursue an alternative approach. In a series of papers (1998, 2004, 2007) they aim to
explain why the European welfare state was associated with (OECD-) average unem-
ployment rates until the mid 1970s but with substantially higher unemployment rates
thereafter even though there have been no major changes to labour market institutions
during that period. Another motivating stylised fact is that the increase in unem-
ployment has been accompanied by a decline in the probability of gaining employment
rather than an increase in the separation rate, and thus an increase in unemployment
duration.
In Ljungqvist and Sargents approach, increased Microeconomic turbulence in-
creases unemployment levels in an economy with generous unemployment benets.
Microeconomic turbulence is dened as the probability that a laid o¤ worker su¤ers
substantial skill loss. During tranquil times, on the other hand, the welfare state
economy generates unemployment rates which are almost equal to the unemployment
rates of the laissez faireeconomy, which o¤ers no unemployment benets to laid-o¤
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workers. Thus Ljungqvist and Sargent o¤er an explanation of why unemployment has
increased in Europe without institutions becoming more unemployment unfriendly.
We will rst summarise the original exposition (Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998))
of their argument, which was based on a simple competitive search model in sections
1.2.1 and 1.2.2. They rene their argument in later papers but the basic mechanisms
determining the relationship between turbulence and unemployment remain the same.
Ljungqvist and Sargents argument has been attacked by Den Haan et al. (2001,2005).
They restate the unemployment turbulence relationship in a matching model and show
that it breaks down if there is even a small probability that workers whose matches have
broken up endogenously su¤er from skill loss. This critique is summarised in section
1.2.3.
1.2.1. Assumptions
Workers aim to maximise the present value of their income net of job search costs.
Income, in case of having a job, is the product of the skill level and the wage, which
is specied per skill unit. In case of unemployment, the welfare state economy o¤ers
unemployment benets to its workers which replace 70% of previous earnings. They are
funded by a payroll tax. Benets are terminated if the worker rejects a job o¤er which
would generate an income larger or equal to those benets. With a xed probability,
skills can increase if the worker is in employment, thus generating earning rises of
employed workers over time (there are 21 skill levels). They will deteriorate during
periods of joblessness. What is more, the event of a layo¤will cause an immediate skill
loss. In the initial calibration, corresponding to tranquil timesthis skill loss is zero,
while in the turbulent times calibration, the immediate skill loss a worker might su¤er
can be huge. Layo¤s happen with a xed probability. Workers also die with a xed
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probability. Dead workers are replaced by an equal number of entrants which have the
lowest skill level.
Unemployed workers determine the probability of receiving a wage o¤er by choosing
their search intensity. Job search is costly and increases in the search intensity. The
wage o¤er follows a continuous distribution.48
1.2.2. Benet Traps and the E¤ect of Turbulence
This setup implies that in the welfare state economy, an unemployed worker with low
skill levels but high past earnings will exert a low search e¤ort. With a low skill level, the
wage o¤er such a worker would have to receive in order to generate earnings exceeding
their benets is high and thus quite unlikely to occur. Accepting a job o¤er generating
a lower income than the unemployment benet will mostly not be worthwhile because
building up the skills necessary for the workers income to exceed his unemployment
benet will take a long time, while there is still the danger of being laid o¤ again in
the meantime and thus ending up with a much lower unemployment benet (as the
wage on which to base the benet is calculated has decreased as well). Apart from
that, further skill deterioration is not much of an issue for these workers since they are
close to the lowest skill level anyway. The low search intensity in conjunction with the
high reservation wage means that few of those worker move into jobs.49 Workers in the
laissez faire economy, by contrast, always choose the highest search intensity, implying
that they receive a job o¤er with probability one.50
48See Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), pp. 524-528.
49See Ljungqvist and (1998), pp. 529-531. Workers with very high skill levels and high benets tend
to exert low search e¤orts, too, but not as low as the low skilled/ high benet workers, and search
intensities increase as skills move towards the intermediate range as the unemployment spell lengthens.
50See Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), p. 531.
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In the tranquil timescalibration, however, these di¤erences do not lead to signif-
icantly di¤erent average unemployment rates. The reason is that with no immediate
skill loss after layo¤, the group described above is too small to matter.51 In such a
world, higher previous earnings, and thus higher benets, are on average associated
with higher current skills, which tend to reduce the reservation wage and tend to in-
crease search intensity. To reach the lowest skill level while enjoying a high benet
therefore implies a very long unemployment spell which is unlikely to occur for the
reasons just given. Even in the tranquil times calibration, however, a higher fraction
of the unemployed in the welfare state economy are long-term unemployed, i.e. with
spells exceeding six months (12.6% as compared to 9.8%) and twelve months (1.3% as
compared to 0.7%).
An increase in the degree of economic turbulence, as dened above, causes a much
less benign outcome for the welfare state economy. With Ljungqvist and Sargents
calibration of skill evolution during employment, workers who become unemployed will
typically have accumulated the highest skill level.52 Faced with large skill losses, many
will thus end up in a situation as sketched above, i.e. low skills coupled with high
benets. Thus the share of the population trapped in the benet system because
they have little incentive to search for jobs and to accept job o¤ers will be much higher
than during tranquil times. Furthermore, moving to a higher skill level takes on average
longer than with low turbulence and payroll taxes increase to sustain the benets paid
to the larger number of unemployed. This further reduces the attractiveness of job
51See Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), pp. 447-448.
52See Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), p. 540 and p. 527.
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searches.53 Hence average unemployment increases in the welfare state economy. By
contrast, unemployment in the laissez-faire economy does not change.54
1.2.3. Stylised facts
Apart from generating an increase in unemployment in the welfare state economy as
compared to the laissez-faire economy holding the welfare state constant, the welfare
state economy also has a much larger fraction of long-term unemployment. For the
highest degree of turbulence, 55.6% of the unemployed in the welfare state economy
have been unemployed for longer than a year, as opposed to 0.6% in the Laissez-faire
economy. This matches the fact that European OECD countries have larger fractions
of unemployed with long spells than the U.S has. Average unemployment duration
also strongly increases in the welfare state economy.55 This is in line with the ob-
served increase in the average duration of unemployment as unemployment increased
in Europe.56
Concerning the laissez faire economy, the model can partly reproduce evidence on
earnings of Gottschalk and Mo¢ t (1994) for the U.S., who decompose earnings of
individuals into two components, an individual specic mean and a transitory serially
correlated component. They nd that during the 1979 to 1987 period as opposed to
the 1970 to 1978 period, both the dispersion of individual means and the standard
deviation of transitory earnings have increased.57 An increase of the degree of economic
53See Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), p. 540.
54See Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), p. 532 and p. 540.
55See Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), p. 541.
56Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) mention that feature of their approach more explicitly. See Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2007), pp. 2140-2141 and pp. 2153-2155.
57See Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), p. 518.
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turbulence in the laissez-faire economy does the same but the changes are not as big as
to match all of the increase observed by Gottschalk and Mo¢ t.58
While the extent to which the model can match the evolution of stylised facts is
remarkable, Ljungqvist and Sargent do not provide any direct evidence on the variable
driving their model, namely the mean and variance of the immediate human capital
losses su¤ered by laid-o¤workers. This is pointed out by Nickell et al. (2005), who also
argue that there seems to be no evidence for increase in the rates of job-destruction,
which could provide a rationale for the increase in the immediate loss of human capital
assumed by Ljungqvist and Sargent.59
1.2.4. Turbulence in the Presence of Endogenous Separation
Den Haan et al. (2001,2005) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) reconsider the the
ability of turbulence to explain increases in unemployment within a simple matching
model. Thus the model sketched above is modied in the following ways. The number
of newly formed employment relationships is determined by a homogenous-of-degree-
one matching function. Employment relationships consist of one rm and one worker.
As the number of rms and workers is xed, so is the matching probability. The
productivity z of a newly formed relationship is drawn from a continuous distribution,
where vi (z) denotes the distribution function and i denotes the skill level of the worker,
which may be high or low. It is assumed that vh (z) < vl (z), i.e. the distribution
of z for high skilled workers stochastically dominates the distribution for low skilled
workers. Each period an employment relationship persists, with a xed probability,
there will be a new draw from vi (z) : Furthermore, with a xed probability, employed
58See Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), p. 542
59See Nickell et al. (2005), p.13.
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low skilled workers will become high skilled workers. Employment relationships may
be exogenously destroyed with a xed probability.60
Unlike Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), the wage payment in each relationship is
determined via Nash bargaining between the worker and the rm after the new value
of z has been observed by both parties. Thus employment relationships may also break
up endogenously because the bargaining surplus turns negative due to an unfavourable
draw of z.61
The main di¤erence between Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) and Den Haan et al.
(2001,2005) lies in whether endogenous separation can trigger skill loss. Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2004) assume that only exogenously laid o¤ workers face skill loss with
a xed probability d;x (the degree of turbulence), while Den Haan et al. (2001,2005)
allow skill loss to occur in the event of endogenous separation as well with a proba-
bility d, where d = "d;x and " is a small fraction. Accordingly, in Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2004), turbulence continues to operate in a very similar fashion to Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998). An increase in turbulence increases the share of workers entering
unemployment with high benets (due to a high past skill level and high past earnings)
but a low skill level and thus low earnings potential. If matched to a rm, their high
benet level means that they enter bargaining with a high outside option. It is then
quite likely that the realisation of z is too low for the bargaining surplus to turn positive
and thus the relationship is not formed. Accordingly, these workers have a low hazard
rate of gaining employment. Thus as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), an increase in
60See Den Haan et al. (2005), p. 1363.
61See Den Haan et al. (2005), p. 1363.
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turbulence depresses the overall hazard rate, increases average unemployment duration
and the average unemployment rate.62
Den Haan et al. (2005) show that these results change dramatically even for a
very small probability of skill loss following an endogenous separation. For " = 0:03,
the unemployment-turbulence relationship turns weakly negative, while for " = 0:05
more strongly so. This is due to declining endogenous separation among highly skilled
workers. Since workers are aware that terminating the employment relationship can
have strong adverse consequences for their future earnings due to the possibility of a
skill downgrade, they are willing to accept lower wages in case z takes a low value. In
other words, higher turbulence lowers the disagreement point of highly skilled workers
and thus lowers the reservation value of z, thus lowering endogenous separation of highly
skilled workers. This channel comes to dominate the channel emphasized by Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998, 2004) and thus the overall unemployment rate declines.63
Thus the unemployment-turbulence relationship turns out to be highly sensitive
to whether skill loss is allowed to happen in the event of an endogenous separation.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) justify out ruling this possibility as follows: "We see
quitters as people who are secure in their skills and inspired to change jobs to take
advantage of evident opportunities to make better use of their current skills".64 How-
ever, Den Haan et al. (2005) argue that "the quit/ layo¤ distinction is completely
arbitrary in the context of Nash bargaining" since workers and rms mutually agree to
terminate their relationship after observing the draw of z. Correspondingly, "exogenous
separations can be viewed as responses to changes in z such that the surplus becomes
62See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), pp. 465-467. As in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), the average
inow rate into unemployment is not a¤ected.
63See Den Haan et al. (2005), pp. 1372-1374, and p. 1361.
64Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), p. 462.
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permanently negative. Viewed in this way, there is no fundamental distinction, but
only a quantitative di¤erence, between exogenous and endogenous separation, as both
are optimal responses to a deterioration in z. This view accords with our perturbation
experiment, where the probability of skill loss after and endogenous separation is a
(small) fraction of the probability of skill loss after an exogenous one." They add that
labelling endogenous separation as employee quits is a departure from the established
search and matching literature.65
1.3. Evidence on Endogenous Persistence and Unit Roots in
Unemployment
Amain motivation for the models developed in chapters two and four is the evidence
for high endogenous persistence in European unemployment and lower endogenous per-
sistence in the United States. In particular, there has been an ongoing discussion over
the last two decades about whether unemployment has a unit root. Taken at face value,
a unit root in unemployment does not appear plausible since it would imply that unem-
ployment could in principle become negative or could exceed 100%. Thus if unit root
behaviour is detected, it should be interpreted either as a local linear approximation to
a global non-linear and stable process or as evidence for very high unemployment per-
sistence indistinguishable from a unit root. Thus we view such evidence as a motivation
to develop models which produce signicant unemployment persistence.
Following Camarero et al. (2006), tests of the null of a unit root hypothesis against
the alternative of stationarity or trend stationarity, can be divided into three groups.
The rst one consists of classical ADF type tests. The second group tests for the unit
65Den Haan et al. (2005), pp. 1374-1377.
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root in the presence of structural breaks. The third group tests for a unit roots in a
panel of countries.
An early example of the rst group are Blanchard and Summers (1986), who reject
the unit root for the United States but fail to do so for France, Germany and the United
Kingdom. Indeed, today a broad consensus in the literature says that applying such
tests to EU (or EEA) countries almost uniformly leads to a failure to reject the unit
root, while the unit root tends to be rejected in the United States.66.
However, unit root-like behaviour of a variable might in fact be generated by a
stationary process with a structural break as shown by Perron (1989). Hence if one
estimates an autoregressive equation without a break, the estimate of the autoregressive
coe¢ cient will be biased towards unity, rendering a failure to reject the unit root quite
likely. The location of the break is somewhat arbitrary and could itself be the source
of bias. Perron suggests to base the break location on graphical inspection of the series
and historical events representing shocks which can be safely considered exogenous,
which is followed by Mitchell (1993). Roed (1997) surveys this and other early tests
along these lines and concludes that the results found using simple ADF tests continue
to hold.67 More recently, this consensus has been partly challenged by tests basing the
break location on the unemployment data itself using statistical algorithms. Papell et
al. (2000) test the unit root hypothesis for 16 OECD countries for unemployment data
spanning from 1955 to 1997.68 They allow for one structural break, the date of which is
chosen in order to minimise the t-statistic on lagged unemployment after the break and
a constant have been removed from the data.69 This procedure of course maximises the
66See Camarero et al. (2006), pp. 168-169.
67See Roed (1997), p. 408.
68See Papell et al. (2000), p. 310. The countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA.
69See Papell et. al. (2000), p. 311.
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likelihood that the null is rejected. The unit root is rejected in Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
They fail to reject the unit root in Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, while in Ireland, it is rejected only at the 10% level. Hence even when allowing
for a structural break, the unit root can not be rejected in most of the bigger European
economies with a history of high unemployment. However, the estimated autoregressive
coe¢ cients in the countries where the unit root has been rejected are quite low.
Papell et al. (2000) then search for multiple breaks in those countries where the
unit root was rejected and detect 20 signicant breaks, out of which 18 are positive.
The United States have one positive and one negative break. Furthermore, the positive
breaks are clustered in times of recession like for instance those at the beginning of the
1980s.70 The authors conclude their results are "in accord with the view that, especially
for Europe, increases in unemployment during recessions have lead to increase in long
term unemployment."71 Camarero et al. (2006) also conduct a unit root test with
multiple structural breaks and o¤er the same interpretation of the break location.72
Thus these results can be seen as motivation for a theory purporting that aggregate
demand uctuations can have long lasting e¤ects on unemployment, even though a
simple autoregressive process in unemployment does not always seem to be a good
approximation to the underlying data generating process.
Arestis et al. (2000) conduct a very similar test on quarterly data from 23 OECD
countries stretching for most countries from 1960 to between 1995 and 1997.73 They
70Eight occur during 1973-1975, ve from 1980 to 1982 and three from 1988 to 1991.
71See Papell et al. (2000), p. 314.
72See Camarero et al. (2006), pp. 178-179 and p. 180.
73The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United States and the United Kingdom.
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nd that the unit root is not rejected in 11 countries, namely Austria, France, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the USA. For Portu-
gal, Italy and New Zealand, the result is sensitive to how the lag length is chosen. If the
method leading to more lags is chosen, the unit root is not rejected in Italy and New
Zealand.74 The unit root is unambiguously rejected in Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the UK. For Belgium and
Denmark, the estimated persistence coe¢ cients amount to 0.976, while for Germany,
the estimate is still consistent with a value of 0.935.
Moreover, we would like to note that the two studies from the literature on the
relationship between labour market institutions and unemployment which include a
lagged dependent variable (i.e. Nickell et al. (2002, 2005) and IMF (2003)) can be
interpreted as tests for endogenous persistence (if not a unit root) in unemployment in
the presence of structural breaks, where the latter have a strong theoretical motivation
rather than a purely statistical one. As was mentioned above, using annual data, the
coe¢ cient on lagged unemployment are 0.86 and 0.8, respectively, which is a substantial
degree of persistence.
The third approach is motivated by the well known nding that standard unit root
tests have low power against stationary alternatives in small samples. Testing the
unit root hypotheses in a panel context promises to increase power by making use of
cross sectional information. For instance, Song and Wu (1998) test for a unit root
in a panel of 15 OECD countries on quarterly data stretching form 1972 to 1992.75
They use a test developed by Levin and Lin (1992) which restricts the coe¢ cient on
lagged unemployment to be the same for all countries in the panel to improve power
74See Arestis et al. (2000), p. 402, table 1.
75The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, U.K. and USA.
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while allowing for country specic serial correlation, country specic and time specic
e¤ects.76 They reject the unit root at the 10% level with only country specic e¤ects and
at the 5% level with both country and time specic e¤ects. They estimate the coe¢ cient
on lagged unemployment as 0.976 and 0.957, respectively, which is clearly substantial.77
Leon-Ledesma (2002) tests for a unit root in a panel of 51 US states and a panel of 12
EU countries using quarterly data from 1985 to 1999.78 He uses an IPS test where the
null is a unit root among all individuals in the panel, while the alternative says that at
least some individuals have stationary unemployment rates. There is no cross country
restriction on the speed of mean reversion under the alternative. As shown by Im et al.
(2003), allowing for this amount of heterogeneity reduces size distortions while it also
increases power relative to the Levin and Lin (1992) test.79 Applying the IPS test to
the European panel, he nds that the unit root is not rejected at the 10% level, while
he is able to reject the unit root in the panel of US states.80 Camarero and Tamarit
(2004) test for a unit root in 19 OECD countries on annual data stretching from 1956
to 2001.81 They use a SURADF test developed by Breuer (1999) which allows for allow
for heterogeneous serial correlation, contemporaneous correlations among errors across
individuals and di¤erent autoregressive parameters for each individual. Unlike the panel
tests discussed so far, however, it allows to test the unit root for each individual country
in the panel.82 While the unit root is rejected in the United States, it is not rejected
for Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, New Zealand and Switzerland, while it is
76See Song and Wu (1998), p. 184.
77On an annual basis, this amounts to 0.91 and 0.84, respectively.
78The countries are Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and UK.
79See Leon-Ledesma, p. 98.
80See Leon-Ledesma (2002), p. 101.
81The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.
82See Camarero and Tamarit (2004), p. 415.
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rejected for France and Spain only at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. Chang et al.
(2005) apply the same test to a to annual data stretching from 1961 to 1999 from ten
European countries.83 They reject the unit root only in Belgium and the Netherlands
at the 5% and 10% level, respectively, while the unit root is not rejected in Denmark,
Finland, France, Norway, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and the UK.
To sum it up, even though unit root tests using endogenously determined structural
breaks and to some extend also panel unit root tests indicate that unit roots in European
unemployment seem to be less widespread than previously thought there still seems
to be quite a bit of evidence in favour of a unit root in unemployment or at least
high endogenous persistence in Europe, especially in the bigger continental European
economies. Among the post-1997 studies discussed above which are able to discriminate
between Europe and the United States, the unit root in unemployment was not rejected
for Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands in three out of four,
ve out of ve, four out of ve, two out of four, three out of ve and three out of
ve studies testing for unit roots in these countries. Furthermore, for both Spain and
Ireland one rejection is only signicant at the 10% level. Interestingly, three out of three
studies did not reject the unit root in Japan. Furthermore, in those studies featuring
structural breaks, virtually all positive breaks are located during recessions, which is
consistent with a model generating long lasting e¤ects of aggregate demand uctuations
on unemployment.
83Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the UK. Note
that apart from Norway, all these countries where also considered by Camarero and Tamarit (2005).
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1.4. Monetary Policy and the NAIRU
This section summarizes three papers by Ball which try to establish a relationship
between the monetary and macroeconomic policy stance and changes in the NAIRU in
a set of 20 OECD countries during the 1980s and to some extend subsequently as well.
Ball (1996) and Ball (2007) ask whether there exists a negative relationship between
changes in ination and changes in the NAIRU. Just as in the approach of Jackman
et al. (1991), an increase in ination is seen as evidence that unemployment is below
the NAIRU due aggregate demand pressures. With some sort of hysteresis, this would
increase the NAIRU itself. These papers are discussed in the following section. In
section 1.4.2, we turn to Ball (1999), which focuses mainly the relationship between the
change in the short term real interest rate during recessions and subsequent changes
in the NAIRU. In Ball (1996, 1999), the analysis follows the OECD Jobs study in
constructing the NAIRU data, while in Ball (2009) uses a method developed by Ball
and Mankiw (2002).84
A general problem with Balls analysis is that it lacks a well specied theoretical
model which could more tightly motivate the way he looks at the relationship between
disinations and real interest rates on the one hand and NAIRU movements on the
other. However, this thesis develops theoretical models which are able to replicate
some of his empirical ndings.
84See Ball (1996), p.3 and Ball (2009), p. 7.
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1.4.1. The Relationship between the Change in Ination and the Change in
the NAIRU
Ball uses two measures of ination dynamics: The size of the disination from 1980 to
1990 and the length of the longest disination during that period. Those matter because
in standard NAIRU models, the former is related to the size of the unemployment
increase, while the latter indicates for how long the actual unemployment rate exceeded
the NAIRU. Ball also points towards empirical evidence saying that slower disinations
cause higher cyclical output losses.85 He squares the length of disinations but gives
no further justication for that other than this resulted from "experimentation with
functional forms".
Balls preferred regressions features the change in the NAIRU as dependent variable
and the interaction between benet duration and the policy stance as independent
variables. From the labour market hysteresis point of view, one would expect a fall
of unemployment below the NAIRU to have a greater e¤ect if unemployment benets
are paid for a long time. A longer benet duration will cause less enthusiastic search
activity among the newly unemployed, thus increasing the time required to nd a
job. This will increase skill loss and also reduce the competitive pressure on insiders
bargaining with rms over wages. Furthermore, longer benets facilitate the process of
becoming accustomed to an unemployment lifestyle, thus enhancing the reduction in
search activity.86
Hence Ball considers interactions of benet duration with the ination decrease and
squared length. This yields an R2 between 0.67 and 0.75, depending on whether both
interactions are included or whether only the change in ination is interacted with
85See Ball (1996), pp. 6-7.
86See Ball (1996), p. 13.
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benet duration. Ball concludes that while with the amount of data available it is
not possible to decide which specication is superior, "a broad conclusion is robust:
the explanatory power of macro policy variables increases greatly when we account for
interaction with benet duration."87
Ball then subjects this result to a series of robustness experiments, all of which
basically conrm his original conclusions.88 Most notably, he tries to show that the
correlation between the change in the NAIRU and the change in ination represents
a causal relationship rather than increases in the NAIRU and ination driven by an
unobserved third variable which subsequently lead to large disinations parallel to the
rise in the NAIRU with no causal relationship between the two.89 All in all, Balls
results seem quite supportive to the hypothesis that monetary policy, to the extent
that it is responsible for the disinations in the sample, indeed has an e¤ect on the
NAIRU.
In a more recent paper, Ball (2009) examines the relationship between major changes
in ination and major changes in the NAIRU over the period from 1980 to 2007 in a
simple fashion.90 He rst denes episodes of major NAIRU changes as periods during
which the NAIRU moves in the same direction and which also involve a change in
the NAIRU of at least three percentage points within a period of ten years (or less).91
Using this denition, he identies eight episodes of NAIRU increases and nine episodes
of NAIRU decreases.92 For each of these episodes, he looks for large changes in ination,
dened as those exceeding three percentage points.
87Ball (1996), p. 12.
88These includes using and HP estimate of the NAIRU and a procedure to account for an imperfect
purge of cyclical unemployment out of the NAIRU measure. See Ball (1996), pp. 13-15.
89See Ball (1996), p. 16-17.
90Trend ination is measured as a centred nine quarter moving average, see Ball (2009), p. 16.
91See Ball (2007), p. 14.
92See Ball (2009), p. 15.
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Ball then shows how the episodes of NAIRU increases and decreases are associated
with changes in ination. Six out of eight episodes of NAIRU increases involve major
disinations and no ination run-up. Two countries (Sweden and New Zealand) each
involve two disinations and one run up in between. The size of the disinations
are in both countries larger than the intervening run-up, and the overall change in
ination over the three periods is highly negative in each case. Ball therefore views
these countries as having disinationary regimes overall.93 He concludes that "if you
nd an episode with a NAIRU increase, it is always an episode with a major disination.
To put the same result in a di¤erent way, a major disination is a necessary condition
for a NAIRU increase."94 He adds that "the reverse result does not hold: a disination
is not su¢ cient for a NAIRU increase."95
The picture is more complex for episodes of NAIRU decreases. Out of the nine
episodes of NAIRU decreases, only ve include at least one ination run-up, and four of
these include one disination as well. However, Ball notes that the ination run-ups and
disinations are of familiar sizes and thus the disinations where not "overwhelmed" by
larger disinations.96 Furthermore, four countries experience decreases in the NAIRU
without major changes in ination as dened by Ball. Ball notes all of these NAIRU
decreases were preceded by large increases in the NAIRU and only partly reversed these
increases.97 Ball interprets this as suggesting that "hysteresis e¤ects are long lived but
not permanent. Tight monetary policy causes a rise in unemployment that lasts a long
time, but eventually unemployment starts falling even if ination is stable."98 Thus
93See Ball (2009), p. 17.
94See Ball (2009), pp. 17-18.
95See Ball (2009), p. 18.
96See Ball (2009), p.19.
97See Ball (2009), p. 20.
98Ball (2009), p. 20.
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an increase in ination is a necessary condition for a decrease in the NAIRU if "mean
reversion is not at work."
Finally, Ball looks at the ination run-up/ NAIRU change relationship the opposite
way. There are 13 ination run-ups over the sample period. Ball excludes four of
them either because the countries involved are not able to experience a major decline
in the NAIRU due to its low level (Japan and Switzerland) or the ination run-ups
are interruptions of overall disinationary regimes.99 This leaves nine ination run-
ups, seven of which occurred during NAIRU decreases. The two that do not involve
the smallest "major" disinations in the sample. Ball concludes that "With some
qualications, an ination run-up is su¢ cient for a NAIRU decrease."100 Ball (1999)
provides further evidence for a relationship between NAIRU reductions and ination
run-ups for 10 OECD countries between 1985 and 1997.101
1.4.2. Short-term Interest Rates and the NAIRU in the 1980s
Ball then turns towards the role of monetary easing as measured by interest rates
during the deep recessions of the early 1980s. At rst, he focuses on the policies of six
countries (United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany). Those
countries had very di¤erent outcomes both in the development of actual unemployment
and the NAIRU. All those countries went into two recessions during the 1980-1984
period, with the exception of Germany, which had only one. Ball denes a recession as
two quarters of falling GDP in row or a fall of GDP exceeding 2% in any quarter.102
However, while in the United States and Canada, actual unemployment rose sharply
99The former two countries are Japan and Switzerland. The latter two country/ ination-run-up pairs
are the aforementioned Swedish and New Zealand episodes
100Ball (2009), p.22.
101See Ball (1999), pp. 212-220.
102See Ball (1999), p. 193.
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but returned to its pre-recession value during the eight years following the pre-recession
peak or even fell below this value (as in the USA), in the European countries (including
the UK), unemployment remained between 3.8 percentage points and 5.8 percentage
points higher than at the pre-recession peak.103
The turnarounds in unemployment in the North American countries were driven by
strong recoveries pushing output growth above trend in the quarters especially after the
second recession. These recoveries ensure that long run average growth rates across the
two recessions, where Ball denes the 20 quarter average beginning at the pre-recession
peak of the rst recession as "long run", are close to estimates of potential output
growth for those countries, whereas the long run growth rates for the European countries
remain substantially below theirs.104 At the same time, the reduction in ination in
the European countries were not substantially larger as after some time ination just
stopped falling although unemployment was still high. The average ination reduction
in the four European countries exceeds the average ination reduction in the North
American ones by just 2.3 percentage points.105 Correspondingly, OECD estimates of
the NAIRU show substantial increases for the four European Countries (between 2.4
and 3.3 percentage points) during the ve years following the pre-recession peak while
the NAIRU actually slightly declines during that period in Canada and more strongly
in the United states.106
Ball then shows that the central banks of the two North-American countries reacted
much more forcefully to the unfolding recessions than the four European countries. He
measures the policy response by calculating the cumulative change in short-term real
103See Ball (1999), p. 201.
104See Ball (1999), pp. 199-200.
105See Ball (1999), p. 202.
106See Ball (1999), pp. 202-204.
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and nominal interest rates between the pre-recession peak and the quarter after the
trough for each recession. The relevant ination rate is calculated using the average of
two four quarter moving averages of present and past ination rates.107 Ball summarizes
the results as follows: "In the four recessions in the NA2 [Canada and the United
States, A.R.], the total change in the real interest rate from the peak to the quarter
after the trough ranges from -1.4 to -5.4 percentage points, with an average of -3.4
percentage points. In the seven recessions in the E4[United Kingdom, France, Italy,
Germany, A.R.], there is always less easing of policy, and often[UK, France 80-81] even
a tightening: the change in the real interest rate ranges from -1.1 to +2.6 percentage
points, with an average of +0.2 percentage points."108 Ball shows that these di¤erences
are mostly due to di¤erent evolution of nominal interest rates and thus are caused by
monetary policy.109 Hence it seems that those countries experiencing no increase in the
NAIRU also pursued a stronger countercyclical monetary policy.
Ball then moves to a larger sample of 19 OECD countries in order to check whether
these conclusions carry over and to control for the e¤ect of benet duration, for the
reasons discussed in the previous subsection.110 For a lack of data, he now uses annual
rather than quarterly output gures. This requires new identication procedures for
recessions and the stance of monetary policy. The former is now dened as one or
more consecutive years of growth below one percent a year, while the latter is measured
by largest cumulative decrease in any part of the recessions rst year, or the average
107See Ball (1999), pp. 193-196. Ball reports that he experimented with both t-3 through t and t-4 to
t-1 averages. The former he considers to be more commonly used in the literature but criticizes for the
fact that the period t ination rate is unknown in period t. He reports that the "broad conclusions"
of his analysis remain una¤ected by the choice of the ination rate but uses an average of the two in
the paper.
108Ball (1999), p. 196.
109See Ball (1999), pp. 194-196.
110See Ball (1999), pp. 203-204.
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of the largest cumulative decreases from each recession in case the country had two
recessions.111 Ball then uses this measure of policy and benet duration to explain two
variables: the change in the NAIRU from the peak before the rst recession until ve
years after the peak, and this change divided by the change in actual unemployment
over the same time period. The latter variable is called degree of hysteresis and accounts
for the fact that the severity of recessions and thus the increase in actual unemployment
vary over the sample and hence one would observe di¤erent increases in the NAIRU
even if actual unemployment fed into the NAIRU to the same extent in all countries, i.e.
if monetary policy and benet duration had been the same.112 In both equations, both
the easing variable and the benet duration variable are individually signicant. Fit is
substantially better when the degree of hysteresis is used as a dependent variable, with
an adjusted R2 of 0.62 as opposed to 0.43. This is in line with the fact mentioned above,
namely that the countries in the sample experienced recessions of di¤ering severity.
Concerning the quantitative impact of the two variables on the degree of hysteresis,
Ball points out that "The coe¢ cient on maximum easing implies that raising that
variable from 0 to 6 (Swedens value, the highest in the sample) reduces the degree
of hysteresis by 0.54. Reducing the duration of unemployment benets from indenite
to half a year reduces the degree of hysteresis by 0.35. Thus policymakers can reduce
hysteresis through both macroeconomic and labour market policy, and the former has
somewhat larger e¤ects."113 Hence it seems that the e¤ect of monetary policy on the
NAIRU in the 80s is robust to di¤erent specications of the policy stance.
111Ball notes that his dating criterion for recessions yields only two countries with two recessions and
thus is stricter than the one used with quarterly data. See Ball (1999), p. 205.
112See Ball (1999), p. 205-206.
113Ball (1999), p. 207.
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Stockhammer and Sturn (2008) extend this part of Balls analysis in four ways.
Firstly, they extend the sample to range from 1980 to 2003. Secondly, they use quarterly
rather than annual data to measure the period of recession, the degree of hysteresis and
the reaction of monetary policy. The degree of hysteresis is now given by the increase
in the NAIRU during the ve years following the business cycle peak divided by the
greatest increase in actual unemployment from the quarter before the recession to at
most 18 quarters later. The response of monetary policy is measured by the cumulated
change of the ex post short-term real interest rate per quarter between the rst quarter
of the recession and the second quarter after the recession. Thirdly, they control for
a larger set of labour market institutions and nally, they conduct a set of robustness
checks.114 They nd that in the various specications they estimate, monetary easing
almost always has a highly signicant and quantitatively substantial e¤ect on the degree
of hysteresis, with the coe¢ cient on monetary easing ranging between 0.3 and 0.85.115
This is substantially above Balls (1999) estimate.
1.5. Conclusion
This chapter motivates the theoretical research conducted in the following chap-
ters. For that purpose, we rst critically examine what we consider the two leading
mainstream approaches trying to explain the evolution of unemployment across time in
advanced OECD countries and the fact that unemployment has persistently increased
in many European countries but has not done so in the United States. The rst of
these is the macroeconometric work inspired by Jackman et al. (1991) trying to explain
changes in unemployment via changes in labour market rigidities, also referred to as
114See Stockhammer and Sturn (2008), p. 2 and p. 5.
115See Stockhammer and Sturn (2008), pp. 8-15 and Table 1 and 2 at the end of the paper.
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labour market institutions. We identify the following problems. First, the ability of
changes in labour market institutions to explain the evolution of unemployment across
time is limited, especially for several high unemployment European countries. This
seems to be partly related to the fact that in many countries institutions have not
changed very much. Furthermore, there appear to be robustness issues and problems
of reverse causality: Some institutions like the generosity of unemployment benets
appear to have changed in response to increasing unemployment.
In response to the rst of these issues, Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2004) develop
models able to generate an increase in unemployment for a given level of institutions.
In their framework unemployment benets interacts with "microeconomic turbulence",
where the latter is dened as the probability that a worker su¤ers substantial skill loss
following an exogenous separation. An increase in turbulence increases unemployment
in an economy where unemployment compensation forms a large fraction of income
in the previous job but will not a¤ect unemployment in an economy where benets
are absent. The interaction of benets and turbulence pushes a large share of workers
into benet traps from which they have no incentive to escape. However, den Haan
et al. (2005) show that this result is not robust against allowing skill loss linked to
endogenous separations, even if the probability of this to happen is only a tiny fraction
of the probability of skill loss following an exogenous separation. We conclude from this
that causes of large swings in OECD unemployment are by no means well understood
and that the development of a new theory explaining such swings is called for. This is
the overall goal of this thesis.
We then turn our attention to an additional set of empirical ndings surrounding
the unemployment nexus which we aim to explain. Section 1.3 examines the time series
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evidence on endogenous persistence and unit roots in unemployment. Although there is
some controversy, there is quite a bit of evidence consistent with a unit root or at least
high endogenous persistence in a set of large Western European countries with a history
of high unemployment, including Germany, France, Italy and Spain. By contrast, for
the United States, the unit root is rejected most of the time.
Studies which are more likely to reject the unit root even in the aforementioned
countries are those allowing for structural breaks. While allowing for structural breaks
makes the unit root more likely to be rejected even in many European countries, vir-
tually all positive breaks are located during recessions. This is consistent with a model
generating long lasting e¤ects of aggregate demand uctuations and thus of monetary
policy on unemployment.
Section 1.4 examines Balls OECD evidence surrounding the relationship between
the NAIRU on the one hand and the movement of ination on the other. Ball shows
that a major disination seems to be a necessary condition for an increase in the NAIRU
to occur. He also shows that there exists negative relationship between the change in
ination from 1980 to 1990 and the change in the NAIRU during that period. Finally,
he nds a relationship between the amount of monetary easing during the recessions of
the 1980s and the subsequent development of the NAIRU.
Hence we conclude that a new theory of medium run unemployment swings should
be able to shed light on the following set of ndings:
 The medium run swings in unemployment we observe in OECD countries,
particularly the increase in unemployment in several Western continental Eu-
ropean countries since the end of the 1970s. Our discussion in section 1.1
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suggests that the theory should generate medium run swings without relying
on changes in labour market institutions.
 The time series evidence we reviewed in section 1.3 saying that there is high en-
dogenous unemployment persistence, or even unit root behaviour in a number
of Western continental European countries, but much less persistence in the
United States. That means that a temporary shock increasing unemployment
today should have a lasting e¤ect on unemployment long after it has passed.
 The time series evidence that positive structural breaks in unemployment seem
to be predominantly located during recessions. This suggests that aggregate
demand contractions may have long lasting e¤ects on unemployment.
 The evidence produced by Ball that a major disination seems to have been
a necessary condition for a major increase in the NAIRU to have happened.
There is also evidence that the change in ination over a ten year period
is negatively related to the change in the NAIRU during that period. We
discussed these ndings in section 1.4.1
 The evidence produced by Ball that the amount of monetary easing during a
recession is negatively related to the subsequent change in the NAIRU, which
we discussed section 1.4.2.
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CHAPTER 2
Shocks, Monetary Policy and Institutions: Explaining
Unemployment Swings in Europe
This chapter examines the rise in European unemployment by introducing endoge-
nous growth along the lines of Romer (1986) into a New Keynesian model featuring
unemployment. We subject the economy to a one quarter non-serially correlated cost-
push shock and let the central bank disinate the economy. The purpose of the cost
push shock is to create scenario akin to the second oil price shock and its aftermath.
This temporary shock causes a persistent and substantial increase in unemployment,
lasting over 10 to 20 years in an order of magnitude of one percentage points or more.
The model also sheds light on some cross-country di¤erences in the unemployment
experience.
More precisely, we aim to shed light on the following set of stylised facts and em-
pirical ndings (this list is partly a recap of the list in of chapter one):
 Unemployment has increased substantially in many large European economies
since the 1970s. Figure 2.1 displays quarterly unemployment rates from 1975
to 2000 for six selected European Economies and the United States. By con-
trast, there is no such persistent increase in the United States. Furthermore,
note that unemployment increases relatively quickly, as for instance during the
recessions at the beginning of the 80s, but reverts only relatively slowly, incom-
pletely, or not at all. Moreover, there is evidence in favour of high endogenous
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unemployment persistence, or even unit root behaviour in a number of West-
ern continental European countries. That means that any temporary shock
increasing unemployment today will have a lasting e¤ect on unemployment
long after it has passed.
 There has been a decline in the growth rate of labour productivity (measured as
output per hour worked) across OECD countries in the 1980s. This decline has
been substantially larger in Western European economies than in the United
States. Average annual productivity growth in Western European economies
was 1.5% lower in the period from 1981 to 1990 than in the previous decade,
while it declined by merely 0.2% in the United States.1 Skoczylas and Tissot
(2005) estimate changes in trend productivity growth for OECD economies
from 1960 to 2004. They locate declines between one and 3.9% between 1976
and 1985 in nine Western European Economies but none in the United States.
 It is a consistent nding that a decline in productivity growth increases un-
employment. Examples include Bassanini and Duval (2006), Pissarides and
Vallanti (2005), Nickel (2002, 2005), Ball and Mo¢ tt (2001), Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000) and Fitoussi et al. (2000). Three of these studies (Bassanini and
Duval, Blanchard and Wolfers, Fitoussi et al.) explicitly model interactions be-
tween decreases in productivity growth and labour market institutions. They
nd that macroeconomic shocks help to explain the evolution of unemployment
across time while cross country-di¤erences in institutions help to explain why
1The number is based on cross country averages for 1971-1980 and 1981-1990 of the productivity
growth rates of Belgium, Denmark, Western Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Norway. These rates are based on the series on GDP at
constant prices and total hours worked from AMECO (2008).
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in some countries unemployment responds more strongly to macroeconomic
shocks than in others.
 As discussed in chapter one, based on evidence from advanced OECD economies,
Ball (1999) argues that those central banks willing to aggressively lower real
interest rates during the recessions of the early 1980s reduced the subsequent
increase in the NAIRU in their countries.
 Based on OECD evidence, Ball (2009) shows that "if you nd an episode with
a NAIRU increase, it is always an episode with a major disination. To put
the same result in a di¤erent way, a major disination is a necessary condition
for a NAIRU increase."2
 There seems to be a negative medium run relationship between the change
in ination and the change in the NAIRU. This is illustrated in gure 2.2,
which plots the change in the NAIRU against the change in CPI Ination for
21 OECD countries from 1980 to 1990 and from 1990 to 2000. The negative
correlation is not perfect but still obvious: Countries with a larger decrease in
ination su¤ered on average a larger increase in their NAIRU.3 We mentioned
that Ball (1996) is the rst to draw attention to this link and also investigates
it more formally.
Our motivation for addressing these issues by introducing endogenous growth into
a sticky price model can be sketched as follows. The standard way to think about the
e¤ects of a monetary contraction is that it increases unemployment, lowers real wage
growth, unit labour costs of rms and thus ination. The decline in ination induces the
2See Ball (2009), pp. 17-18.
3The data is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook. The countries are Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, U.S.A.
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Figure 2.2. Change in CPI Ination vs. Change in the NAIRU: 1980-
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central bank to lower the nominal and real interest rate, which would work to reverse
the increase in unemployment.
Introducing endogenous growth inhibits the deationary e¤ects of a monetary con-
traction because it implies a strong link between investment and productivity growth. It
thus creates a link between monetary policy and aggregate demand on the one hand and
productivity growth on the other. A monetary contraction -since it lowers investment-
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thus also reduces productivity growth. The decline in productivity growth lowers the
real wage growth rate associated with stable ination. If real wage growth is rigid,
stable ination will then require an increase in the unemployment rate: the NAIRU
increases. The central bank therefore engineers a very slow recovery of aggregate de-
mand and unemployment to prevent an acceleration of ination. The slow recovery of
demand also slows down the recovery of investment and productivity growth.
Thus endogenous growth may be able to create endogenous unemployment persis-
tence: A temporary shock increasing unemployment today -for instance an adverse
cost push shock inducing the central bank to raise the interest rate- may also increase
unemployment in the future. It may also be able to generate a persistent decline in
productivity growth in response to a contraction of the economy. Furthermore, the
response of the central bank to the shock will shape not just the short run, but also
the medium run response of unemployment to the shock. The goal of this chapter is to
explore the quantitative relevance of these mechanisms.
Our approach is in some respects similar to Comin and Gertler (2006) in that they
also incorporate endogenous growth into a general equilibrium model in order to analyse
the causal relationship between short and medium run movements of the economy. In
particular, temporary mark-up shocks have lasting real e¤ects in their model. However,
in their exible price real business cycle model, monetary policy, unemployment and
ination are absent, all of which are our focus of attention.
Our results resemble in some respects those of Sargent and Ljungqvist (1998, 2004,
2007) in that the model proposed here generates an increase in unemployment without
relying on changes in labour market rigidity, while the "level" of labour market rigidity
does matter. However, as we discussed earlier, their approach di¤ers from ours in that
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in their model, unemployment increases via the interaction of unemployment benets
linked to past income and a permanent increase in "microeconomic turbulence".
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 develops a model which broadly
reects the mainstream consensus on the long and short run dynamics of unemployment
as for instance developed by Jackman et al (1991). In this model, a temporary cost
push shock only has a short lived e¤ect on unemployment and the same is true for the
monetary policy response to the shock. We coin this model "Jackman, Layard, Nickell",
or JLN economy. We then add the New Growth extension. Section 2.2 calibrates the
model to Western German data. Section 2.3 compares the second moments of important
variables of the model to German data. Section 2.4 then discusses the response of
the economy to a one quarter cost push shock calibrated to induce a disination of
about 4 percentage points and focuses on the induced evolution of unemployment across
time. It also looks into the tradeo¤s policymakers face between stabilising ination and
stabilising unemployment. Section 2.5 adds a cross-country dimension to our analysis.
First, we vary the size of the cost push shock and record the resulting changes in
ination and the NAIRU over a 10 year horizon. We then compare the di¤erences in
the unemployment response generated by a Bundesbank and a Federal Reserve Policy
rule as estimated by Clarida et al. (1998), and nally we investigate the e¤ects of
di¤erences in real wage rigidity between Europe and the United States. Section 2.6
concludes.
2.1. The Model
In this section we will develop a New Keynesian model with unemployment and
endogenous growth which contributes to explaining the above ndings. To stress the
fact our results stem from the introduction of endogenous growth, we also present an
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otherwise identical model without endogenous growth which we take as the starting
point of our analysis. This is a model to approximate the prevailing consensus on the
relationship between unemployment and the NAIRU. We will refer to this model as the
JLN economy. This consensus says that while unemployment both in the short and in
the long run is determined by aggregate demand, only the NAIRU is consistent with
stable ination. Ination targeting central banks will push unemployment towards this
level. The NAIRU itself will be a¤ected by any variable which directly increases wages
in spite of excess supply in the labour market, increases the pricing power of rms or
reduces the e¢ ciency of the labour market to match jobs to workers4
Sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.4 develop the JLN economy, while section 2.1.5 introduces
endogenous growth.
2.1.1. Households
The representative household is innitely lived and chooses its consumption Ct, end-
of-period holdings of the risk-less bond Bt; investment expenditure It and its next
periods capital stock Kt+1 in order to maximise the expected present value of its
lifetime utility. Ct is a CES consumption, i.e. Ct =
hR 1
0
(ct(i))
( 1)
 di
i 
 1
where ct(i)
denotes the di¤erent varieties in the basket while  denotes the elasticity of substitution
between those varieties. Following Smets and Wouters (2002), we assume external habit
formation in consumption and adjustment costs in investment. The level of habit is
denoted by
habt 1 = jCt 1
4See Nickell et al. (2002), pp. 2-3.
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while investment adjustment costs imply the following capital accumulation equation:
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It

1  S

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

S (0) = 0; S (0)0 = 0; S (0)
00
> 0
Hence only a fraction 1 S (:) of one unit of investment expenditure is actually turned
into additional capital. This fraction decreases in the investment growth rate. The
assumptions on the rst derivative of the S (:) function imply that adjustment costs
vanish when the economy is growing at its steady state growth rate g.5
Following Danthine and Kurmann (2004), the representative household consists of
a continuum of members who might be employed or unemployed but are all allocated
the same level of consumption. Each household member supplies one unit of labour in-
elastically but derives disutility G(et) from the e¤ort et he or she supplies in their job.
The share of unemployed members is the same for each household. These assumptions
imply that although there are unemployed individuals in the economy, it is not necessary
to track the distribution of wealth.
5There are two advantages of assuming investment adjustment costs and external habit formation.
Firstly, it facilitates matching the second moments of investment and consumption, and secondly, it
dampens the on-impact response of unemployment to the cost push shock in the simulation we are
going to perform later, thus making it more reasonable. By contrast, the impact on the longer run
response of unemployment, which is the main focus of this chapter, is rather small.
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The cost of e¤ort function of individual j G(et+i (j)) is of the form
G (et(j))
=
0BB@et(j) 
0BB@ 0 + 1 logwt(j) + 2f (nt)
+3 logwt + 4 logwt 1   5 log bt   8 log (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns))
1CCA
1CCA
2
;
log bt = 6 log (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns)) + (1  6) logwt 1 + 7
f 0 (nt) > 0; 1; 5; 8 > 0; 1 = 6 = 0; 2; 3; 4 < 0; 1 >  3;
where Yt is private sector output. Note that the e¤ort function enters the families
utility separately which implies that it is independent of the budget constraint.
The structure of the cost of e¤ort function is motivated by the idea of "gift ex-
change" between the rm and the worker. The workers gift to the employer is e¤ort.
The employer has to show his appreciation for the employeescontribution by paying an
appropriate wage wt(j). A higher contemporary average wage wt reduces e¤ort because
it represents a "reference level" to which the current employerswage o¤er is compared.
Put di¤erently, it requires the rm to pay a higher wage if it wants to extract the same
amount of e¤ort. A higher average past real wage wt 1 boosts the workers aspira-
tions as well.6 The aggregate employment level of non-overhead workers nt summarizes
labour market tightness. It is thus positively related to the workersoutside working
opportunities, and thus also tends to reduce e¤ort.
The view that wages have a big e¤ect on workers morale and thus productivity
because they signal to the worker how his contribution to the organizational goals
6See Danthine and Kurmann (2004), pp. 111-113. It would be desirable to have the individual workers
past real wage wt (j) in the equation but that would considerably complicate the maximisation problem
of the representative rm dealt with later, so we follow Danthine and Kurman in assuming a dependence
of e¤ort on the average wage. For the same reason we include average productivity rather than the
respective rms productivity.
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is valued is supported by an extensive microeconomic survey conducted by Bewley
(1998). Bewley found that wage changes (in particular wage cuts) seem to be especially
important. Bewley interviewed over 300 business people, labour leaders and business
consultants in search for an explanation why wages are rarely cut in recessions.7 Bewley
(2004) also nds that workers elicit higher e¤ort if unemployment is high, layo¤s are
likely and new jobs are di¢ cult to nd. This motivates a role for nt in the e¤ort
equation.8
The terms bt and (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns)) represent a modication to the Danthine
and Kurman (2004) cost of e¤ort function. bt denotes unemployment income. This
will be chiey unemployment benets and black market income. It tends to lower the
level of e¤ort.9 Workers want to be valued more than someone who receives benets or
does not have a legal job. bt is linked both to past real wages and past productivity in
the private sector, where Yt denotes private sector output. This may reect both the
structure of benets and the manner in which the black market is linked to the o¢ cial
economy. Productivity also has a direct e¤ect on morale and e¤ort as employees desire
their due share of the companiessuccess. Unions might play a role in this to the extent
that they instil a sense of entitlement among employees. Abowd et al. (2001) present
evidence for a relationship between rm level wages and performance measures like
value added and sales per employee. This suggests that there might be a relationship
between e¤ort and productivity.
7See Bewley (1998), pp. 459-490. A discussion of further evidence is Bewley (2004). Bewley also
argues that his ndings contradicts essentially all theoretical justications of real wage rigidity not
based on gift exchange considerations, like implicit contracts, insider outsider models or the e¢ ciency
wage models based on no-shirking conditions.
8See Bewley (2004), p. 10.
9Danthine and Kurman (2007) introduce the benet level as a factor which, ceteris paribus, reduces
e¤ort.
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Some of the household members supply overhead labour. They can be thought of as
the owners of the monopolistically competitive rms. Overhead workers never become
unemployed because no rm can produce without managerial sta¤. Furthermore, a
share ns of the workforce is employed by the government who is assumed to pay the same
wage as the private sector. Government employees are funded by lump sum taxes.10 We
assume that these workers do not contribute to output but perform essential services
without which the economy as a whole could not function, like policing, public transport
and maintaining the infrastructure. All families have the same share of managers and
government employees.11
Hence each period the household solves the following constraint maximisation prob-
lem by optimally choosing Ct; Bt; It; Kt+1 and et :
U = Et
( 1X
i=0
i [u(Ct+i   habt+i 1)  (nt+i   n)G(et+i)]
)
; u0 > 0; u00 < 0(2.1)
s:t: (nt   n)wt + rktKt +
Bt 1
Pt
(1 + it 1) +zt  Ct + It + Bt
Pt
+ Tt and
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It

1  S

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

; S (0) = 0; S (0)0 = 0; S (0)
00
> 0
10The level of the wage of state employees does not matter for the results because we assume lump sum
taxes and a representative household. Checking (2:21) and (2:30) = (2:31) ; which will be derived further
below, reveals that real government expenditures nswt cancel out since they are part of aggregate
demand, but also part of output. The government is assumed to employ workers directly. This implies
that their wages are counted as output of the government at cost. This is what is conventionally done
in the national accounts. Thus the demand generated by the government automatically generates its
own supply, without any direct e¤ect on private sector output.
The representative household will not increase its consumption if the wage of its members employed
by the state increases because the increase in wage income is exactly o¤set by the higher tax burden
and marginal benets and costs of alternative actions are not a¤ected by lump sum taxes.
11The reason for introducing both state employees and overhead workers n is to achieve a reason-
able calibration of steady state values. In the Romer (1986) endogenous growth model, the level of
employment a¤ects the growth rate. This is due to the fact that the marginal product of capital is
an increasing function of employment. The marginal product of capital governs the growth rate by
determining the willingness of households to save. To achieve a reasonable steady state growth rate,
we remove a fraction of the labour force from the "productive" sector by assuming that they perform
necessary tasks without which the productive sector could not operate (managerial work in case of
overhead workers, policing etc. in case of the state employees).
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The second line denotes the budget constraint in real terms, where Pt denotes the price
index of the consumption basket. The households period t real income consists of
real wage income (nt   n)wt earned by the non-overhead workers, where wt denotes
the real wage, interest income on the real value of the risk-less bonds they bought
in the previous period it 1
Bt 1
Pt
, where it denotes the nominal interest rate earned by
holding bonds from period t to period t+1, the operating prots of the monopolistically
competitive rms zt which are accrued by the overhead workers, and rental income rkt
Kt earned from renting the households capital stock to the rms. Households have to
pay lump sum taxes Tt to the government.
Setting up the lagrangian and denoting the lagrange multipliers of the budget con-
straint and the capital accumulation constraint as t and tqt; respectively, yields the
following rst order conditions with respect to consumption, capital and investment:
u0(Ct   habt 1) = Et

u0(Ct+1   habt) 1
1 + t+1

[1 + it](2.2)
t = u
0(Ct   habt 1)
Et
 
t+1r
k
t+1 + t+1qt+1 (1  )

= tqt
tqt

1  S

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

  It
It 1
S 0

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

(2.3)
+Et
"
t+1qt+1

It+1
It
2
S 0

It+1
It
  (1 + g)
#
= t
Note that with this notation, qt denotes the present discounted value of the future
prots associated with buying an additional unit of capital today, also known as Tobins
q.
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The rst order condition with respect to e¤ort is
et(j) = 0 + 1 logwt(j) + 2f (nt) + 3 logwt(2.4)
+4 logwt 1   5 log bt   8 log (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns))
The employer takes this relationship into account and sets the wage as part of his
cost minimisation problem. In section 2.1.3, we show that cost minimisation implies
an equation relating real wage growth positively to employment and negatively to the
lagged private sector labour share.
2.1.2. Price Setting and Nominal Rigidities
Each rm produces one of the variants of the output good in the CES basket. House-
holds spread their expenditures across the di¤erent varieties in the basket in a cost
minimising fashion. Assuming that investment expenditure stretches over these vari-
ants in precisely the same way as consumption demand, we can write the demand for
variant j as yt(i) = Yt

pt(i)
Pt
 
, where pt (i) denotes the price of variety i: Following
Rotemberg (1983) we assume that the representative rm faces quadratic costs if it
alters its individual price ination from a reference level   1. This is the steady state
level of ination in the economy. These costs arise because frequent price changes are
bad for the reputation of the company. Convincing customers to remain with the com-
pany in spite of price volatility is costly. Additional costs arise because deviating from
the "standard" level of ination requires the rm to engage in a costly re-optimisation
process. This has to be carried out by highly paid marketing professionals, while price
changes close to average ination can be decided by lower paid "frontline" sta¤. Both
kinds of costs are likely to increase in the rmsoutput as well. We assume the following
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functional form:
ACt+i(i) =
'
2
(
pt+i(i)
pt+i 1(i)
  )2yt+i(i)
The rm j chooses its price pt+i(j) in order to maximise
1X
i=0
Et

t;t+i

pt+i(i)
Pt+i
yt+i(i) mct+iyt+i(i)  ACt+i(i)

where t;t+i denotes the discount factor used to discount real prots earned in period t+i
back to period t. Note that because households own the rms, we have t;t+i = 
i u0(Ct+i)
u0(Ct) :
Furthermore, note that marginal cost mct+i is the same across all rms, which we will
prove in section 2.1.3. Di¤erentiating with respect to pt(i) and noting that, as all rms
are identical, pt(i) = Pt holds ex post, yields
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  

Pt
Pt 1
+ 
'
2
(
Pt
Pt 1
  )2
+Et

t;t+1'
Yt+1
Yt

Pt+1
Pt
  

Pt+1
Pt

= 0
which is a nonlinear version of the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve. It is, how-
ever, a consistent feature of empirical estimations of Phillips curves that specications
which include lagged ination as well ("hybrid" Phillips curves") perform better than
purely forward looking Phillips Curves. This is because ination has inertia.12 Back-
ward looking elements are easily introduced into the price setting considerations of the
rm by assuming that the reference level of ination does not remain constant over
time. Instead, we assume that it equals last periods ination, i.e. t =
Pt 1
Pt 2
: If the
ination rate becomes higher for several periods, rms will mandate frontline sta¤ to
handle price increases of that size in order to keep costs low. Customers will get used to
12See for instance Gali and Gertler (2000).
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the di¤erent pace of price changes as well, reducing the adverse e¤ect of a given change
in prices on the reputation of the rm. Hence we have
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  Pt 1
Pt 2

Pt
Pt 1
+ 
'
2
(
Pt
Pt 1
  Pt 1
Pt 2
)2
+Et

t;t+1'
Yt+1
Yt

Pt+1
Pt
  Pt
Pt 1

Pt+1
Pt

= 0(2.5)
The experiment we want to conduct later is a disination following an inationary
shock. Ination is brought into the economy by a so-called "cost-push shock" ut widely
used in the New Keynesian literature.13 This shock increases current ination, holding
the values of past ination and marginal costs constant, and is added directly to the
Phillips curve equation:
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

(2.6)
+
'
2
(

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2
) + Et

t;t+1'
Yt+1
Yt

Pt+1
Pt
 

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

Pt+1
Pt

= 0
It is easily shown that up to rst order, this Phillips Curve resembles very closely
specications which are obtained by Woodford (2003) under the assumption of Calvo
contracts and full indexation of the prices of those rms which can not re-optimise prices
to past ination.14 It is a forward looking accelerationist Phillips Curve. If present and
future marginal costs are at their steady state level and present and future values of the
cost push shock are zero, ination will remain constant. It will accelerate or decelerate
otherwise. Hence the model has a well dened NAIRU.
13See for instance Clarida et al. (1999), p.1665 and p. 1667.
14See Woodford (2003), p. 215. In fact, the coe¢ cients on expected future ination and the coe¢ cient
on lagged ination exactly match Woodfordsresults.
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2.1.3. Cost Minimisation and E¢ ciency Wages
The production technology is a Cobb Douglas production function,
Yt(i) = AKt(i)
(TFPtet(i) (nt(i)  n))1 
where the output of rm i Yt(i) depends on the capital stock of rm iKt(i), the e¢ ciency
of its workers et(i) and the number of non-overhead workers nt(i)  n: In the Danthine
and Kurman model (2004), in a rst stage the rm minimises its cost of producing a
given amount of output. Capital and labour are hired in economy-wide factor markets.
However, the rm does not take the real wage as given but sets it taking into account
the relationship between e¤ort and wages given by (2:4).15 Hence the rms problem is:
min
Kt(i);nt(i);wt(i);et(i)
rktKt(i) + wt(i)(nt(i)  n)s:t:Yt(i) = AKt(i)(TFPtet(i) (nt(i)  n))1 
and et(i) = 0 + 1 logwt(i) + 2f (nt) + 3 logwt
+4 logwt 1   5 log bt   8 (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns))
This gives rise to the lagrangian
$ (Kt(i); nt(i); wt(i); et (i) ;mct (i) ; t) = r
k
tKt(i) + wt(i)(nt(i)  n)
+mct (i)
 
Yt(i)  AKt(i)(TFPtet(i) (nt(i)  n))1 

+t
0BB@ et(i)  (0 + 1 logwt(i) + 2f (nt) + 3 logwt)
+4 logwt 1   5 log bt   8 (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns))
1CCA
15See Danthine and Kurman (2004), pp. 114-115.
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The rst order conditions for capital and labour are
rkt = mct (i)
Yt(i)
Kt(i)
wt(i) = (1  )mct (i) Yt(i)
nt(i)  n
where mct(i) and rkt refer to real marginal costs of rm i and the capital rental rate.
It will be shown below that even though all rms set the wage individually, rms will
nd it optimal to set the same wage and the same e¢ ciency level. Dividing the two
rst order conditions gives Kt(i)
nt(i) n =

1 
wt
rkt
: Thus the capital labour ratio is the same
across rms. It is then easily shown using the production function that the same holds
for the output-capital ratio and the output-to-productive labour ratio, implying that
marginal costs are the same across all rms as well. Hence we can write
rkt = mct
Yt
Kt
(2.7)
wt = (1  )mct Yt
nt   ns   n(2.8)
Yt = AKt
(TFPt1 (nt   ns   n))1 (2.9)
Substituting Kt(i)
nt(i) n =

1 
wt
rkt
into equation (2:7) yields
(2.10) mct =
 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1TFPt)1 
Note that we have used the fact that rms nd it optimal to set et(i) = 1, which we
will prove now. The rms rst order conditions with respect to the real wage and e¤ort
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are
nt(i)  n = t1
wt(i)
t = (1  )mct
Yt(i)
et(i)
Combining those with the rst order condition with respect to labour yields et(i) =
1. Substituting this back into the e¤ort function (2:4), we note that, as the rms
wage depends only on aggregate variables which are the same for all rms, it must
indeed hold that wt(i) = wt . We then substitute for log bt, solve for logwt and impose
the balanced growth restriction 5+8 4
1+3
= 1.16 Thus we arrive at a real wage Phillips
Curve with a labour share term:
logwt   logwt 1 = a+ b  f (nt) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

;(2.11)
with a =
0   1 + 57
1 + 3
, b =   2
1 + 3
> 0 and c =  (56 + 8)
1 + 3
< 0
The details of the derivation are given in appendix A.1. Equation (2:11) is very
close to a specication derived by Blanchard and Katz (1999) from intuitively plausible
relationships between average wages, the reservation wage and productivity.17 The
growth rate of the real wage wt is positively related to employment and negatively
to the labour share. The e¤ect of the labour share stems from the direct impact of
16This restriction ensures that steady state employment is constant even though the economy is growing
in the steady state. This does not seem too restrictive; it simply says that an increase in the log of the
time t real wage in the economy (including rm i) has in absolute value the same net e¤ect on e¤ort
(remember we have 1 + 3 > 0) as an increase in the exogenous reference as represented by logwt 1,
log bt and log (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns)) :
17Blanchard and Katz (1999) specify the wage as a function of productivity and the reservation wage,
the latter of which is in turn a convex combination of average wages and productivity, just as bt in our
model.
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productivity on e¤ort 8 and the indirect impact through benets 6. If these are
absent, i.e. 8 = 0 and 6 = 0; we have c=0.
Empirical estimates of (2:29) (usually replacing nt with the unemployment rate) or
variants thereof repeatedly nd c=0 (or even c>0) for the United states but, c<0 for
European countries.18 The di¤erence could be due to the direct e¤ect of productivity
on e¤ort being close to zero in the U.S. but positive in Europe because of a larger
inuence of unions who establish the idea that the reference wage should be linked to
productivity, as is also argued by Blanchard and Katz (1999). Using individual data on
compensation matched with rm level data on performance and inputs, Abowd et al.
(2001) nd that the relationship between rm level wages and performance measures
like value added and sales per employee is stronger in France than in the United States.
One could also imagine that benets are linked more closely to productivity in Europe
because policymakers are more likely to believe in concepts of relative poverty rather
than absolute poverty and therefore would aim to link benets to a countrys overall
income.19
For now we allow f (nt) to take two di¤erent forms: nt and -log(1   nt). The
advantage of the log specication is twofold. First, it has the appeal that wage growth
will become very high if unemployment moves close to zero. In the context of the wider
model, this rules out negative unemployment rates.
The second advantage of the log specication is that it introduces downward rigidity
in the real wage or real wage growth in a crude but simple fashion. There is some
evidence for downward real wage and real wage growth rigidity. For instance, Bewleys
(1998) survey nds that employers are extremely reluctant to cut pay due to the adverse
18See Blanchard and Katz (1999), p.73, Blanchard and Katz (1997), p.62, OECD(1997), p. 21 and
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), pp.484-486.
19See Abowd et al. (2001), pp. 429-433.
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e¤ects on morale. His results do not allow a clear cut distinction of whether it is a
reduction in nominal or in real wages employers deem harmful. However, the fact that
employers mention the adverse e¤ect of a wage decline on the standards of living as
a reason why wage cuts harm morale point suggests a reluctance to implement real
wage cuts.20 Econometric studies trying to detect downward real wage rigidity focus
on the skewness of the distribution of wage changes. They try to gauge the "notional"
distribution which would hold if wages were exible using various approaches. They
then compare the notional to the actual distribution to nd the extent of downward real
wage rigidity. Bauer et al. (2003) investigate nominal wage changes of western German
workers between 1976 and 1997. The lower bound of the nominal wage change for those
individuals subject to real rigidity is allowed to vary over time and to be above the rate
of ination. They nd that the percentage of wage changes constrained by downward
real rigidity varies between 37% and 16% over the period they consider.21 Furthermore,
a large fraction of those constrained workers experience real wage increases.22 The
estimated "sweep up" e¤ect on average wage growth is substantial and varies between
3% in the 70s to less than 1% in the 90s.23 Holden and Wolfsberg (2007) consider
industry wide annual real wage changes for manual workers from seven sectors and 19
OECD countries between 1973 and 1999.24 They measure the degree of downward real
wage rigidity by the fraction of the real wage cuts which would have taken place under
the notional distribution but did not take place because the wage follows the actual
distribution. They nd that in the "core" region (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) 6.3% of all real wage cuts are prevented but only
20See Bewley (1998), p. 477.
21See Bauer et al. (2004), p. 17 and p.37.
22See Bauer et al. (2004), p.15.
23See Bauer et al. (2004), p. 17.
24See Holden and Wolfsberg (2007), p.13.
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2.7% in the "Anglo" (Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) region. The fraction of cuts larger or equal to 2% prevented amounts to
18.8% in the "Core" and to 11.7% in the Anglo region.25
The size of the overhead labour force remains to be determined. Following Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1999), we assume that in the steady state, all economic prot
generated by the monopolistically competitive rm goes to the overhead sta¤. This is
justied because setting up production is impossible without overhead labour and the
rms prot is thus essentially equal to the collective marginal product of its overhead
sta¤. We assume that the overhead sta¤ splits this prot equally. Hence the rm ends
up with zero prots, which eliminates any incentive for market entry. Christiano et
al. (2005) also assume a xed cost of production to eliminate prots among monopo-
listically competitive rms, although they do not specify the origin of the cost.26 The
details of the derivation can be found in appendix A.2.
2.1.4. Monetary Policy
Monetary Policy is assumed to follow a simple Taylor type nominal interest rate rule.
The exact specication will vary across simulations. In the baseline, the nominal interest
rate reacts to current ination, the lagged output gap and the lagged nominal interest
rate:
(2.12) it = (1  )

i+  t +
 Y
4
gpt 1

+ it 1
i;  and gpt denote the long-run real interest rate, the degree of interest rate smooth-
ing and the output gap, respectively.   and  Y denote the long run coe¢ cients on
25See Holden and Wolfsberg (2007), pp. 20-21.
26See Rotemberg and Woodford (2004), p. 17, and Christiano et al. (2005), p. 15.
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ination and the output gap. The central bank responds to the lagged value of the
output gap but the current deviation of ination from its target, which without loss of
generality is assumed to be zero. Note that this implies a zero steady state ination
rate.
There are a couple of advantages associated with characterising monetary policy
via an interest feedback rule like (2:12) rather than a rule determining the money
supply. Firstly, almost all central banks target the interest rate rather than the money
supply.27 Clarida and Gertler (1996) argue that this is true even for the Bundesbank,
in spite of the public focus on monetary targeting. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that
central banks do not control the money supply since the money multiplier varies as the
desired reserve holdings of commercial banks change. Secondly, assuming an interest
rate feedback rule means that we avoid having to make assumptions about money
demand. Thirdly, and most importantly, interest rate feedback rules with interest
rate smoothing have been estimated and have been found to be successful at explaining
interest rate movements in various countries, including Germany.28 Specifying monetary
policy as an interest rate feedback rule thus allows us to calibrate the behaviour of
monetary policy in line with the data by drawing on such estimates. Finally, an interest
rate feedback rule allows us to vary the emphasis the central bank places on output
and ination stabilisation in a simple fashion.
The output gap is the percentage deviation of total output, i.e. private sector plus
the output of government employees, from its natural level. We calculate the output
of government employees by simply adding up their wages, following the convention of
national accounts. We assume that government employees earn the same wage as in the
27See Woodford (2003), pp. 24-31, and Walsh (2003), p. 29.
28See for example Clarida and Gertler (1996), Clarida et al. (1999) and Clausen and Meier (2003).
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private sector. For total output, we then have Outputt = Yt+wtns, while total natural
output is given by Outputnt = Y
n
t + w
n
t n
s. wnt and Y
n
t denote the wage rate and the
private sector output level consistent with natural employment, or the NAIRU. Thus
we have
(2.13) gpt =
Outputt  Outputnt
Outputnt
Outputnt denotes the output level which would set marginal costs equal to its long
run level  1; given the capital stock and the previous periods real wage. As can be
obtained from equation (2:6), this would ensure that in the absence of cost push shocks,
ination is neither rising nor falling. The employment level corresponding to this output
level will be referred to as "natural employment" nnt . The natural levels of output and
employment are derived by rst substituting the equation for the rental on capital (2:7)
into (2:10) and setting mct =  1: The natural levels of output, employment and the
real wage are then given by the values of Y nt n
n
t and w
n
t solving
 1 =
(nnt   ns   n)wnt
A (1  ) (1TFPt)1 Kt
logwnt   logwt 1 = a+ b  (nnt   n) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

Outputnt = AKt
(TFPt1 (n
n
t   ns   n))1  + wnt ns(2.14)
2.1.5. Introducing Endogenous Growth
We introduce endogenous growth following Romer (1986). We assume that investing
rms discover ways to produce more e¢ ciently and that knowledge is a public good.
Therefore total factor productivity TFPt is assumed to be proportional to the aggregate
capital stock rather than the individual rms capital stock. This implies that there are
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now constant returns to capital at the economy wide level, allowing per capita output
to grow. However, there are still decreasing returns to capital at the rm level.
Hence we replace TFPt with Kt in the above equations. The equations for private
sector output and marginal costs are given by
mct =
 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1Kt)1 
(2.15)
Yt = AKt(1 (nt   ns   n))1 (2.16)
while total output is given by
(2.17) Outputt = AKt(1 (nt   ns   n))1  + wtns
The capital stock now has a stronger e¤ect on both marginal costs and output than
in the JLN economy. This can be seen by rst eliminating Yt in equation(2:7) using
(2:9) and then substituting the resulting expression into (2:10) ; which yields
(2.18) mct =
wt
A(1  ) (nt   ns   n)  (1TFPt)1 Kt
for the JLN economy and, after again setting TFPt = Kt
(2.19) mct =
wt
A(1  ) (nt   ns   n)  1 1 Kt
for the New Growth economy. Hence an increase in the capital stock by 1% for a
given employment level reduces marginal costs by 1%: In the absence of endogenous
growth the e¤ect is only %: The unitary elasticity of marginal costs with respect to
the capital stock in the New Growth economy implies that the real wage-to-capital ratio
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drives marginal cost for a given level of employment. We will return to this relationship
in section 2.4.
(2:18) and (2:19) also reveal the intuition for this result. In each equation, the
denominator is the marginal product of labour. Hence (2:18) and (2:19) express mar-
ginal cost as marginal unit labour costs. An increase of the capital stock increases the
marginal product of labour by % in the JLN economy but by 1% in the New Growth
economy. This is of course due to the fact that there are decreasing returns to capital
in the JLN economy but constant returns in the New Growth economy.
Furthermore, Y nt ; n
n
t and w
n
t are now determined by
 1 =
(nnt   ns   n)wnt
A (1  ) (1)1 Kt
(2.20)
logwnt   logwt 1 = a+ b  (nnt   n) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

Y nt = AKt(1 (n
n
t   ns   n))1  +wnt ns
The assumption that technological progress is simply a by-product of capital ac-
cumulation is clearly a strong simplication. However, the capital stock externality
assumption can thus be seen as a convenient short cut to a model with more realis-
tic microfoundations but similar implications at the aggregate level. Acemoglu (2009)
notes that also a more explicit modelling of technological change frequently leads to lin-
earity of output in the produced input, for instance in expanding variety type models.29
A famous example are expanding-variety-type models, like the one developed by Romer
(1990).30 Furthermore, Comin and Gertler (2006) show in that their real business cy-
cle expanding-varieties-type endogenous growth model, a temporary adverse mark-up
29See Acemoglu (2009), p. 402 and p. 440.
30See Acemoglu (2009), p. 440.
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shock reduces not only output but TFP growth. This is because the drop in output
lowers R&D investment and expenditure on the adoption of new technologies.31 The
capital stock externality we assume produces a similar relationship: A reduction in
output will lower employment, the marginal product of capital, capital stock growth
and thus total factor productivity growth.
2.1.6. The Aggregate Equations
This section summarises the models aggregate equations developed above for conve-
nience of the reader and introduces explicit functional forms where that has not yet
been done above. As many of the economys variables are growing in the steady state
(Yt;Ct; It; wt; Kt), simulation of the model requires normalising those variables with a
cointegrated variable. It is very convenient from a technical point of view to normalise
with respect to the capital stock. How that is done is shown in appendices I and III to
this chapter.
Aggregate demand is the sum of consumption, investment, the amount of price
adjustment costs and government expenditure:
(2.21) ADt = Ct + It +
'
2
(t   t 1)2Yt + wtns
We will assume logarithmic utility so that the consumption Euler equation becomes
(2.22) 1= (Ct   habt 1) =  (1 + it)Et

1
(Ct+1   habt) (1 + t+1)

The level of habit is given by
habt 1 = jCt 1
31See Comin and Gertler (2006), pp. 542-543.
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Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005), we assume
S

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

=

2

It
It 1
  (1 + g)
2
:32
Hence Investment expenditures is governed by the following equations:
t =
1
Ct   habt 1
Et
 
t+1r
k
t+1 + t+1qt+1 (1  )

= tqt
tqt
" 
1  
2

It
It 1
  (1 + g)
2!
  It
It 1


It
It 1
  (1 + g)
#
(2.23)
+Et
"
t+1qt+1

It+1
It
2


It+1
It
  (1 + g)
#
= t
while capital accumulation is given by
(2.24) Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It
 
1  
2

It
It 1
  (1 + g)
2!
The capital rental is given in both models by
(2.25) rkt = mct
Yt
Kt
32The functional form we use has the following advantages:
 It fulls the requirements stated in equation (2:1), for instance convexity of S(.) in the
investment growth rate (which is necessary for a maximum to exist).
 Using a second order polynomial in the investment growth rate makes for algebraic conve-
nience.
 The recursive solution of the model is approximated (only) up to second order anyway. This I
implies that the quantitative results would not be a¤ected by using a higher order polynomial
for S(.). For instance, even with the chosen second order polynomial, in equations (2:23)
and (2:24), investment (or the investment growth rate) occurs up to third order. But the
fact that we only take a second order Taylor approximation means that the presence of a
third order term does not matter. Thus using a higher order polynomial would not make a
di¤erence (perhaps kappa would have to be chosen slightly di¤erently).
 The fact that the recursive solution of the model is only approximated up to second order
also renders using a nonlinear functional form more complicated than a polynomial futile.
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However, with endogenous growth, we can write rkt as a function of employment and
marginal costs alone, namely as
(2.26) rkt = mctA(1 (nt   ns   n))1 
Marginal cost in the JLN economy becomes
(2.27) mct =
 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1TFPt)1 
while in the presence of endogenous growth, we have
(2.28) mct =
 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1Kt)1 
Wages are set according to equation (2:11):
(2.29) logwt   logwt 1 = a+ b  f (nt) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

Total output in the absence of endogenous growth is given by private sector output
Yt plus the output of state employees:
(2.30) Outputt = AKt(TFPt1 (nt   n  ns))1  + wtns
while in the presence of endogenous growth, we have
(2.31) Outputt = AKt((nt   n  ns)1)1  + wtns
Markets clear:
ADt = Outputt
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The evolution of prices is determined by the Phillips Curve, where we replace the
stochastic discount factor by its denition t;t+1 = 
u0(Ct+1 habt)
u0(Ct habt 1) = 
Ct habt 1
Ct+1 habt
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

+ 
'
2
(

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2
)2
+Et

Ct   habt 1
Ct+1   habt'
Yt+1
Yt

Pt+1
Pt
 

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

Pt+1
Pt

= 0(2.32)
Finally, monetary policy is specied by equation (2:12)
(2.33) it = (1  )

i+  t +
 Y
4
gpt 1

+ it 1
with gpt as dened in (2:13) with natural output as determined in (2:14) for the JLN
economy and as determined in (2:20) for the New Growth economy.
2.2. Calibration
Wherever we can draw on empirical evidence to pin down the model parameters,
we calibrate the model to Western German data. Germany is the largest economy in
Western Europe, it has a history of high unemployment, and the monetary policy of
the Bundesbank was widely regarded to exert a strong inuence on monetary policy in
other Western European countries.33
The calibration of the non-monetary policy model parameters for the experiment
described above is presented table 2:1. We distinguish between three di¤erent types of
parameters. The rst set is calibrated according to standard values in the literature.
33For instance, Clarida et al. (1998) estimate Taylor rules for Britain, Italy and France and show
that the German short rate has an e¤ect on the short rate in these countries between 0.6 and 1.14.
Furthermore, they nd that none of these central bank pursued an active monetary policy, i.e. the
estimate of the ination coe¢ cient is signicantly below one. See Clarida et al. (1998), pp. 1054-158.
Thus using estimates for these countries would have raised determinacy issues which we would like to
avoid in this chapter.
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This set contains the discount factor , the output elasticity of employment 1   ,
the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods , the depreciation rate ; and
the price adjustment cost parameter '. ' is calibrated as to generate a marginal cost
coe¢ cient in the linearised version of equation (2:6) which would also be generated in a
Calvo Phillips Curve with full backward indexing of unchanged prices and a probability
of no re-optimisation of 2/3.34
The second set, consisting of ns a, b and c, is based on evidence from German data.
The share of government employees ns has been set to 0.18, which corresponds to a
share of government expenditure in GDP of 0.14.35 This is somewhat below the average
share of government consumption expenditure in German GDP from 1970-1990, which
is 0.19. However, our main results are robust to increasing ns:36
We estimate the wage setting equation (2:29) on German data on labour costs per
employee, unemployment (instead of employment, as is done in the empirical literature)
and productivity per employee ranging from 1970q1 to 2000q4, using both the log and
the level specication.37 The results are discussed in appendix A.7 . For the simu-
lation, we decided to let employment enter (2:29) linearly for two reasons. Since the
New Growth economy is quite a non-standard framework, we would like to facilitate
the interpretation of our simulation results by using the simpler specication. Fur-
thermore, simulating the model with the wage setting function featuring -log(1   nt)
and b and c calibrated according to the point estimates yielded explosive paths for the
models variables. Therefore we use the linear specication in the simulation but use
34See for instance Danthine and Kurmann (2004), p. 119.
35This share is given by wn
s
Output = (1   )mc Ytn ns n=

Y + (1  )mc Yn ns n  ns

: This can be
simplied to yield wn
s
Output =
(1 )=ns
n ns n+(1 )=ns
36See Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden (2006a).
37We would have preferred to estimate on pre-reunication data alone but needed to extend the dataset
to 2000q4 to get signicant coe¢ cients.
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a smaller coe¢ cient for b than the point estimate, namely 0.08. It can be checked in
the appendix A.7 that this is less than one standard deviation away from the point
estimate. Furthermore, it is still higher than the e¤ect of a change in unemployment in
the equation featuring -log(1  nt) if the unemployment rate is at the sample average.
The calibration of c is consistent with both estimates of that coe¢ cient. The intercept
a is calibrated to achieve a steady state unemployment rate of 4%.
The third set consists of the three "free" parameters A,  and j the production func-
tion shifter, the parameter indexing adjustment costs and the degree of habit formation.
Given the calibration of ; ; ; ns; and ; the value of A was calibrated to achieve
a reasonable steady state growth rate. The other two parameters were calibrated to
match second moments of the investment-capital ratio and the consumption capital
ratio. The results of the moment comparison are discussed in the following section.
  j A   1 ' n
0.33 0.99 0.4 0.38 6 0.025 0.452 30 0.1793
ns i gTFP u a b c 
0.18 0.0181 0.0079 0.003 -0.1123 0.08 -0.1 0.65
Table 2.1. Baseline Calibration of non-policy Parameters
Turning to the monetary policy parameters, the baseline calibration of the monetary
policy reaction function is taken from Clausen and Meier (2003), who estimate the
interest feedback rule (2:12) for the Bundesbank over the period from 1973 to 1998 for
quarterly data.38 They use a real time measure of the output gap in order to account for
the fact that the central banks information set does not include future levels of GDP.
Therefore they argue that the estimate of potential output underlying the output gap
measure should be based only on GDP levels known up to the quarter when the decision
38See Clausen and Meier (2003), p. 22.
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on the interest rate is made.39 An important additional benet of this procedure is that
the potential output estimate will evolve in a manner depending more strongly on
past values of actual output than in a procedure which uses the full sample of output
values. If the economy is characterised by endogenous growth, we would expect that
this method is superior at detecting the path of potential output. High past output
will trigger high investment and thus will also increase potential output.
Clausen and Meiers preferred estimates are reported in table 2.2 which in fact
correspond to the original coe¢ cients proposed by Taylor (1993) to characterise the
policy of the Federal Reserve. Their estimate of the output gap coe¢ cient is of particular
interest because the Bundesbank was often perceived as paying less attention to output
than the Fed. This is also borne out by other Taylor-rule estimates, one of which we
discuss in turn.
   Y 
1.5 0.52 0.75
Table 2.2. Baseline Calibration of the Policy Rule: Clausen and Meier (2003)
In section 2.5, we compare the e¤ects of monetary policies estimated for the Bun-
desbank and the Federal Reserve and thus need internationally comparable estimates.
Therefore we would like to draw on a study conducted by Clarida et al. (1998) which
uses the same methodology to estimate policy rules for di¤erent countries. Their rule
is estimated on monthly data stretching from 1979 to 1993. A quarterly data version
of their specication would be
39See Clausen and Meier (2003), p. 2. Note that because Taylor rules are usually estimated using
annualised ination and interest rate data, the coe¢ cient on the output gap has to be divided by 4 to
adapt it to quarterly frequency.
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(2.34) it = (1  )

i+  Et

t+1 + t+2 + t+3 + t+4
4

+
 Y
4
gpt

+ it 1
Hence the central bank responds to a one year forecast of ination, the current
output gap and the lagged interest rate.40 The point estimates for the Bundesbank and
the Federal Reserve are replicated in table 2.3.41 Clearly, the small coe¢ cient on the
output gap corresponds more to the conventional wisdom on how the Bundesbank was
conducting policy.
   Y 
Bundesbank 1.31 0.25 0.91
Federal Reserve 1.83 0.56 0.97
Table 2.3. Forward looking Interest Rate Rules: Clarida et al. (1998)
2.3. Some Moment Comparisons
We now compare the second moments generated by stochastic simulations of the
two models to the corresponding empirical moments for German data. The moment
comparison serves two purposes: First, it informs the calibration of the free parameters
 and j. These were calibrated with an eye to matching the standard deviation of
the investment to capital ratio relative to the output to capital ratio, and also the
persistence of the consumption to capital ratio, as measured by the rst to fth order
autocorrelation. Furthermore, we want to instil trust in our simulation results in section
2.4 by showing that the moments generated by the New Growth economy are broadly
in line with the data, while the JLN economy fails to match the persistence in the
40See Clarida et al. (1998), p. 1039 and p.1042.
41See Clarida et al. (1998), p.1042 for the estimate for the Bundesbank and p. 1045 for the estimate
for the Federal Reserve.
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real variables. In order to see whether our results are robust, we carry out the same
comparison for the JLN economy. For both economies, we consider the moments of
the models variables for two di¤erent cases. In the rst case, the monetary policy
reaction function is as estimated by Clausen and Meier (2003), i.e. our baseline case.
In the second case, the policy reaction function is as estimated by Clarida et al. (1998).
We generate the models second moments by conducting a stochastic simulation by
randomly drawing a value for ut 200000 times, where ut is assumed to be normally
distributed and to have a standard deviation of 0.003. The standard deviation of the
shock was chosen to set the standard deviation of employment close to its value in the
data. We solve the model by employing a second order approximation to the policy
function using the approach of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a). We use the software
Dynare to implement the solution and conduct the simulation.
We consider the following variables: The ratios of (total) output, consumption, in-
vestment and real wages to capital, denoted as Ft; Dt; Rt and Ht respectively (recall
that we have to normalise all the trended variables with the capital stock to render
them stationary), employment nt (measured as linearly detrended log hours), the un-
employment rate, the nominal interest rate it, ination t (measured as the change in
the consumer price index (CPI)), productivity growth pt (measured as change in real
GDP per hour worked), capital stock growth gt, and the investment rate I=Y: From
those, we compute the following moments: The standard deviations of nt (which in
our model, since nt is the employment rate, is same as the standard deviation of the
unemployment rate) and gt; the coe¢ cient of variation of Ft, and the ratio between the
coe¢ cients of variation of Dt and Rt, the standard deviations of employment, capital
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stock growth ination, the nominal interest rate and the coe¢ cient of variation of Ft:42
We will refer to theses ratios below as the "relative coe¢ cients of variation" or the
"relative standard deviations" without explicitly mentioning the coe¢ cient of variation
of Ft each time. Furthermore, we look at the cross-correlation of all variables with Ft
and the autocorrelation of each variable up to the fth order.
The construction of the data for Ft; Dt; Rt and Ht is discussed in appendix A.6. The
raw data was obtained from the Federal Statistical O¢ ce of Germany (Statistisches
Bundesamt), except for the nominal interest rate and the ination data which was
obtained from the "International Financial Statistics" CD-ROM. The data ranges from
1970:Q1 to only 1990:Q4 because reunication is associated with a big drop in Ft; Dt
and Rt; which would distort the moments. Furthermore, there are strong theoretical
reasons to believe that all variables other than hours, ination and the nominal interest
rate are stationary. This is why we do not detrend or lter them. However we adjust
the sample to induce stationarity if stationarity is not conrmed for the full sample by
either an ADF test (by rejecting the null of a unit root) or by the KPSS test (by not
rejecting the null of stationarity). Where we have to detrend, we use a linear time trend.
The details are given in appendix A.6. The one exception is the unemployment rate: We
include this variable in spite of stationarity being strongly rejected even after removing
a substantial amount of observations from the sample. This is not surprising since, as
we discussed in chapter one, there is indeed quite a bit of evidence that the German
unemployment rate is not stationary. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this moment
comparison, we interpret the data as saying that unemployment is highly persistent
42Note that when solving the models, we express the variables in absolute rather than log (or per-
centage) deviations from their steady state, as is more common in the literature. Thus to render our
statistics comparable, we have to compute the coe¢ cients of variation of those variables which are not
naturally expressed as percentages. For example, note that for the variance of the log deviation of Ft
from its mean, we have V ar

dFt
Et(Ft)

= V ar(dFt)
(Et(Ft))
2 =
V ar(Ft)
(Et(Ft))
2 : Hence sd:

dFt
Et(Ft)

= sd(Ft)Et(Ft)
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but assume that it is stationary, as it is in our model. Furthermore, note that while in
the model, the second moments of employment and unemployment are identical, this
will not be the case in the data.
Table 2.4 reports the various standard deviations, relative standard deviations and
cross-correlations with the output capital ratio Ft listed above. Column 1 contains the
data, while column 2 and 3 refer to the baseline policy reaction function. The standard
deviation of employment for the New Growth economy is on the mark because we
have calibrated the standard deviation of the cost push shock accordingly. Note that
the empirical standard deviation of employment happens to be extremely close to the
standard deviation of the unemployment rate, implying that we can match both at the
same time. The coe¢ cient of variation of Ft for the New Growth economy (NGE) is
considerably smaller than in the data. It is almost equal to the standard deviation
of employment, which is also true for the JLN economy. The relative coe¢ cient of
variation of Dt in the New Growth model is somewhat lower than in the data, while
in the JLN economy, it is far too low. The relative coe¢ cient of variation of Rt is
somewhat lower in the New Growth economy than in the data, while it is way too high
in the JLN economy.
Of particular interest is the relative volatility of capital stock growth. As we show
in section 2.4, movements in capital stock growth drive our results in the New Growth
economy. We would thus prefer the relative volatility of capital stock not to be too high.
The relative standard deviation of capital stock growth gt in the New Growth economy
is somewhat higher than in the data, although it is higher still in the JLN economy.
On the other hand, the standard deviation of gt relative to the standard deviation of
employment nt is a little smaller than in the data for the New Growth economy (0.0766
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Moments Data JLN NGE CGG: JLN CGG: NGE
(sd:Dt=meanDt) = (sd:Ft=meanFt) 1.0165 0.6573 0.8773 0.685 0.8704
(sd:Rt=meanRt) = (sd:Ft=meanFt) 2.7836 3.2060 2.5184 3.364 2.5736
sd:nt=(sd:Ft=meanFt) 0.6907 0.9763 1.0875 0.9688 1.0932
sd:gt=(sd:Ft=meanFt) 0.0601 0.1072 0.0840 0.1125 0.0857
sd:Ft=meanFt 0.0311 0.0115 0.0192 0.0077 0.0215
sd:(1  nt)=(sd:Ft=meanFt) 0.6578 0.9763 1.0875 0.9688 0.023
sd:nt; sd:(1  nt) 0.0215, 0.0205 0.0112 0.0209 0.0074 0.0235
sd: (It=Yt) 0.0122 0.0048 0.0053 0.0035 0.0061
sd:t= (sd:Ft=meanFt) 0.1835 0.3645 0.2001 0.8801 0.1982
sd:it=(sd:Ft=meanFt) 0.1952 0.2254 0.1418 0.0868 0.1081
sd:gt 0.0019 0.0012 0.0016 0.0009 0.0018
corr(Dt; Ft) 0.8704 0.95 0.9923 0.8863 0.9906
corr(Rt; Ft) 0.9284 0.9317 0.9953 0.8898 0.9948
corr(nt; Ft) 0.6902 0.7970 0.999 0.8001 0.9991
corr(it; Ft) 0.3068 -0.6772 0.0830 0.0188 0.8804
corr(t; Ft) 0.2505 -0.5071 -0.0901 0.1471 0.2263
corr(pt; Ft) 0.2390 -0.1966 0.7587 -0.2452 0.8262
corr(Ht; Ft) 0.4123 0.4476 -0.6729 0.4468 -0.7258
Table 2.4. Relative Standard Deviations and Cross-Correlations
as compared to 0.0870 in the data). This discrepancy stems from the fact that the
New Growth economy understates the volatility of Ft and matches the volatility of nt
while the standard deviation of gt in the data actually exceeds its value in the model.
Since the focus of this chapter is on explaining movements in unemployment, we place
a greater importance on the relative volatility of gt with respect to nt than the volatility
of gt with respect to Ft and thus conclude that gt is not too volatile.
Turning to the nominal variables, the relative standard deviation of t is very close
to the data for the New Growth economy, but too high in the JLN economy. Both
models come reasonably close to matching the relative standard deviation of the nominal
interest rate it as well, although the JLN economy does slightly better.
Turning to the cross-correlations, what is most striking is that for the JLN econ-
omy, corr(t; Ft); corr(it; Ft) and corr(pt; Ft) are wrongly signed. They are negative
whereas those calculated from the data are positive. A negative correlation of ination
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and the interest rate with output is what we would expect in a standard sticky price
New Keynesian model. A positive cost push shock raises ination and thus the nom-
inal as well as the real interest rate via the interest feedback rule and lowers output.
Correctly matching the correlation of output with ination and the nominal interest
rate is generally perceived as a di¢ culty in New Keynesian models if demand shocks
are absent.43 Furthermore, the decline in output following a positive cost push shock
lowers employment and thus increases labour productivity.
The New Growth economy produces wrong signs for corr(t; Ft); though the ab-
solute value is much smaller than for the JLN Economy, and corr(Ht; Ft): The mag-
nitudes of corr(Dt; Ft) and corr(Rt; Ft) are not too far away from the data for both
models, while for corr(nt; Ft); both models produce considerably too high values. It
is particularly interesting that the New Growth model produces a positive correlation
between the output capital ratio and the nominal interest rate.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report the autocorrelation up to the fth order for the data and
the baseline case. For those variables for which we do not reject the null of stationarity
over the full sample we use the dataset starting in 1970 rather than the reduced dataset
in order not to unnecessarily sacrice information. When the i-th order autocorrelation
of a variable is within 0:1 of the corresponding autocorrelation in the sample, it is
printed in bold. A number in italics means that the value is closer to the data than
the i-th order autocorrelation of the same variable in the competing model. Concerning
the variables Ft; Dt;and nt; we observe that the New Growth economy is matching
the persistence in the data quite closely. By contrast, Rt; 1   nt; gt, it and It=Yt are
considerably less persistent in the New Growth model than in the data, although they
43See for instance Nolan and Thoenissen (2005), pp. 25-26.
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Order of Autocorrelation Data JLN NGE Data JLN NGE
Ft Ft Ft it it it
1 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.9 0.8 0.84
2 0.78 0.65 0.82 0.75 0.49 0.58
3 0.65 0.4 0.71 0.58 0.22 0.38
4 0.58 0.22 0.63 0.39 0.06 0.25
5 0.47 0.08 0.58 0.23 -0.00 0.2
Dt Dt Dt t t t
1 0.91 0.88 0.94 0.35 0.45 0.42
2 0.85 0.65 0.85 -0.16 0.1 0.07
3 0.78 0.4 0.76 0.21 -0.07 -0.09
4 0.71 0.22 0.71 0.6 -0.11 -0.11
5 0.65 0.11 0.68 0.17 -0.08 -0.07
Rt Rt Rt pt pt pt
1 0.96 0.9 0.94 -0.03 0.53 0.84
2 0.92 0.68 0.82 -0.18 0.07 0.67
3 0.86 0.45 0.7 -0.02 -0.21 0.53
4 0.81 0.24 0.6 0.37 -0.31 0.47
5 0.74 0.1 0.54 0.04 -0.27 0.42
nt nt nt Ht Ht Ht
1 0.93 0.88 0.94 0.92 0.99 0.99
2 0.84 0.65 0.84 0.89 0.95 0.97
3 0.73 0.34 0.74 0.85 0.9 0.94
4 0.62 0.20 0.66 0.82 0.84 0.92
5 0.51 0.08 0.62 0.78 0.78 0.89
Table 2.5. Autocorrelations, Baseline
Order of Autocorrelation Data JLN NGE Data JLN NGE
1  nt 1  nt 1  nt
1 0.98 0.88 0.94
2 0.96 0.65 0.84
3 0.93 0.34 0.74
4 0.9 0.20 0.66
5 0.86 0.08 0.62
g g g I=Y I=Y I=Y
1 0.97 0.9 0.94 0.95 0.91 0.94
2 0.94 0.68 0.82 0.91 0.71 0.82
3 0.89 0.45 0.7 0.87 0.49 0.69
4 0.85 0.24 0.6 0.82 0.3 0.58
5 0.79 0.1 0.54 0.75 0.15 0.51
Table 2.6. Autocorrelations, Baseline (continued)
are still considerably closer to the data than in the JLN economy Conversely, all these
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Order of Autocorrelation Data JLN NGE Data JLN NGE
Ft Ft Ft it it it
1 0.88 0.84 0.96 0.9 0.91 0.99
2 0.78 0.57 0.87 0.75 0.73 0.98
3 0.65 0.30 0.77 0.58 0.55 0.96
4 0.58 0.10 0.69 0.39 0.42 0.93
5 0.47 -0.01 0.64 0.23 0.34 0.91
Dt Dt Dt t t t
1 0.91 0.77 0.96 0.35 0.66 0.49
2 0.85 0.46 0.90 -0.16 0.36 0.14
3 0.78 0.23 0.83 0.21 0.12 -0.06
4 0.71 0.13 0.78 0.6 -0.03 -0.13
5 0.65 0.12 0.74 0.17 -0.1 -0.11
Rt Rt Rt pt pt pt
1 0.96 0.92 0.96 -0.03 0.34 0.9
2 0.92 0.72 0.86 -0.18 -0.00 0.76
3 0.86 0.48 0.75 -0.02 -0.20 0.64
4 0.81 0.26 0.65 0.37 -0.26 0.55
5 0.74 0.08 0.58 0.04 -0.23 0.49
nt nt nt Ht Ht Ht
1 0.93 0.82 0.96 0.92 0.99 0.99
2 0.84 0.53 0.88 0.89 0.95 0.98
3 0.73 0.24 0.8 0.85 0.91 0.95
4 0.62 0.03 0.73 0.82 0.85 0.93
5 0.51 -0.1 0.68 0.78 0.8 0.90
Table 2.7. Autocorrelations, Clarida et al.
Order of Autocorrelation Data JLN NGE Data JLN NGE
1  nt 1  nt 1  nt
1 0.98 0.82 0.96
2 0.96 0.53 0.88
3 0.93 0.24 0.8
4 0.9 0.03 0.73
5 0.86 -0.1 0.68
g g g I=Y I=Y I=Y
1 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.95
2 0.92 0.72 0.86 0.91 0.78 0.85
3 0.88 0.48 0.75 0.87 0.58 0.73
4 0.83 0.26 0.65 0.82 0.37 0.62
5 0.78 0.08 0.58 0.75 0.19 0.54
Table 2.8. Autocorrelations, Clarida et al. Reaction Function
variables show far too little persistence in the JLN economy (and for all variables less
than in the New Growth economy): The autocorrelations are dying o¤ too quickly.
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For t; both models produce very similar autocorrelations. They match the rst
order empirical autocorrelation but all the remaining ones are incorrectly signed. For
pt; both models produce incorrectly signed rst and second order autocorrelations. The
JLN economy then does match the sign of the third order autocorrelation but produces
wrong signs for the remainder. The New Growth economy produces a wrong sign for
the third order autocorrelation but almost matches the fourth and matches the sign of
the fth. For the real wage to capital ratio Ht; both models match the rst to fourth
order autocorrelation, though the JLN economy comes closer to the data. The New
Growth economy fails to match the fth order autocorrelation, while the JLN economy
does.
Thus the New Growth economys second moments are indeed broadly in line with
the data. It does mostly better than the JLN economy, with a few exceptions. In
particular, the JLN economy fails to match the persistence of the real variables.
We now turn to the moments for the case where the models feature the reaction func-
tion estimated by Clarida et al. (1998), i.e. equation (2:34), instead of equation (2:33) :
The relative standard deviations and cross correlations can be obtained from columns 4
and 5 of table 2.4 (Clarida et al.=CGG). The performance of the two models seems quite
robust to the change in the reaction function, with a couple of exceptions. Concerning
the standard deviations and cross correlations, both models perform worse at match-
ing the relative standard deviation of it: The relative standard deviation of ination
becomes far too high in the JLN economy. For the New Growth economy corr(Dt; Ft),
corr(Rt; Ft) and corr(nt; Ft) are almost unchanged while corr(Dt; Ft) is somewhat re-
duced (and thus brought closer to the data) for the JLN economy. corr(t; Ft) becomes
positive in both models, with the New Growth model coming very close to the data.
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Concerning the autocorrelations, which are reported in tables 2.7 and 2.8, note that
they generally increase slightly in the New Growth model, much so in case of it; but
decrease in the JLN economy, with the exception of it and t:
Thus we conclude that the New Growth model is still better at matching the sec-
ond moments discussed here, in particular the persistence in the data, than the JLN
economy.
2.4. Explaining the Evolution of Unemployment over Time
We now discuss the response of the New Growth and the JLN economies to a cost
push shock. We aim to create a scenario akin to the one faced by central banks in
Western Europe at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the time of
the second oil price shock. That means we would like to create a situation where an
exogenous force increases annual ination several percentage points above its target
level, forcing the central bank to increase the interest rate to bring ination back to
target. Therefore ut is set equal to 0.03 for the rst quarter. To put it di¤erently, for
given values of marginal cost, past and expected ination, ination in that quarter is
increased by three percentage points. In the baseline simulation, this will give rise to a
disination of a bit more than 4.6 percentage points over 5 years, if we compare annual
rates in the rst and the sixth year. This is at the lower end of disinations actually
experienced during that period. For instance, in Germany, annual ination was at 6.3%
in 1981, which was then reduced to -0.1% in 1986, which is a rather small disination
compared to the UK, France or Italy where ination declined by 8.6, 10.8 and 13.7
percentage points over the same period, respectively.
An alternative way to generate a disination would have been a reduction of the
ination target of the central bank. However, this approach would have rendered a
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disination of a given size much less costly in terms of the increase in unemployment
necessary to bring ination back to target. The reason for this is rooted in the e¤ect
of future expected ination on current ination. The cost push shock generates a
less favourable trade-o¤ between ination and unemployment than a reduction in the
ination target. Moreover, as mentioned above, we aim to simulate the e¤ect of an
exogenous supply shock on the model economies rather than a reduction in the ination
target.
Note that there is no endogenous persistence in the shock itself beyond the rst
quarter, implying that any persistence in the path of the variables and in particular
unemployment beyond that point is endogenous. This section focuses on understanding
the induced evolution of unemployment and ination over time. We rst examine the
results under the baseline calibration. Section 2.4.1 restricts itself to comparing the
evolution of unemployment and ination in the New Growth and the JLN economy,
as well as describing the paths of the NAIRU and productivity growth. It turns out
that in the New Growth economy, the cost push shock causes a persistent increase in
unemployment and the NAIRU as well as a persistent decline in productivity growth.
Section 2.4.2 develops the intuition for the persistent increase in unemployment. The
increase is due to the interaction of a decline in capital stock growth (which with
endogenous growth implies a decline in total factor productivity growth) with rigid real
wage growth. Section 2.4.3 shows how varying the output gap coe¢ cient  Y in the
interest feedback rule a¤ects the unemployment increase over the short and medium
run. Section 2.4.4 examines the robustness of our results against varying the parameter
indexing the degree of investment adjustment costs  and the slope of the real wage
growth function b:
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We again solve the model by employing a second order approximation to the policy
function using the approach of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) and using the soft-
ware Dynare to implement the solution and conduct the simulation. The simulation is
conducted under perfect foresight.
In all gures, the period zero value is the steady state value of the respective variable.
Furthermore, when we refer to Baselinein gures or in the text, we always mean the
New Growth economy in its baseline calibration. The abbreviation "NGE" used in the
gures refers to "New Growth Economy".
2.4.1. Unemployment and the NAIRU in the NewGrowth and JLNEconomies
Figure 2.3 plots the response of actual unemployment for the JLN and the New Growth
economies to the one quarter cost push shock. In the JLN economy, unemployment
increases by about 3 percentage points on impact but starts declining after reaching
a maximum of 10.4%. It then quickly falls and in quarter 8 practically returns to its
steady state value and then slightly undershoots for some time. Unemployment would
be expected to increase because the cost push shock will increase ination which will
ultimately lead to an increase in ex ante real interest rates via equation (2:33). As
consumers and investors are forward looking, this causes a contraction of aggregate
demand on impact. Figure 2.4 plots the ination rate, which peaks in quarter one at a
value of about 3.8% and then quickly declines back to zero. In both economies, ination
then turns negative and approaches its steady state from below.44
44The fact that there is persistent deation, especially in the New Growth economy, is caused the fact
that we calibrated the steady state ination rate to be zero. If the ination target were about 2%, this
would imply a quarterly steady state ination rate of about 0.5%. The ination trajectory in gure
2.4 would be shifted upwards accordingly and thus deation would be limited to three quarters.
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Figure 2.3. Unemployment in the New Growth and the JLN Economy
By contrast, in the New Growth economy, unemployment increases by more on
impact than in the JLN economy. Even more important, the increase is far more
persistent. After about 11 quarters (10 quarters after the end of the shock), when
unemployment is already undershooting in the JLN economy, only a bit more than half
of the on-impact loss in employment has vanished and employment is still about 3.2
percentage points below its steady state value. What is more, employment growth in the
New Growth economy then becomes very slow: quarterly increases are only around 0.06
percentage points per quarter or less. As can be seen in table 2.9, in the New Growth
economy, after 10 years unemployment is still about 1.8 percentage points above its
steady state value and after 15 years the di¤erence is still about 1.2 percentage points.
As observed in many European countries, unemployment increases quickly but re-
verts only very slowly. What is more, this slow mean reversion is endogenous: The
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Figure 2.4. Ination in the New Growth and the JLN Economy
exogenous shock which increases unemployment in the rst place vanishes after one
quarter but unemployment remains high. This is in line with the time series evidence
we discussed in chapter one saying that unemployment rates in Germany and several
other big European economies display high endogenous persistence.
Furthermore, Figure 2.5 reveals that the persistent increase in actual unemployment
is matched by an increase in the NAIRU, as after six quarters, actual unemployment
falls below the NAIRU, which gradually increases during and after the recession. A
glance at Figure 2.4 shows that ination (after peaking in quarter 1 at a quarterly rate
of about 3.3%) indeed stops declining at about the same time that actual unemployment
falls below the NAIRU, as we would expect from the denition of the NAIRU. Thus
the disination engineered by the central bank, while clearly successful, has come at a
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Figure 2.5. New Growth Economy, Baseline - Unemployment and NAIRU
cost beyond a temporary reduction in employment: The unemployment level consistent
with constant ination has increased.
Quarters 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Baseline 3.1 2.8 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.2 1 0.8
 Y = 5 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4
 = 0:5 3.5 3.1 2.5 2 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.9
 = 0:8 2.8 2.6 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7
b = 0:14 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 0 0 0
b = 0:06 4.3 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.2 3 2.8
Table 2.9. Unemployment Deviation from the Steady State in the New
Growth Economy
Associated with the increase in unemployment in the New Growth economy is a
persistent slowdown in labour productivity growth. This is in line with the evidence
cited above. After 10 quarters it falls short of its steady state value by about 0.21%
per quarter or 0.88% at an annualised rate, while 40 quarters after the shock it is still
about 0.13% lower than in the steady state, or 0.54% at an annualised rate. Average
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annualised productivity growth over the rst 10 years after the shock equals 2.46%.
Assuming that average productivity growth before the shock hit equalled its steady
state rate of 3.42%, this implies a decline of average productivity growth from one
decade to the next of 0.96%. Interestingly, average German productivity growth did
decline by 1.44% from the 1970s to the 1980s.45
2.4.2. Understanding the Evolution of Unemployment in the New Growth
Economy
We know from equation (2:29) that an increase in unemployment will reduce real wage
growth which will tend to lower marginal costs. Hence there must be a strong counter-
vailing force pushing marginal costs up in order to explain why ination stops falling.
Figure 2.6 shows that while real wage growth drops sharply, in quarter two, the growth
rate of the capital stock falls by even more and remains considerably below real wage
growth for about nine quarters. After that they are about equal. In the New Growth
economy, slower capital stock growth entails slower technological progress and thus
slower growth of labour productivity. We showed more formally above (see equation
(2:19)) that therefore in the New Growth economy, the real wage-to-capital ratio drives
marginal cost. Figure 2.7, which plots the deviations of marginal cost and the real
wage-to-capital ratio from their steady state values conrms that it is the movement of
the real wage-to-capital ratio which drives marginal cost back up, as both move broadly
in parallel.
45Productivity is measured as real GDP per hour worked. The data was taken from the Federal
Statistical O¢ ce of Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt). See Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden
(2007b). A sophisticated analysis of changes in trend productivity growth by Skoczylas and Tissot
(2005) nds a negative break for Germany in 1979 of -2.75%
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Figure 2.6. New Growth Economy, Baseline - Capital Stock Growth and
Real Wage Growth
By contrast, in the JLN economy, the e¤ect of the capital stock on marginal costs is
much weaker, as shown by equation (2:18) : The major determinant of marginal costs
apart from the real wage is total factor productivity TFPt. This grows exogenously
no matter whether output and investment are contracting or growing. Thus marginal
costs or, to put it di¤erently, the permissible, non-inationary rate of real wage growth
are much less a¤ected by changes to the capital stock.
Turning back to the New Growth economy, the recovery of actual employment has
to slow down after about six quarters because unemployment arrives at a level beyond
which any reduction would cause ination to accelerate as it pushes real wage growth
above the growth rate of the capital stock and thus pushes up marginal cost. A quick
reduction in unemployment would also turn the output gap positive. Both of these
developments would trigger interest rate increases via the policy rule. In fact this is
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and Marginal Costs
already happening: Ination is picking up and actual unemployment is falling below
the NAIRU in quarters six and seven, respectively, as can be obtained from Figures
(2:4) and (2:5). Correspondingly, gure 2.8 shows that the central bank stops lowering
the real interest rate it Ett after 8 quarters, when it is 0.45 percentage points (about
1.81 percentage points at an annualised rate) below the steady state value, and begins
to tighten again.
Note that this level of the real interest rate, while below its steady state value, is not
su¢ ciently low to promote a fast recovery of capital stock growth and thus a fast decline
of the NAIRU and unemployment. Figure 2.9 summarises the benets from investing
by plotting the present discounted value of an additional unit of capital, qt. qt recovers
quickly after the shock has passed and reaches its steady state value of one after ve
quarters. It then slightly exceeds its steady state level for six quarters. The rst order
conditions (2:23) determine the investment growth rate, which due to the fast recovery
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of qt; moves much closer to its steady state value as well. However, the capital stock
growth rate depends on the investment-to-capital ratio, as can be seen from the capital
accumulation equation (2:24). The investment-to-capital ratio has declined during the
recession and the subsequent period of slow growth. To move the investment-to-capital
ratio and thus capital stock growth back to its steady state would require an investment
growth rate exceeding the steady state. An above-steady-state investment growth rate
would have to be induced by an above-steady-state value of qt. This in turn would
require a lower real interest rate.
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Figure 2.8. New Growth Economy, Baseline -Real Interest Rate
The speed of recovery is then governed by the relative growth rates of real wages
and the capital stock. From quarter 9 onwards, the capital stock grows slightly faster
than real wages. This slowly lowers the real wage-capital ratio (see gure 2.7), and a
slow reduction in unemployment as higher productivity growth implies that rms can
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Figure 2.9. New Growth Economy, Baseline - Tobins q
accommodate the increased real wage growth associated with a tighter labour market
without facing an increase in marginal costs. This, in turn, again increases capital stock
growth by increasing the marginal product of capital.
Before we move on to discuss the ination-unemployment trade-o¤ in the New
Growth economy, note that the above discussion implies that in the New Growth econ-
omy, the causal link between monetary policy and productivity growth runs both ways.
The real interest rate a¤ects productivity growth via its direct and indirect (via ADt)
e¤ects on investment, while productivity growth a¤ects the real interest rate via its
e¤ect on ination and the output gap which are arguments in the monetary policy rule.
2.4.3. The Ination-Unemployment Trade-O¤
These results provoke the question as to how changes to the central banks reaction
function would a¤ect the long-run paths of employment and ination. Intuition suggests
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that a stronger weight on the output gap in the reaction function would lead to a smaller
decrease in employment not just in the short but also in the long run. As investment
would be squeezed less, there would be a smaller decline in capital stock growth. This
would accommodate higher non-inationary output and employment after the recovery
from the recession. This would further induce the central bank to set a lower interest
rate than it would otherwise have done in order to move output closer to the higher
potential output level. To show this we increase the coe¢ cient on the output gap,  y, to
5, leaving all other parameters the same. The corresponding evolution of unemployment
can be obtained from gure 2.10. Indeed unemployment increases considerably less in
the short run (in fact it decreases on impact), and after 40 quarters it is still about 0.8
percentage points lower than in the Baseline case, as can be obtained from the second
line of table 2.9. Hence a less hawkish monetary policy has indeed very long-lasting
benign e¤ects on unemployment.
The lower increase in unemployment comes at the cost of a considerably stronger
short-run ination surge. While in the baseline simulation, ination peaks at a (quar-
terly) rate of 3.3%, it now increases as high as 4.9% in the rst quarter (gure 2.11),
while the annual ination rate over the rst year amounts to 15%. Note however that
the increase in ination is only temporary. After 10 quarters, it has already decreased
to 0.42%. Thus the stronger acceleration in ination is a short-run phenomenon. The
gain in employment is of more persistent nature.
As mentioned above, Ball (1999) nds that during the recessions of the early 1980s,
countries whose central banks aggressively lowered interest rates experienced smaller
increases in the NAIRU than those which did not. Ball calculates the di¤erence between
the NAIRU in the year before the recession and ve years after. He denes a recession
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as one year with GDP growth below 1%. He regresses the change in the NAIRU on the
maximum reduction of the ex-post real interest rate during any time of the recessions
rst year, which he refers to as maximum easing.46 The coe¢ cient on maximum easing
is -0.42 and is signicant at the 10% level.47 We try to replicate this relationship with
our New Growth model by varying the output gap coe¢ cient between 0 and 4, leaving
everything else the same, thus obtaining data on maximum easing and the ve year
change in the NAIRU. Our resulting coe¢ cient on maximum easing is negative as well
and varies between -0.24 and -1.16. This is for the most part consistent with Balls
estimate.
46Ball controls for the duration of unemployment benets.
47See Ball (1999), p. 207.
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2.4.4. Robustness
We now check the robustness of the above results against changes to the parameter
indexing investment adjustment costs  and against changes in b, the e¤ect of unem-
ployment on real wage growth. We restrict ourselves to the response of unemployment.
Figure 2.12 reports the response of unemployment for  = 0:5; 0:8 and the baseline
value. Clearly the response of unemployment is somewhat sensitive to varying  : The
path of unemployment is between 0.1 and 0.4 percentage points above and below the
baseline path for  = 0:5 and 0:8; respectively, as can be obtained from table 4: With
lower values of ; unemployment is increased as compared to the baseline in the short
and in the long run since investment declines by more in response to the cost push shock.
This reduces both aggregate demand and capital stock growth, thus increasing actual
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unemployment and the unemployment rate consistent with constant ination. Corre-
spondingly, a higher value of  limits the drop in investment and thus unemployment
is reduced as compared to the baseline.
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Figure 2.12. New Growth Economy, various Values of  - Unemployment
Figure 2.13 displays the response of unemployment under values for b two standard
deviations above (i.e. a value of 0.14) and two standard deviations below (i.e. 0.06)
the point estimate reported in appendix A.7 and the baseline calibration. Clearly the
response of unemployment is very sensitive to the value of b both in the short and in
medium run. Unemployment peaks at 11% if b = 0:14 but at 13.5% for b = 0:06: The
unemployment increase is also a lot less persistent if wages are more exible: After
10 quarters, unemployment is merely 0.8 percentage points higher than in the steady
state if b = 0:14, while after 40 quarters unemployment has almost returned to its
steady state. By contrast, if b = 0:06; the response of unemployment becomes very
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Figure 2.13. New Growth Economy, various Values of b - Unemployment
persistent. After 10 quarters, unemployment exceeds its steady state by 4.3 percentage
points, while after 40 quarters unemployment still exceeds its steady state by about 3.7
percentage points. This implies that 39% of the peak deviation of unemployment from
its steady state is still present after 10 years.
The great sensitivity of the unemployment response to changes in b is not surprising.
The New Growth economy generates a persistent increase in unemployment through
the reduction in the productivity growth rate implied by the drop in investment during
the recession induced by the cost push shock. The fall in productivity growth implies
that the real wage growth rate consistent with constant ination declines and thus the
unemployment rate increases. However, the increase in unemployment necessary to
enforce that decline in the real wage growth rate will depend on how strongly wage
growth responds to changes in unemployment. Hence with b = 0:14; the central bank
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has to increase unemployment by a lot less for a given reduction in productivity growth
than under b = 0:06: This in turn increases the marginal product of capital (relative to
a scenario with a lower b), implying a higher investment growth rate and thus a faster
recovery of capital stock growth and thus productivity growth.
2.5. Cross Country Aspects
The previous section shows that our New Keynesian model with endogenous growth
is able to produce a persistent increase in unemployment as a consequence of a disin-
ation. This is an important result because economists have been struggling to explain
the evolution of unemployment in continental Europe over time. This begs the ques-
tion as to whether we can also use the model to replicate di¤erences in the evolution
of unemployment across countries. We address this issue in three di¤erent ways in this
section. For that purpose, we will draw on the di¤erences in the size of the disination
across the OECD, in (estimates of) the policy reaction function coe¢ cients between
the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve and in real wage rigidity.
We noted earlier that there is a negative correlation between the change in ination
and the change in the NAIRU. Ball (1996) investigated this for the 1980s and we plotted
it over two decades and across 21 OECD countries in gure 2.2. There are various
possible reasons why countries might have di¤erently sized disinations. Economies
might di¤er in the way they respond to global supply shocks, perhaps due to di¤erences
in energy intensity of production. Their past record of monetary policy might di¤er as
well, (in the sense that some central banks have let ination spiral more out of bounds
than others, leading to larger deviations of ination from target), as might choices of
how much to disinate (a central bank might just be willing to accept a higher ination
rate following a supply shock). Finally, exchange rate volatility might di¤er as well.
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Incorporating these various sources of ination volatility into our model would be far
beyond the scope of this chapter. However, we do try to mimic their inationary impact
by varying the size of the cost push shock.
We vary the size of the cost push shock from 0.01 to 0.05, leaving all other parameters
unchanged. Then we calculate the change of the ination rate from year 1 to year 10
and the change of the NAIRU from the rst quarter of year one to the rst quarter of
year 10, and plot the latter against the former in gure 2.14.48 There is a clear negative
correlation. The slope of the line varies between -0.41 and -0.56, which is not too far
away from the simple regression coe¢ cient of -0.33 (or -0.36 if, like Ball (1996) we
exclude Greece) resulting from a regression of the change in the NAIRU on the change
in ination using the OECD data presented earlier.
We now examine whether observable cross-di¤erences in the monetary policy rule
imply di¤erent unemployment paths in response to the cost push shock. To get a proper
idea of the e¤ects of these it is obviously important to have comparable estimates.
Therefore we make use of the estimates by Clarida et al. (1998), who estimate equation
(2:34) using the same methodology for Germany and the United States. The coe¢ cient
estimates are reproduced in table 2.3.
We now repeat the same experiment we conducted in the previous section for both
the estimate of equation (2:34) for the Bundesbank and the estimate of equation (2:34)
for the Federal Reserve. The rst two lines of Table 2.10 show the deviation of unem-
ployment from steady state for both set of coe¢ cients. Note rst that the persistent
48We take the di¤erence of the rst quarter of both years since the NAIRU moves up very fast during
the rst four quarters. Di¤erencing the annual averages of the two years would create a misleading
impression of the correlation between the medium run change in the NAIRU (by unduly reducing this
change) and the change in ination. The quarterly movements of the NAIRU in the OECD data are
very slow and re-doing gure one with the di¤erence in the NAIRU between 1980 quarter1 1990 quarter
one rather than with the di¤erences in the annual averages as is the case now would not change the
result.
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Figure 2.14. Change in Ination vs. Change in the NAIRU over 10 Years
increase in unemployment with the policy rule as specied and estimated by Clarida
et al. for the Bundesbank is substantially higher than the increase we saw with the
policy rule used in the Baseline. This illustrates that, in terms of the unemployment
e¤ects which are the subject of this chapter, we were quite conservative in specifying
and calibrating our Baseline policy rule. Apart from that, unemployment is persis-
tently higher under the Bundesbank rule than under the Federal Reserve one, though
the di¤erence is for the most part less than one percentage point. For instance after
10 years, unemployment and the NAIRU are about 0.5 percentage points higher under
the Bundesbank Rule than under the Federal Reserve rule.
It is, however, informative to take a look at the standard errors associated with
Clarida et al.s estimate. For instance, the coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate  has
a standard error of 0.03. Thus a value for  of 0.06 is still consistent (at a 5% level
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of condence) with Clarida et al.s estimate. The third row of table 2.10, shows the
implied evolution of unemployment if we set  = 0:91. The resulting unemployment
trajectory is substantially lower than before. After 40 quarters, the unemployment and
the NAIRU are now 1.1 percentage points lower than under the Bundesbank rule, while
after 50 quarters, the di¤erence is still 1 percentage point. In the same manner, we can
also make use of the standard error of the estimate of  Y , which equals 0.16. Increasing
 Y to 0.88 yields the employment trajectory shown in the nal row of table 2.10, which
is again lower than with the point estimate. After 40 quarters, unemployment and the
NAIRU are about 0.9 percentage points lower than under the Bundesbank policy rule.
Thus in the New Growth model, di¤erences in policy function parameters consistent
with Clarida et al.s estimate can contribute to explaining the di¤erent evolution of the
unemployment rate in Germany as compared to the United States.
Accordingly, di¤erences in monetary policy also explain di¤erences in the change in
the productivity growth rate between Germany and United States from the 1970s to the
1980s. As noted above, average US productivity growth declined by only about 0.18%
from the 1970s to the 1980s, whereas the decline in Germany was about 1.4%. Table
2.11 displays the di¤erence between average annualised productivity growth during the
rst decade after the shock and the decade before the shock.49 Thus within the New
Growth model, di¤erences in monetary policy would account for between 0.24 and 0.6
percentage points of the di¤erence between Germany and the United States in the
decline in productivity growth.
Finally, we explore the e¤ects of the observed cross continental di¤erences in the na-
ture of real wage rigidity. As was mentioned above, empirical estimates of wage setting
49As above we assume that during the decade before the shock hits, the average productivity growth
rate equals its steady state.
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Unemployment Deviation from the Steady State, Percentage Points
Quarter 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Bundesbank 3.8 3.8 3.1 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.1
Federal Reserve 2.9 3.1 2.5 2 1.7 1.3 1.1 0.9
Federal Reserve,  = 0:91 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6
Federal Reserve,  Y = 0:88 2.4 2.5 2 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7
Table 2.10. Results for Clarida et al.s Policy Rules
Change in ten Year Average
productivity Growth, Percentage Points
Bundesbank -1.28
Federal Reserve -1.04
Federal Reserve,  = 0:91 -0.68
Federal Reserve,  Y = 0:88 -0.88
Table 2.11. Results for Clarida et al.s Policy Rules
functions repeatedly nd that real wage growth is negatively related to the labour share
in Europe but not in the United States. Therefore, in our nal experiment aimed at
highlighting cross country dimensions, we set c = 0 in the Baseline calibration, leaving
everything else as in the Baseline. The resulting deviation of unemployment from its
steady state can be obtained from table 2.12. Clearly, the increase in unemployment
is persistently lower. After 40 quarters, unemployment is only 0.6 percentage points
higher than in the steady state, compared to 1.7 percentage points in the Baseline. Av-
erage annualised productivity growth is only 0.36% lower than in the previous decade
as opposed to 0.96% in the baseline calibration.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0.9 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3
Table 2.12. c=0 - Percentage Point Deviation of Unemployment from its
Steady State for selected Quarters
Within our model, c=0 would arise if there is no direct e¤ect of productivity on
e¤ort and if benets are not linked to productivity. We suggested above that these
results might be rooted in stronger unions and perhaps a stronger link between unem-
ployment benets and productivity in Europe. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) nd that
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the impact of macroeconomic shocks on unemployment is a¤ected by the labour market
structure. They nd that both unobservable macroeconomic shocks (captured by a time
e¤ect) as well as a one percentage point reduction in total factor productivity growth
increase unemployment by more the higher is union density.50 This result is conrmed
by Fitoussi et al. (2000).51 In that sense, our model provides some theoretical support
to the notion that both "shocks and institutions" (Blanchard and Wolfers) are crucial
to explaining the cross country evidence on the evolution of unemployment.
2.6. Conclusion
This chapter develops a New Keynesian model with unemployment and endogenous
growth to explain the persistent increase in continental European unemployment and
the lack thereof in the United States. We calibrate key parameters like the coe¢ cients in
the wage setting equation and the interest feedback rule of the central bank to Western
German data. The model economy is hit with a one quarter cost-push shock calibrated
to induce a disination of an order of magnitude seen at the beginning of the 1980s in
many industrialised OECD economies. We perform the same experiment on a model
without endogenous growth which we coin the JLN economy.
Under the baseline calibration, after ten years, unemployment will still be about 1.8
percentage points above its pre-shock value. As observed in many European countries,
unemployment increases quickly but reverts only very slowly. What is more, this slow
mean reversion is endogenous: The exogenous shock which increases unemployment in
the rst place vanishes after one quarter but unemployment remains high. This is in line
with the time series evidence we discussed in chapter one saying that unemployment
50See Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), pp. C20-C28.
51See Fitoussi et al. (2000), p. 250.
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rates in Germany and several other big European economies display high endogenous
persistence.
At the same time, ination stops declining soon after the cost push shock has van-
ished, implying that the successful disination has increased the NAIRU. Unsurpris-
ingly, no such e¤ect is seen in the JLN economy, where unemployment is back to its
steady state after about two years.
The high degree of endogenous unemployment persistence in the New Growth econ-
omy is due to the interaction of the investment - productivity growth relationship with
rigid real wage growth. In the New Growth economy, for a given employment level,
capital stock growth determines labour productivity growth. Hence the real wage-to-
capital ratio is the main driver of marginal costs. Thus, although real wage growth
declines as employment contracts, marginal cost returns back to its steady state level
soon after the shock has vanished because capital stock growth declines by even more.
This stops the disination and lowers the real wage growth rate associated with stable
ination. Since real wage growth is rigid, stable ination then requires an increase in
the unemployment rate: the NAIRU increases. The central bank therefore engineers
only a slow recovery of aggregate demand and unemployment since a faster decline of
unemployment would push ination above its target and render the output gap pos-
itive. The slow recovery of demand also slows down the recovery of investment and
productivity growth.
The model thus also contributes to explaining the productivity slowdown observed
across advanced OECD economies, and why negative shocks to productivity growth
are frequently signicant variables in regressions of unemployment on this variable and
others. Furthermore, the amount of monetary easing during the recession associated
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with the disination is negatively related to the subsequent increase in the NAIRU as
found by Ball (1999). If the central bank aggressively lowers the real interest rate as soon
as the economy is in recession, this lowers the decline in investment and productivity
growth and thus the increase in the NAIRU.
Finally, apart from generating a persistent increase in unemployment, the model
also contributes to explaining cross country di¤erences in the unemployment evolution.
Varying the size of the cost push shock generates a relationship between the change
in the ination rate and the change in the NAIRU over a ten year horizon similar to
a relationship in the data rst observed by Ball (1996). Using comparable policy rule
estimates of Clarida et al. (1998) for the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve, while
holding the cost-push shock constant, creates a higher persistent unemployment increase
with the latter than with the former. Finally, taking account of a well established cross-
continental di¤erence in the structure of the wage setting function, namely the absence
of a labour share term, also proves informative. In the absence of the labour share term,
we see a lower medium run increase in unemployment and the NAIRU since real wage
growth adjusts more exibly to the decline in productivity growth caused by the cost
push shock. The size of the labour share term in wage setting can be linked, if coarsely
so, to features of the labour market like union density or the benet system. Thus the
chapter lends support to the view that, as suggested by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000),
it is both "shocks and institutions" which are at the heart of explaining the evolution
of unemployment across time and the di¤erences across countries.
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CHAPTER 3
Optimal Simple Monetary Policy Rules in a New Keynesian 
Endogenous Growth Model
Conventional wisdom among monetary economists says that central banks should
mainly focus on ghting ination. This priority is found to be optimal in a wide
range of small and medium scale macroeconomic models. Examples include but are
not limited to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b), (2004c) and (2005), or for an open
economy context Senay (2008). Costs of ination arise in the form of price dispersion
in the presence of Calvo contracts. As not all rms can re-optimise their price every
period, their prices will diverge as will their output quantities. This is ine¢ cient as
each good generates declining marginal utility for the consumer, implying that more
purchases have to be made in order to reach a given utility level. Other costs of
ination arise from monetary frictions in the form of cash-in-advance constraints or
transaction-cost technologies. These factors all work to focus an optimising central
bank on stabilising ination rather than output. In addition in these models, temporary
shocks to the exogenous driving processes like total factor productivity do not have very
long lasting e¤ects on real variables. To the extent they do, this persistence is generated
by autocorrelation in the exogenous variables.
In the New Keynesian New Growth model developed in the previous chapter, a non-
auto correlated one period cost-push shock a¤ects employment, capital stock growth and
the other real variables over more than two decades in a non-trivial fashion. Therefore
it is interesting to reassess the conventional wisdom on the central banks stabilisation
120
priorities. This chapter aims to do so by optimising the coe¢ cients of an interest
feedback rule for the economy with and without endogenous growth.
As in chapter two, the only source of disturbance we consider is a cost push shock
since a cost push shock generates a trade-o¤ between stabilising output and stabilising
ination.1 A demand shock, by contrast, does not create this sort of trade-o¤ and is
therefore less interesting in the present context.
We proceed as follows. First, in section 3.1, we replace our assumption of quadratic
costs of price adjustment by the more commonly used assumption of Calvo contracts.
The reason for this modication is that that Calvo contracts is the most commonly
used way of modelling nominal rigidity in the literature on optimal monetary policy
and that Calvo contracts imply larger welfare costs of ination than quadratic costs
of price adjustment. Let us assume for the moment that we searched for an optimal
simple rule in the economies developed in chapter two and found that in the presence of
endogenous growth, the central bank responds less to ination and more to the output
gap. Then one could argue that this shift in priorities might be due to the low welfare
costs associated with quadratic costs of price adjustment rather than to endogenous
growth. To avoid this charge, we use Calvo contracts. Note that this modication has
only minor consequences for the positive properties of the models. Up to rst order,
both assumptions lead to the same Phillips curve as long as under Calvo contracts,
non-reoptimised prices are fully indexed to past ination, which is what we will assume
most of the time.
1An alternative way to generate a trade-o¤ between stabilising ination and stabilising output would
have been a productivity shock. However, to analyse the e¤ects of a productivity shock would have
been a lot more di¢ cult as it would directly a¤ect more than one of the two models equations, while
the cost push shock a¤ects only the Phillips curve. We leave this extension for future research.
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Thus as far as the non-policy components of the model are concerned, the baseline
model used for policy evaluation in this chapter deviates from the model developed in
chapter two only in the source of nominal rigidity. We also maintain the calibration
introduced in the previous chapter and thus will discuss calibration issues only in so far
as required by new features we ad to the model. Section 3.2 introduces a transaction
cost for consumption purchases to motivate a money demand by households, following
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005). This modication also works to increase the cost of
ination and thus provides another check of the robustness of our main result. Section
3.3 shows how we are measuring welfare and the welfare costs of suboptimal policies.
Section 3.4 introduces the policy rule and discusses the grid. Section 3.5 summarises
the equations of the modied model. Section 3.6 illustrates how the trade-o¤ between
stabilising real variables and stabilising ination di¤ers between the endogenous growth
and the JLN economy. Section 3.7 presents the result from the grid search and discusses
some properties of the rules found to be optimal in the respective scenarios. Section 3.8
computes the welfare costs associated with the policy rule estimates for the Bundesbank
by Clausen and Meier (2003) and Clarida et al. (1998). Section 3.9 concludes.
3.1. Calvo Contracts
We replace the assumption of quadratic costs of price adjustment with Calvo (1983)
contracts. The main reason is that Calvo price setting is generally held to involve
larger costs of ination. As before, the aggregate consumption and the investment
good bought by the household is a CES basket of varieties. Households spread their
consumption and investment expenditures across the various varieties in the basket in
a cost minimising way, subject to achieving a certain number of baskets. This number
is the sum of Ct; which determined by the consumption Euler equation, and It, which is
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determined by the investment rst order condition. Under Calvo pricing, the prices of
the varieties in the basket can di¤er because only a fraction of rms can re-optimise their
prices each quarter. Thus the quantities bought of each variety di¤er since households
buy more of the cheaper and less of the more expensive varieties. Because the marginal
contribution of each variety to the basket is diminishing, the decline in the basket from
consuming less of the more expensive varieties more than o¤sets the increase in the
basket from consuming more of the cheaper varieties. To put it di¤erently, to reach a
certain value of Ct + It, consumers have to pay more if there is price dispersion.2
Under the assumptions about the degree of indexing of non-optimised prices to past
ination we are going to make, the resulting Phillips curve will be identical to the one
we used so far up to a rst order approximation.
With Calvo pricing, a random fraction of rms ! is not allowed to re-optimise their
prices every period. Those rms instead index their prices to past ination, where the
degree of indexing is given by ; so that a price of a rm j allowed to reset its price in
period t equals Pt (j)

Pt+i 1
Pt 1

in period t+i. Hence the rm maximises
Et
2664 1X
i=0
!it;t+iYt+i
2664

Pt(j)
Pt+i
1  
Pt+i 1
Pt 1
(1 )
 mct+i

Pt(j)
Pt+i
  
Pt+i 1
Pt 1
 
3775
3775
where t;t+i = 
i u0(Ct+i habt+i 1)
u0(Ct habt 1) denotes the stochastic discount factor employed by the
household to discount real prots. The rst order condition can be rearranged to get

pt =
Et
" 1X
i=0
(!)i uc (Ct+i   habt+i 1)mct+iYt+i

Pt+i
Pt
 
Pt+i 1
Pt 1
 #
(   1)Et
" 1X
i=0
(!)i uc (Ct+i   habt+i 1)Yt+i

Pt+i
Pt
 1 
Pt+i 1
Pt 1
(1 )#
2See for instance Walsh (2003), p. 521.
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where

pt =
ePt
Pt
, and ePt denotes the price set by the fraction of rms which has been
allowed to reoptimse. To get rid of the innite sums, we dene two articial variables
Gt and Mt, one for the numerator and one for the denominator. Thus we have
Gt = Et
" 1X
i=0
(!)i uc (Ct+i   habt+i 1)mct+iYt+i

Pt+i
Pt
 
Pt+i 1
Pt 1
 #
Mt = (   1)Et
" 1X
i=0
(!)i uc (Ct+i   habt+i 1)Yt+i

Pt+i
Pt
 1
Pt+i 1
Pt 1
(1 )#
which can be rewritten, assuming log utility, as
Gt =  (mct)
Yt
Ct   habt 1 + ! (1 + t)
  Et

(1 + t+1)
Gt+1

(3.1)
Mt = (   1) Yt
Ct   habt 1 + ! (1 + t)
(1 )Et

(1 + t+1)
 1Mt+1

(3.2)
The price index evolves according to
P 1 t = (1  !)

P
1 
t + !

Pt 1

Pt 1
Pt 2
1 
or
1 = (1  !) p1 t +
!
(1 + t)
1  (1 + t 1)
(1 )
Thus we have
(3.3)

p
1 
t =
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
We now want to again introduce a cost push shock, i.e. a shock increasing ination
given marginal costs. Due to the more complicated structure of the Phillips Curve,
instead of subtracting ut from t; we instead add ut   1 !1 !  1+1 ! to mct in (3:1)
and (3:2) : This implies that up to rst order approximation, we have a Phillips curve
with a cost push shock added on the right hand side, just as in chapter two.
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The resource cost induced by the ine¢ cient price dispersion present in the Calvo
model is captured by the variable St; which enters the recourse constraint in the fol-
lowing way
ADt = St (Ct + It)(3.4)
St = (1  !)  p
 
t + !

1 + t
(1 + t 1)


St 1(3.5)
as shown by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005).3 St is always greater than or equal to
one. It increases the recourse costs of a given amount of consumption and investment
goods.
For future reference, it will be useful to substitute (3:3) into (3:5), then take a sec-
ond order approximation of the resulting expression and the unconditional expectation
thereof. This (as is shown in the appendix B.1 ) yields
(3.6) ESt = 1 +
!
(1  !)2

1
2

1 + 2
  AC (dt)E (dt)2
where AC (dt) and E (dt)
2 denote the autocorrelation and variance of ination, re-
spectively. Thus price dispersion depends positively on the variance of ination, as the
term in the outer brackets is always positive AC (dt) < 1 and   1.4 If there is
some indexing ( > 0), it also depends negatively on the autocorrelation of ination.
Note also that the e¤ect of the variance of ination increases in : Note that an in-
crease in the degree of nominal rigidity ! increases the e¤ect of the ination variance
on mean price dispersion. If prices remain xed for longer on average, they will revert
3For a derivation of the law of motion for St see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005), pp. 18-19.
4The expression in brackets clearly decreases in AC (dt) : If we set AC (dt) = 1, the term in brackets
becomes 12

1 + 2
   ; which will be zero if 2   2 + 1 = 0:The single solution to this equation is
 = 1: For 0    1; 12

1 + 2
   will be larger than or equal to zero.
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less quickly to whatever the average price level turns out to be in the future. Hence
an increase in ination in a given period will have a stronger e¤ect on price dispersion
than it otherwise would.
We set ! = 0:67, implying that rms re-optimise their prices about every three
quarters, and  = 1; implying that non-optimising rms index their prices to past
ination.
3.2. Transaction Cost
As a deviation from the baseline, we will introduce a transaction cost for consump-
tion. Following Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2005), consumers have to pay a cost l (vt) ;
where vt = Ctmht
and mht denotes real money holdings by the household, and l
0 (vt) ;
l
00
(vt) > 0: Thus the household faces higher transaction costs if it increases its pur-
chases for a given amount of money holdings in period t, and the costs increase at an
increasing rate. We also follow Schmitt Grohe and Uribe in adopting the following
functional form:
(3.7) l(vt) = 1vt + 2=vt   2
p
12; 1; 2 > 0
One of the great advantages of this functional form is that the resulting money de-
mand function can be quite accurately approximated up to second order over a relevant
interest rate interval.
With the transaction technology summarised by (3:7) ; and all other assumptions
about the household remaining the same, the representative household now faces the
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problem to maximise
U = Et
( 1X
i=0
i [u(Ct+i   habt+i 1)  (nt+i   n)G(et+i)]
)
; u0 > 0; u00 < 0
G (et(j)) =
0BB@et(j) 
0BB@ 0 + 1 logwt(j) + 2(nt   n) + 3 logwt
+4 logwt 1   5 log bt   8 log (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns))
1CCA
1CCA
2
s:t: (nt   n)wt + rktKt +
Bt 1
Pt
(1 + it 1) +zt +mht 1
Pt 1
Pt
 Ct

1 + l

Ct
mht

+ It +
Bt
Pt
+ Tt +m
h
t and
l(
Ct
mht
) = 1 + 2=vt   2
p
12; 1; 2 > 0
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It
 
1  
2

It
It 1
  (1 + g)
2!
Note how the budget constraint is being modied by the introduction of the trans-
action cost. Households have to pay the transaction cost for each unit of consumption.
If they want to reduce the transaction cost, they have to hold money mht ; implying that
they are going to have less wealth to allocate towards investment or bonds.
Maximising utility yields the following rst order conditions for consumption, bonds
and money (the rst order conditions for capital, investment and e¤ort are una¤ected),
assuming that u(Ct+i   habt+i 1) = ln (Ct+i   habt+i 1) :
1
Ct   habt 1 = t

1 + l(vt) +
Ct
mht
l0 (vt)

(3.8)
1 = Et

t+1
t (1 + t+1)

(1 + it)(3.9)
v2t l
0 (vt) = 1  Et

t+1
t (1 + t+1)

(3.10)
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Combining (3:9) and (3:10) yields the demand for money:
(3.11) v2t l
0 (vt) = 1  1
1 + it
or, applying our assumed functional form for l(vt)
(3.12) v2t =
2
1
+
1
1
it
1 + it
Note that vt is increasing in the interest rate: As the yields on bonds increases, holding
money becomes more costly relative to the increase in transaction costs associated with
reducing money holdings. Thus the household holds less money. Note also that a higher
ination rate, to the extent that it implies a higher nominal interest rate it; will also
tend to lower money holdings. As this increases l(vt), the introduction of transaction
costs thus creates another reason why ination is costly. This will provide a useful
check of our baseline results.
Given that consumption now comes with a transaction cost, we also have to modify
the aggregate demand equation, which now reads
ADt = St

Ct

1 + l

Ct
mht

+ It

Although the transaction cost thus a¤ects aggregate demand, it turns out that it has
in fact a negligible e¤ect on the second moments and impulse responses.
We will calibrate the coe¢ cients 1 and 2 as follows: (3:12) implies the following
demand for log money ln
 
mht

= ln (Ct)  12 ln

2
1
+ 1
1
it
1+it

: Hence around the steady
128
state, the annualised semi elasticity of money demand, "mi = 14
d ln(mht )
dit
; is given by
"mi =  1
8
1
2
 
1 + i
2
+
 
1 + i

i
We calibrate "mi to an empirical estimate of a M1 log money demand function on
German data by Clausen (1998) using short term interest rates and output as the
arguments. We would of course prefer an estimate based on a specication including
consumption but as far as we are aware these estimates do not exist in the empirical
literature. Clausens estimate of "mi is -2.93, but we also check our results against
an estimate of Luetekepohl et al (1999), who estimate "mi to be -5.11.5 Using our
estimate for "mi, we can back out 2. We then calibrate 1 from (3:12) using the
average household money to consumption ratio for Germany from 1970q1 to 1990q4.
The average of vt is obtained by calculating the average of CtPt=M1t over this time
period; and further assuming that households hold a xed share of M1. We calibrate
this share to equal 0.54 as this was the average annual share in Germany from 1970 to
1990.6
We show in appendix B.2 to this chapter that a more negative "mi implies a larger
increase in transaction costs as a response to higher interest rates, i.e. @
2lt
@it@"mi
< 0: This
is because if "mi is more negative, people will reduce their money balances by more
in response to an increase in the nominal interest rate, and thus transaction costs will
increase by more.7
5See Clausen (1998), p. 737, and Luetkephol et al., (1999), p. 516. A problem with these estimates is
that the underlying equations are misspecied for our purpose because, like all empirically estimated
money demand equations, use output rather than consumption in their equation.
6We are grateful to DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK- Kommunikation for emailing us the relevant data.
7That @
2lt
@it@"mi
< 0 is not as self evident as it may seem. There are two e¤ects at work here: On the one
hand, a more negative value of "mi means that as the nominal interest rate increases, the consumption
money ratio vt increase by more thus implying a higher rise in transaction cost. The countervailing
e¤ect stems from the fact that the calibration method backs out the transaction cost parameters (1
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3.3. Measuring Welfare
Our welfare measure is going to be a quadratic approximation to the representative
households utility. However, the endogenous growth sticky price model has multiple
distortions rendering the steady state ine¢ cient. As shown by Sutherland (2002) and
Woodford (2003), an ine¢ cient steady state implies that the second order approxima-
tion to the households welfare would feature a term linear in one or more of the models
variables. The recursive solution describing the path of these variables needs to be
second order accurate as well to render the approximation to the households welfare
second order accurate. Under a rst order approximation to the recursive solution of
the model, we would ignore certain second order terms belonging to the second order
accurate approximation to the households welfare.8
To address this issue we use a second order approximation to the models solution
following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a). Our welfare measure is the households
expected utility, conditional on the state of the economy being the non-stochastic steady
state in period 0. This implies that the stochastic shocks are equal to zero as well.
Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2004c) detail how to compute welfare for a given policy
under these assumptions.9 As in this paper, we are using the solution method of
Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2004a) as implemented in the software Dynare, we will
use a somewhat di¤erent notation to illustrate their approach.
and 2) such that the money demand function implies a given "mi. Both 1 and 2 will be lower if
"mi is more negative. As can be seen from (3:7) , the e¤ect of this on l
0
(vt), is ambiguous. Hence a
higher "mi might decrease the cost of increasing vt: The net e¤ect on @lt@it would be ambiguous.
8See Sutherland (2002), p. 5, and Woodford (2003), pp. 383-388.
9See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004c), pp.19 and pp. 28-30.
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The equilibrium conditions of most rational expectation models can be written in
the following fashion:
Et [f (yt+1; yt; yt 1; ut)] = 0
ut = "t
Et

"t"
0
t

= "
Et

"t"
0
t+i

= 0; i 6= 0
In this notation, y denotes a vector of endogenous variables, "t a vector of mean zero
and variance one random variables which might be intratemporary correlated. All
predetermined, or state variables are denoted with a t-1 subscript.
The non explosive recursive solution to this set of equations, if it exists, can be
written as
(3.13) yt = g (yt 1; ut; )
In our model, the endogenous variables are Ft = YtKt ; Dt =
Ct
Kt
; Rt =
It
Kt
; nt; g
K
t =
Kt+1
Kt
; t; St; it; Ht =
wt
Kt
; rkt ; mct; qt; Gt; Mt; t =
t
Kt
and eVt; our stationarised welfare
measure, to be dened below in more detail. Among those, the variables which enter
the equilibrium conditions in a predetermined fashion and thus would form part of yt 1
are Dt 1; Rt 1;gKt ; t 1; st 1; it 1; Ht 1: We have a single stochastic shock in our model
denoted by ut; which is not auto correlated.
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We measure welfare using the households utility function. Utility maximisation
implies that the disutility of e¤ort is always zero10, so that the relevant welfare measure
is
V0 = E0
" 1X
i=0
t ln
 eCt#(3.15)
eCt = Ct   jCt 1
Since we are dealing with a growth model, Ct; eCt and Vt will all be trended. Thus
we will have to rewrite (3:15) to contain only stationary variables. Furthermore, we
would like to express welfare in a di¤erence equation which we can add to the other
di¤erence equations to jointly solve them. We proceed as follows:
V0 = E0
" 1X
t=0
t ln
 eC 1 tY
s=0
 
1 + gecs
!#
=
ln
 eC0 1
1   + E0
" 1X
t=0
i ln
 
tY
s=0
 
1 + gecs
!#
eCteCt 1 = 1 + gect
Note that gect is a stationary variable and that eC0 1 is independent of a policy which is
implemented in period t=0. Note also that if we move
ln( eC0 1)
1  to the other side, the right
hand side of the equation will be stationary. We dene eV0 = V0  ln( eC 1)1  and write eV0 =
V0   ln(
eC 1)
1  = E0
 1P
t=0
t

tP
s=0
ln
 
1 + gecs = ln(1+gec0)1  + E0  1P
t=0
t

tP
s=1
ln
 
1 + gecs
=
ln(1+gec0)
1  +E0
 1P
i=0
t

tP
s=0
ln
 
1 + gecs+1 = ln(1+gec0)1  +E0  1P
t=0
t

tP
s=0
ln
 
1 + gecs+1
=
ln(1+gec0)
1  + E0
eV1
10This is because the optimal e¤ort level is given by
et(j) = 0 + 1 logwt(j) + 2 (nt   n) + 3 logwt
+4 logwt 1   5 log bt   8 (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns))(3.14)
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Thus we have expressed welfare in period 0 by means of a forward looking di¤erence
equation featuring only stationary variables. eVt is now a variable in our model, solving
the model will yield a recursive equation expressing it as function of the state vector
and the stochastic shock:
eVt = g (yt 1; ut; )
A second order approximation to g yields
eVt  eV + gydyt 1 + guut + g
2
2 +
1
2
gyydy
0
t 1dyt 1 +
1
2
gyuu
0
t 1dyt 1 +
1
2
guuu
2
t
11;where dyt denotes the deviation of a variable from its steady state y, while eV denotes
the non-stochastic steady state level of welfare, and all partial derivatives are evaluated
at the non-stochastic steady state. We are interested in expected welfare at t=0, i.e.
eV0, which is a function of y 1 and u0. Moreover, as mentioned above, we are interested
in eV0 conditional on the initial state being the non stochastic steady state, i.e. dy 1 = 0
and u0 = 0: Our welfare measure is accordingly written as
(3.16) eV0 (y 1 = y; u0 = 0; )  eV + g
2
2
where the rst term is independent of policy in our model. We perform a grid search
over various interest feedback rule coe¢ cients in order to nd the coe¢ cient vector
maximising eV0 (y 1 = y; u0 = 0) :
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004c), we can also compute the welfare costs
of di¤erent policies, and express them as a percentage of consumption under the optimal
11Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2004a) show that gand gy are equal to zero. See Grohe and Uribe
(2004), p. 763.The second order approximation to a stochastic model di¤ers from its non-stochastic
counterpart only in the constant 12g:
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policy. Let V r0 denote welfare under the optimal, or reference policy regime, while V
a
0
denotes welfare under an alternative policy regime. From (3:15) ; we have
V r0 = E0
" 1X
i=0
t ln
 
Crt   jCrt 1
#
(3.17)
V a0 = E0
" 1X
i=0
t ln
 
Cat   jCat 1
#
(3.18)
It is useful to rewrite (3:17) as
V r0 = ln (C
r
0   jC 1) + E0
" 1X
t=1
t ln
 
Crt   jCrt 1
#
noting that C 1 is independent of policy. Let  denote the percentage of consumption
we will have to take away from consumers from 0 to innity under the optimal policy
regime to make them as bad o¤ as under the alternative one. It must then hold that
V a0 = ln ((1  )Cr0   jC 1) + E0
" 1X
t=1
t ln
 
(1  )  Crt   jCrt 1
#
= ln ((1  )Cr0   jC 1) +
 ln (1  )
1   + E0
" 1X
t=1
t ln
 
Crt   jCrt 1
#
We can thus write
V r0   V a0 = ln (Cr0   jC 1)  ln ((1  )Cr0   jC 1) 
 ln (1  )
1  
= ln

Cr0   jC 1
(1  )Cr0   jC 1

   ln (1  )
1  
As before, we would like to replace all trended variables by stationary variables. Under
our assumption that C 1 is the same under all policy regimes, we have V r0   V a0 =
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eV r0   eV a0 . We thus have
eV r0   eV a0 = ln
  
1 + gc
r
0
  j
(1 + gc
r
0 ) (1  )  j
!
   ln (1  )
1  (3.19)
= ln
  
1 + gc
r
0
  j  ln   1 + gcr0  (1  )  j   ln (1  )1  (3.20)
where gc
r
0 =
Cr0
C 1
 1:We now take a second order approximation to . As eV r0 ; eV a0 and gcr0
are all functions of the state variables, which we denote as gr (yt 1; ut; ), ga (yt 1; ut; )
and gc
r
(yt 1; ut; ) ; so will  :  = g (yt 1; ut; ) : Furthermore, we assume that the
initial state is the non-stochastic steady state, so that we can write
0 (y 1 = y; u0 = 0; )  g


2
2
as there are no welfare costs in the non-stochastic steady state. To nd g from (3:20),
we rst take the rst derivative with respect to ; which yields
gr   ga =
gg
cr

1 + gcr   j  
 
gg
cr
 (1  ) 
 
1 + gc
r
g
(1 + gcr) (1  )  j
!
+
g
(1  ) (1  )
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) show that the rst derivative of the g function with
respect to  is zero. Thus gr = g
a
 = g
gc
r
 = 0; and hence g

 = 0 as well. Taking the
second derivative, and using this information, we have
g =
gr   ga

1  +
1+g
1+g j
and thus
0 (y 1 = y; u0 = 0; ) =
gr   ga

1  +
1+g
1+g j
1
2
2
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where g denotes the steady state growth rate of the economy. Substituting (3:16) and
multiplying both sides by 100 yields the welfare cost of a the alternative policy as a
percentage of the consumption stream under the optimal policy:
1000 (y 1 = y; u0 = 0; ) =
eV r0   eV a0

1  +
1+g
1+g j
100
3.4. Monetary Policy
We maximise welfare by appropriately choosing the coe¢ cients of the following
simple interest feedback rule:
(3.21) it = (1  ) i+ (1  )t + (1  )gapgapt + it 1
We are searching over the following intervals:  = [0; 0:8] ; step size 0.1,  =
[1:2; 8:2] ; step size 0.5 and gap = [0; 8] ; step size 0.5. Note that we are restricting our-
selves to policy rules which would be commonly expected to yield determinate results,
which indeed turns out to be the case. Furthermore, we do not consider "pathological"
rules featuring negative coe¢ cients on either ination or the output gap.
Other than the baseline non-policy calibration, we will also consider the case of
no indexation to past ination among non optimising price setters ({ = 0), a zero
coe¢ cient on the labour share in wage setting (c = 0) and an increase of the probability
! that a rm can not change its price to 0:75 to see whether our results are robust.
Furthermore, we will introduce a transaction cost for consumption purchases which
creates a demand for money. This will increase the costs of ination and will therefore
provide a useful check for our results.
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Finally, note that we are not considering the case of  = 0:9. Allowing for this,
though, would not change the basic thrust of our results regarding the priorities of the
central bank with respect to the stabilisation of the output gap versus the stabilisation of
ination. However, we have two reasons to distrust the accuracy of our welfare measure
for the policies found optimal in this case. Firstly, we nd that for the policy found
optimal for the baseline, the second order accurate standard deviation of ination di¤ers
signicantly from the standard deviation calculated from a simulation of a second order
accurate solution to the model (which amounts to a fourth order accurate approximation
to the standard deviation). As our second order accurate approximation to welfare
incorporates the e¤ects of second order accurate second moments of the model, this
sheds doubt on the accuracy of our welfare measure for this case. More specically, as
shown above, the mean degree of price dispersion, representing the costs of ination,
depends on the ination variance. If our measurement of the ination variance is biased
downwards, so will the welfare costs of ination.
Secondly, comparing welfare across the various deviations from the baseline, we
nd some counterintuitive results. For instance, we nd that welfare levels under the
respective optimal policy are lower for  = 0 and c = 0 than in the Baseline. But both
a lower degree of indexation and lower real wage rigidity should facilitate the task of
the central bank rather than make it more di¢ cult. These issues disappear when we
restrict  to equal 0.8 or less.
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3.5. Aggregate Equations
For future reference, we will list the aggregate equations of the modies model.
Aggregate demand is given by
ADt = St (Ct + It) [ Baseline](3.22)
ADt = St

Ct

1 + l

Ct
mht

+ It

[Transaction cost](3.23)
where St evolves according to
(3.24) St = (1  !)  p
 
t + !

1 + t
(1 + t 1)


St 1
The marginal utility of consumption evolves according to
1
Ct   habt 1 = t [ Baseline](3.25)
1
Ct   habt 1 = t

1 + l(vt) +
Ct
mht
l0 (vt)

[Transaction cost]
and
(3.26) 1 = Et

t+1
t (1 + t+1)

(1 + it)
The level of habit is given by
(3.27) habt 1 = jCt 1
Money demand, in the presence of transaction costs, is given by
(3.28) v2t =
2
1
+
1
1
it
1 + it
[Transaction cost]
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Investment expenditures is governed by the following equations:
Et
 
t+1r
k
t+1 + t+1qt+1 (1  )

= tqt(3.29)
tqt
" 
1  
2

It
It 1
  (1 + g)
2!
  It
It 1


It
It 1
  (1 + g)
#
(3.30)
+Et
"
t+1qt+1

It+1
It
2


It+1
It
  (1 + g)
#
= t(3.31)
while capital accumulation is given by
(3.32) Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It
 
1  
2

It
It 1
  (1 + g)
2!
The capital rental is given by
(3.33) rkt = mct
Yt
Kt
In the equations that follow, total factor productivity will evolve according to
TFPt = (1 + g)TFPt 1 [JLNE](3.34)
TFPt = Kt [New Growth]
Marginal cost are given by
(3.35) mct =
 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1TFPt)1 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Wages are set according to
logwt   logwt 1 = a+ b  (nt   n) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

(3.36)
b > 0; c < 0:
Total output is given by private sector output Yt plus the output of state employees:
Outputt = AKt
(TFPt1 (nt   n  ns))1  + wtns [JLNE](3.37)
Outputt = AtKt((nt   n  ns)1)1  + wtns [New Growth](3.38)
Markets clear:
ADt = Outputt
The evolution of prices is determined by the equations for the two articial variables
Gt and Mt and the law of motion of the price index:
Gt = 

mct + ut   1 !
1  ! 
1 + 
1  !

Yt
Ct
(3.39)
+! (1 + t)
  Et

(1 + t+1)
Gt+1

(3.40)
Mt = (   1) Yt
Ct
+! (1 + t)
(1 )Et

(1 + t+1)
 1Mt+1

(3.41)

Gt
Mt
1 
=
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
The interest feedback rule is given by
(3.42) it = (1  ) i+ (1  )t + (1  )gapgapt + it 1
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with
(3.43) gpt =
Outputt  Outputnt
Outputnt
and natural output, natural employment and the natural wage being determined by
 1 =
(nnt   ns   n)wnt
A (1  ) (1TFPt)1 Kt
logwnt   logwt 1 = a+ b  (nnt   n) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

Outputnt = AKt
(TFPt1 (n
n
t   ns   n))1  + wnt ns(3.44)
3.6. Illustration of the Tradeo¤s between stabilising Ination and
stabilising real Variables
We will now illustrate how the tradeo¤s between stabilising ination and stabilising
real variables di¤er between the JLN and the New Growth economy, referred to as
"JLNE" and "NGE" in the gures and tables printed below. Lets turn rst to the JLN
economy. Figure 3.1 displays the impulse response functions of ination for  = 1:2
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Figure 3.1. JLNE - Ination for  = 1:2,  = 0; and various Values of gap
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and values of gap between 0 and 2. Clearly, the smaller the output gap coe¢ cient,
the less ination rises on impact and the faster it returns to zero. On-impact responses
vary between 0.38% and 0.52%. While for gap = 0; ination is back to target after 5
quarters, it takes about 40 quarters with gap = 2: Correspondingly, the less emphasis
the central bank places on output gap stabilisation, the stronger employment falls on
impact, as can be obtained from Figure 3.2. However, employment bounces back very
quickly. After about 10 quarters, the distance to the steady state has shrunken to
about 0.0189%. Indeed, it returns faster to the steady state than under the alternative
policy rules which put a larger weight on the output gap. The sharp on-impact drop in
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Figure 3.2. JLNE - Employment for  = 1:2,  = 0; and various Values
of gap
employment with gap = 0means that real wage growth collapses and ination is quickly
forced out of the system, thus creating scope for lowering the real interest rate and
increasing employment. By contrast, avoiding a large on impact drop in employment
means that ination remains high for longer, partly as a consequence indexing of non-
re-optimised prices to past ination. Therefore employment has to stay below its steady
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state somewhat longer in order to keep real wage growth muted. Correspondingly, gure
3.3 shows that habit adjusted consumption growth (the variable driving the households
welfare) drops more sharply the less the central bank reacts to output. However for all
ve rules, it returns to its steady state within about 4 years and then remains slightly
above it for some time.
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Figure 3.3. JLNE - gect for  = 1:2,  = 0; and various Values of gap
This above trend growth rate brings consumption back to its pre-shock trajectory.
Hence a more hawkish monetary policy response to a one time cost push shock cannot
permanently lower consumption. This is not surprising since total factor productivity
grows exogenously and thus the capital-to-e¤ective labour ratio has declined after the
recession, which increases the marginal product of capital. Hence capital accumulation
stays above trend until the capital stock, output and thus consumption have returned
to their pre-shock trajectories.
143
-0.20%
-0.10%
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
0.40%
0.50%
0.60%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Quarters
phigap=0
phigap=0.5
phigap=1
phigap=1.5
phigap=2
Figure 3.4. New Growth Economy - Ination for  = 1:2,  = 0; and
various Values of gap
The results are very di¤erent for the New Growth economy. While Figure 3.4
shows that the initial increase and the persistence of ination still increase in gap; not
responding to the output gap has substantially stronger real e¤ects than in the JLN
economy. From gure 3.5, it can be obtained that employment remains persistently
below its steady state. Not only does employment decline more on impact than for
instance with gap = 1 (the triangle), it also remains persistently lower for more than
15 years. Similarly, habit adjusted consumption falls a lot more if gap = 0 than for
larger values of gap, as can be obtained from gure 3.6. While it returns above its
steady state for a couple of quarters, it then falls back below the steady state and
remains there. It also remains below the path it would take if gap would exceed zero.
This implies that after a one-o¤ adverse shock, consumption is permanently lower
under gap = 0 than if policy responds more strongly to output.
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Figure 3.5. New Growth Economy - Employment for  = 1:2,  = 0;
and various Values of gap
The underlying reason for the permanent e¤ect of monetary policy on the post-shock
consumption path is that in the presence of endogenous growth, the capital stock and
by implication output and consumption are fully path dependent. This is a well known
property of growth models with an AK type production technology, i.e. a technology
where output is linear in the producible input. If an adverse shock temporarily lowers
capital stock growth by lowering the marginal product of capital and increasing the
real interest rate, then the capital stock will never return to its pre-shock growth path
- unless a su¢ ciently big favourable shock occurs. This is illustrated by gure 2.6 of
chapter two: Note that capital stock growth stays persistently below its steady state
value but never exceeds it, which would be necessary to move the capital stock back
to its pre-shock trajectory. However, the central bank can inuence how much and
how persistently capital stock growth declines in response to the cost push shock. If it
raises the interest rate very aggressively in spite of a negative output gap, the decline
in capital stock growth will be larger and more persistent. Thus the distance of the
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Figure 3.6. New Growth Economy - gect for  = 1:2,  = 0; and various
Values of gap
post-shock trajectory of the capital stock from the path the capital stock would have
taken in the absence of the shock will be larger. The same will be true for the distance
of the post-shock trajectory of consumption from the path consumption would have
taken in the absence of the shock.
Obviously the trade-o¤ between stabilising ination and stabilising real variables is
di¤erent in the New Growth economy: stabilising ination implies much more volatility
in employment and consumption growth than in the JLN economy. What is more, a
failure to respond to the output gap and an aggressive response to ination increase
the uncertainty of the long run consumption path far more in the New Growth than
in the JLN economy. This is because a cost push shock in the New Growth economy
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has a permanent e¤ect on the future output and consumption trajectory, which will be
amplied by a hawkish monetary policy. By contrast, in the JLN economy a hawkish
monetary policy only increases the uctuations of consumption around an exogenously
determined trajectory.
3.7. Stabilisation Priorities in the Presence and Absence of Endogenous
Growth
Based on the discussion in the previous section we would expect that in the New
Growth economy, an optimising central bank will respond more strongly to the output
gap and less to ination than in the JLN economy in order to reduce the uncertainty of
the future consumption path. Table 3.1 shows that this is indeed the case. It contains
the optimal rules under the various scenarios. The rst column shows the respective
deviation from the baseline case. The rst three columns display the optimal coe¢ cients
in the JLN economy, while the nal three columns display the optimal coe¢ cients
under the endogenous growth economy. Obviously, the central bank is always, with
the exception of { = 0; more hawkish in the JLN than in the New Growth economy.
With the exception of the scenario where { = 0; the coe¢ cient on ination in the New
Growth Economy is always smaller than the coe¢ cient in the JLN economy, while the
coe¢ cient on the output gap is larger. Clearly, the central bank is aware that in the
New Growth economy, a hawkish monetary policy amplies the permanent e¤ect of a
cost push shock on consumption and therefore chooses to stabilise output.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 further illustrate the policymakers motivation by displaying a
couple of unconditional rst second moments for the nominal variables and St (table
3.2) and a couple of real variables (table 3.3). In both tables, the rst row shows the
moments generated by the JLN economy with the policy rule optimal in this economy,
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JLNE NGE
Scenario  gap   gap 
Baseline 6.7 1.5 0.8 1.2 3 0.8
{ = 0 1.2 8 0.8 1.2 8 0.8
c = 0 8.2 2 0.8 1.2 4.5 0.8
! = 0:75 2.7 0.5 0.8 1.2 2 0.8
Money: "mi =  5:11 8.2 0 0 1.2 0.5 0.8
Money: "mi =  2:93 1.2 0 0.6 1.2 1 0.8
Table 3.1. Optimal Rules for the JLNE and the New Growth Economy
while the second row displays the moments generated by applying this rule to the New
Growth economy. Finally, the third row shows the moments generated by applying
the rule optimal in the New Growth economy to the New Growth economy.12 Note
that the moments of the nominal variables St and shown in table 3.2 are remarkably
similar across the rst two rows: The policy rule optimal in the JLN economy induces
very similar behaviour of ination, price dispersion, and the nominal interest rate in
both the New Growth economy and the JLN economy. By contrast, this policy causes
substantially higher volatility of habit adjusted consumption growth gect : This can be
seen from column two of table 3.3. Under the policy optimal in the JLN economy,
the standard deviation of gect is about 0.17% (or 0.68% at an annualised rate) higher
in the New Growth economy than in the JLN economy. The standard deviation of
employment is higher by 0.69%.
By contrast, the policy optimal in the New Growth economy reduces the standard
deviation of gect far below its value in the JLN economy. The likely reason for this was
discussed in the previous section. In the New Growth economy, a given deviation of
gect from its steady state will be associated with a permanently di¤erent consumption
trajectory (unless a future shock moves the economy in the opposite direction). Thus a
12All the second moments are based on a rst order approximation to the solution of the model as
this will yield a second order accurate approximation to the second moments of the model. As we
are taking a second order accurate solution to welfare, this is the welfare relevant way to measure the
second moments.
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given standard deviation of habit adjusted consumption growth generates more uncer-
tainty regarding the future path of consumption in the New Growth than in the JLN
economy. The policy maker chooses to reduce this uncertainty and thus stabilises gect far
more than in the JLN economy. He also strongly reduces its autocorrelation in order to
make sure that a given deviation of habit adjusted consumption growth from its trend
does not persist.
Correspondingly, the optimal policy in the New Growth economy puts a much
smaller priority on stabilising ination. The mean ination rate is 1.27% per quar-
ter, or about 5.1% at an annualised rate. More important for welfare considerations,
the standard deviation of ination is about 2.5 times as large as in the JLN economy,
which tends to increase mean price dispersion ESt; as can be obtained from equation
(3:6) : The autocorrelation of ination also increases when moving to the policy optimal
in the New Growth economy, which will tend to lower ESt; but this e¤ect is dominated
by the increase in sd: t.13 Thus price dispersion is also higher, namely 1.0006 as
opposed to 1.0003 under the rule optimal for the JLN economy.
The welfare cost of applying the policy optimal in the JLN economy to the New
Growth economy, shown in the nal column, amounts to 0.36% of consumption under
the optimal policy. Clearly, a policy optimal in an economy in which the monetary
policy response to a cost push shock has only short lived e¤ects on consumption can
be quite costly in an endogenous growth economy where the monetary policy response
to a shock has permanent e¤ects on the consumption trajectory.
Correspondingly, the response of ination to a one standard deviation shock in the
New Growth economy is much stronger and more persistent under the optimal rule
13Note that equation (3:6) features the variance of ination, implying that. sd t enters EtSt with a
square.
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Scenario Et sd: t ACt ESt sd: it ACit
JLNE, [6:7; 1:5; 0:8] 0.0001 0.0041 0.47 1.0003 0.0048 0.71
NGE, [6:7; 1:5; 0:8] 0.0001 0.004 0.46 1.0003 0.0042 0.68
NGE, [1:2; 3; 0:8] 0.0127 0.0101 0.84 1.0006 0.0071 0.93
Table 3.2. Selected Moments of nominal Variables
Scenario sd: gect ACgect sd: nt ACnt Welfare cost
JLNE, [6:7; 1:5; 0:8] 0.0074 -0.0191 0.0115 0.84 0%
NGE, [6:7; 1:5; 0:8] 0.0091 -0.058 0.0184 0.93 0.36%
NGE, [1:2; 3; 0:8] 0.0037 -0.32 0.004 0.84 0%
Table 3.3. Selected Moments of real Variables
than under the rule optimal for the JLN economy, as can be obtained from gure 3.7.
Ination increases by 0.56% on impact and then decreases only gradually. After 10
quarters, it is still 0.07% above its steady state. It becomes negative after 22 quarters.
Under the rule optimal for the JLN economy, ination increases on impact by mere
0.35%, and returns to zero after 4 quarters. Turning to the real variables, under the
optimal rule, employment actually increases on impact and then starts declining, as
can be obtained from gure 3.8. Its maximum distance to the steady state is about
0.1% , which is reached after about 5 quarters. By contrast, under the rule optimal
for the JLN economy, employment falls by 0.61% on impact, declines further and then
recovers until after about nine quarters, the recovery slows down. Employment remains
substantially below its value under the optimal policy. Habit adjusted consumption
growth, which is displayed in gure 3.9, falls by about 0.55% on impact for the policy
optimal in the JLN economy, while it increases by 0.15% under the optimal policy. In
quarter 3, consumption growth under the policy optimal for the JLN economy actually
increases above its value for the optimal policy, but only for four quarters. After that,
consumption growth under the policy optimal for the JLN economy remains persis-
tently below consumption growth under the optimal policy, although that is not easily
obtainable from the gure.
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Figure 3.7. NGE - Ination for the optimal Policy and the JLNE optimal Policy
We now want to gain some intuition for how the deviations from the baseline sce-
nario a¤ect optimal policy within the New Growth economy. If indexation is removed
({ = 0) ; ination today will have no e¤ect in itself on ination tomorrow and thus is
easier to stabilise. Hence the central bank focuses more on stabilising output.14 As
can be obtained from the second row of table 3.4, even with this stronger emphasis on
stabilising output, the autocorrelation coe¢ cient of ination collapses as compared to
the baseline case, as do its mean and standard deviation, and the mean of St:
Concerning the case of c = 0; this will make wages a lot more exible, implying that
a given reduction in output and employment will do more to reduce ination. This
reduces the increase in ination volatility associated with an increase in the output gap
coe¢ cient and thus induces a somewhat stronger focus on stabilising output.
14This is indeed a result which can be shown within a simple New Keynesian three equation model
featuring a hybrid Phillips curve plus the appropriate welfare measure.
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Figure 3.8. Employment for the optimal Policy and the JLNE optimal Policy
By contrast, increasing the probability that a rm cannot change its price ! to 0:75
instead of 0.67 means that a larger reduction in marginal cost and thus in output is
required to reduce ination by a given amount. Furthermore, as obvious from (3:6), a
given amount of ination variance also creates more mean price dispersion if ! is higher.
Hence the optimal output gap coe¢ cient is lower than in the baseline. Nevertheless, the
standard deviation of ination and mean price dispersion are still substantially higher
with ! = 0:75 than in the baseline, as can be obtained from table 3.4, as is the standard
deviation of gect (see table 3.5).
Turning to the scenario with the transaction cost technology, we observe that the
optimal rule features a much smaller coe¢ cient on output than in the baseline, 0.5 in
the case of "mi =  5:11 and 1 in the case of "mi =  2:93. A stronger emphasis on
output gap stabilisation would imply higher mean ination and thus a higher nominal
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Figure 3.9. Habit adjusted Consumption Growth for the optimal Policy
and the JLNE optimal Policy
Scenario Et sd: t ACt ESt Eit sd: it ACit
Baseline 0.0127 0.0101 0.84 1.0006 0.0313 0.0071 0.93
{ = 0 0.002 0.003 -0.01 1.0002 0.0207 0.0003 0.14
c = 0 0.0206 0.0118 0.88 1.0006 0.0395 0.0094 0.94
! = 0:75 0.0158 0.011 0.87 1.0012 0.0344 0.008 0.94
Money: "mi =  5:11 0.0011 0.0052 0.58 1.0004 0.0196 0.0025 0.92
Money: "mi =  2:93 0.0031 0.0066 0.69 1.0005 0.0217 0.0029 0.88
Table 3.4. New Growth Economy: Selected Moments of nominal Vari-
ables induced by the optimal Policy Rules
Scenario sd: gect ACgect sd: nt ACnt Evt sd: vt
Baseline 0.0037 -0.32 0.004 0.84
{ = 0 0.0005 -0.42 0.0003 0.65
c = 0 0.0035 -0.35 0.0026 0.69
! = 0:75 0.0044 -0.29 0.0059 0.88
Money: "mi =  5:11 0.0036 0.46 0.0143 0.97 0.8764 0.0447
Money: "mi =  2:93 0.0026 0.26 0.0093 0.97 0.8899 0.0296
Table 3.5. New Growth Economy: Selected Moments of real Variables
induced by the optimal Policy Rules
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interest rate. This in turn would increase vt; as can be obtained from equation (3:28) ;
thus increasing transaction costs l (vt). Table 3.6 conrms that for both values of "mi,
the means of vt and it under the rule optimal in the baseline case considerably exceeds
their values under the respective optimal rule. For instance, for "mi =  5:11; the
mean interest and ination rates exceed their values under the optimal rule by about
1.2%. This increases Evt to 1.08 as opposed to 0.88 under the optimal rule. Hence the
policymaker reduces the output coe¢ cient to reduce the mean interest rate and thus
the transaction cost.
The optimal rule features a higher output gap coe¢ cient if "mi =  2:93 than if
"mi =  5:11: As mentioned in section 3.2, @2lt@it@"mi < 0: Hence a given increase in the
mean nominal interest rate will increase transaction costs by less if "mi is less negative.
Hence the policymaker is willing to accept a larger mean interest rate if "mi =  2:93
and thus chooses a higher output gap coe¢ cient.
Scenario Et Eit Evt
"mi =  5:11; [1:2 0:5 0:8] 0.0011 0.0196 0.8764
"mi =  5:11; [1:2 3 0:8] 0.013 0.0316 1.0801
"mi =  2:93; [1:2 0:5 0:8] 0.0031 0.0217 0.8899
"mi =  2:93; [1:2 3 0:8] 0.0129 0.0315 0.9868
Table 3.6. Selected First Moments from the New Growth Economy with
Transaction Costs
Given that stabilising output seems to be a more important priority in the New
Growth than in the JLN economy, it is interesting to compute the costs of deviating
from the optimal value of gap. Table 3.7 displays the welfare costs of for the optimal
values of  and ; which in the New Growth economy are the same for all deviations
from the baseline, and for all the values of gap from our grid. Clearly the costs of not
responding to output at all are substantial in all settings but vary from 0.17% for c=0 to
about 3% for ! = 0:75: Increasing gap from 0 to 0.5 increases welfare substantially for
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Welfare costs
phigap Baseline chi=0 c=0 omega=0.75 epsilonmi=-5.11 epsilonmi=-2.93
0 0.6536% 0.3753% 0.1742% 3.0318% 0.3893% 0.4526%
0.5 0.1501% 0.1398% 0.0932% 0.1993% 0.0000% 0.0120%
1 0.0770% 0.1052% 0.0637% 0.0443% 0.0318% 0.0000%
1.5 0.0365% 0.0821% 0.0393% 0.0025% 0.1055% 0.0275%
2 0.0142% 0.0655% 0.0223% 0.0000% 0.1997% 0.0753%
2.5 0.0036% 0.0529% 0.0116% 0.0111% 0.3048% 0.1346%
3 0.0000% 0.0430% 0.0053% 0.0260% 0.4154% 0.2000%
3.5 0.0004% 0.0350% 0.0019% 0.0410% 0.5282% 0.2684%
4 0.0030% 0.0284% 0.0004% 0.0547% 0.6415% 0.3378%
4.5 0.0068% 0.0229% 0.0000% 0.0667% 0.7542% 0.4074%
5 0.0112% 0.0182% 0.0004% 0.0770% 0.8660% 0.4765%
5.5 0.0157% 0.0141% 0.0012% 0.0857% 0.9766% 0.5449%
6 0.0202% 0.0106% 0.0023% 0.0930% 1.0858% 0.6123%
6.5 0.0246% 0.0075% 0.0036% 0.0990% 1.1936% 0.6788%
7 0.0287% 0.0047% 0.0049% 0.1040% 1.3001% 0.7442%
7.5 0.0325% 0.0022% 0.0062% 0.1079% 1.4052% 0.8087%
8 0.0361% 0.0000% 0.0074% 0.1111% 1.5090% 0.8722%
Table 3.7. Welfare Costs of Deviating from the respective optimal Rule
in the New Growth Economy: Varying the Output Gap Coe¢ cient
all scenarios. At the same time, increasing gap above the respective optimal coe¢ cient
reduces welfare relatively slowly in the absence of consumption transaction costs. For
the baseline, c=0, and ! = 0:75; setting gap = 8 imply welfare costs of 0.0361%,
0.0074% and 0.1111% respectively. Not responding to output at all is costlier in each
case. By contrast, in the presence of a transaction cost of holding money, we nd that
reacting too much to the output gap quickly becomes very costly.
Responding more to ination than under the optimal policy can also be quite costly,
as shown by table 3.8.
Virtually all central banks nowadays believe in some sort of model along the lines
of our JLN economy, namely a model where temporary shocks only have very short
lasting e¤ects on real variables. It is therefore interesting to look at the welfare costs of
applying the optimal rule based on the JLN economy if "in truth" the economy features
endogenous growth. This is done in Table 3.9. Other than in the case of { = 0; the
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phipi Baseline chi=0 c=0 omega=0.75 epsilonmi=-5.11 epsilonmi=-2.93
1.2 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000%
1.7 0.4396% 0.1079% 0.2290% 0.8676% 0.1484% 0.2329%
2.2 0.4701% 0.1583% 0.2483% 0.9610% 0.1507% 0.2311%
2.7 0.4665% 0.1870% 0.2480% 0.9814% 0.1473% 0.2196%
3.2 0.4562% 0.2053% 0.2431% 0.9838% 0.1452% 0.2098%
3.7 0.4449% 0.2178% 0.2371% 0.9809% 0.1448% 0.2024%
4.2 0.4343% 0.2267% 0.2310% 0.9767% 0.1457% 0.1983%
4.7 0.4247% 0.2332% 0.2253% 0.9727% 0.1478% 0.1956%
5.2 0.4163% 0.2382% 0.2200% 0.9695% 0.1507% 0.1945%
5.7 0.4090% 0.2420% 0.2152% 0.9673% 0.1543% 0.1946%
6.2 0.4027% 0.2450% 0.2108% 0.9661% 0.1583% 0.1957%
6.7 0.3974% 0.2474% 0.2069% 0.9659% 0.1627% 0.1975%
7.2 0.3921% 0.2492% 0.2034% 0.9667% 0.1674% 0.2001%
7.7 0.3889% 0.2507% 0.2003% 0.9684% 0.1723% 0.2031%
8.2 0.3857% 0.2519% 0.1976% 0.9708% 0.1773% 0.2066%
Table 3.8. Welfare Costs of Deviating from the respective optimal Rule
New Growth Economy: Varying the Ination Coe¢ cient
welfare costs are quite substantial and range from 0.18% to 0.88% of consumption under
the respective optimal rule.
By contrast, pursuing a policy optimal in the endogenous growth economy if the
actual production function is neoclassical causes much lower welfare costs relative to per
period consumption under the respective optimal rule, as can be obtained from Table
3.10. Thus if there is uncertainty about whether the economy features endogenous
growth or not and policy aims to minimise the maximum welfare costs relative to
consumption under the respective optimal rule, it should in each scenario choose the
policy optimal in the presence of endogenous growth.
For the New Growth economy in the baseline calibration, we also consider two al-
ternative policy rule specications replacing the output gap in equation (3:21) with
two alternative real variables, the current growth rate of the capital stock gkt+1 and the
growth rate of habit adjusted consumption gect :The policy vectors yielding the highest
welfare for these specications are [3:2 1:5 0:8] and [8:2 3 0] , thus placing a higher em-
phasis on the stabilisation of ination than the rule featuring the output gap. However,
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welfare under these rules falls way short of welfare generated by the maximum welfare
achievable if the central bank does respond to the output gap instead: Welfare costs
amount to 0.35% and 0.28%, respectively.
Calibration Welfare Cost
Baseline [6:7; 1:5; 0:8] 0.36%
{ = 0 [1:2 8 0:8] 0%
c = 0 [8:2; 2; 0:8] 0.24%
! = 0:75 0.89%
"mi =  5:11; [8:2; 0; 0] 0.54%
"mi =  2:93; [1:2 0 0:6] 0.27%
Table 3.9. Welfare Cost of applying Policy optimal under JLNE to New
Growth Economy
Calibration Welfare Cost
Baseline [1:2 3 0:8] 0.03%
{ = 0 [1:2 8 0:8] 0%
c = 0 [1:2 4:5 0:8] 0.03%
! = 0:75 0.02%
"mi =  5:11; [1:2; 0:5; 0:8] 0.12%
"mi =  2:93; [1:2 1 0:8] 0.1%
Table 3.10. Welfare Cost of applying Policy optimal under the New
Growth Economy to the JLNE
3.8. Implied costs by two Estimates of Policy Rules for the Bundesbank
How do the rules estimated for the Bundesbank by Clausen and Meier (2003) and
Clarida et al. (1998) perform in the New Growth and the JLN economy across the
various scenarios? Table 3.11 displays the welfare costs of applying these two rules
to the New Growth and the JLN economy. The coe¢ cient estimates are printed in
brackets. Clearly both policy calibrations imply signicant welfare costs compared to
the respective optimal rule in the New Growth economy. They range from 0.14% to
0.91% for the Clausen and Meier (2003) estimate, and from 0.28% to 3.02% for the
Clarida et al. (1998) estimate. Note that we do not provide results for the scenario of
 = 0 if policy is as estimated by Clarida et al. Two reasons made us suspicious of
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our welfare value in this case. First, it proved extremely sensitive to small changes in
the parameters. Second, most of the second moments do not exist, and when we tried
to simulate the second order accurate solution, the simulation exploded.
By contrast, in the JLN economy, both estimated policy rules do much less harm,
as can be obtained from table 3.12. For every scenario considered, the welfare loss
expressed as a percentage of consumption under the optimal rule is always greater in
the New Growth economy than in the JLN economy. Furthermore, within the JLN
economy, the welfare loss is always greater under the rule estimated by CGG than
under the rule estimated by Clausen and Meier.
Calibration Clausen and Meier [1:5 0:125 0:75] Clarida et al. [1:31 0:25 0:91]
Baseline 0.35% 0.66%
{ = 0 0.2% [no reliable measurement]
c = 0 0.15% 0.28%
! = 0:75 0.91% 3.03%
"mi =  5:11 0.14% 0.42%
"mi =  2:93 0.17% 0.47%
Table 3.11. Welfare Cost of Bundesbank Policies in the New Growth Economy
Calibration Clausen and Meier [1:5 0:125 0:75] Clarida et al. [1:31 0:25 0:91]
Baseline 0.0021% 0.0555%
{ = 0 0.0135% 0.0303%
c = 0 0.0029% 0.03166%
! = 0:75 0.0578% 0.0666%
"mi =  5:11 0.079% 0.11%
"mi =  2:93 0.0031% 0.0373%
Table 3.12. Welfare Cost of Bundesbank Policies in the JLNE
3.9. Conclusion
The goal of this chapter is to assess whether the conventional wisdom concerning the
priorities of monetary policy still holds in the presence of endogenous growth. For that
purpose we rst modify the New Growth economy and the JLN economy developed
in chapter two by replacing the assumption of quadratic costs of price adjustment by
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the more commonly used assumption of Calvo contracts. This generates higher costs
of ination. We then search for a simple optimal rule which maximises the households
welfare in the two economies. As in chapter two, the only source of volatility is a cost
push shock.
Our main result is that in the JLN economy, the optimal simple rule features a
large ination coe¢ cient and a much lower output coe¢ cient, just as conventional
wisdom would suggest. By contrast, in the presence of endogenous growth, this hawkish
monetary policy is no longer optimal. The optimal ination coe¢ cient is the lowest
we allow in the grid, while the coe¢ cient on the output gap is higher than in the
JLN economy. The reason for this result seems to be that a failure to respond to
the output gap and an aggressive response to ination increase the uncertainty of the
future consumption path far more in the New Growth than in the JLN economy. This
is because a cost push shock in the New Growth economy has a permanent e¤ect on the
future consumption trajectory absent in the JLN economy. This permanent e¤ect will
be amplied by a hawkish monetary policy. Therefore the central bank opts to respond
more strongly to output than in the JLN economy in spite of the implied higher mean
price dispersion and the associated e¢ ciency loss.
This result is qualitatively robust against a variety of changes to the baseline sce-
nario, i.e. variations to the degree of real wage rigidity and nominal price stickiness
and the introduction of a transaction cost for consumption, the latter of which implies
a transaction demand for money. An exception is the case of no indexation of non-
reoptimised prices to past ination, for which the optimal policy is the same in both
the endogenous growth and the JLN economy.
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Looking across the di¤erent deviations from the baseline within the New Growth
economy, we nd that the optimal coe¢ cient on output is higher than in the baseline
if the real wage is more exible and lower if nominal rigidity is higher. Furthermore,
the presence of a transaction cost of consumption also reduces the optimal output
gap coe¢ cient relative to the baseline. This is because the mean ination rate and
thus the mean nominal interest rate and by implication the mean consumption to
money ratio increase in the output gap coe¢ cient, implying that consumers have to
pay higher transaction costs. The output gap coe¢ cient is lower the more negative the
semi elasticity of money demand.
We also nd that if there is uncertainty about whether the economy features en-
dogenous growth or not and policy aims to minimise maximum welfare loss measured
as percentage of per period consumption under the respective optimal rule, it should
in each scenario choose the policy optimal in the presence of endogenous growth. This
is because welfare costs measured in this way are always higher if we apply the policy
rules optimal in the JLN economy to the New Growth economy than vice versa. For
instance, in the baseline scenario, the welfare cost in New Growth economy of apply-
ing the JLN optimal policy amounts to 0.36% of consumption under the true optimal
policy, while vice versa the welfare cost equals 0.03% of consumption under the JLN
optimal rule.
Finally, we examine the welfare costs of the monetary policies of the German Bun-
desbank, as estimated by Clarida et al. (1998) and by Clausen and Meier (2003).
We nd that in the New Growth economy, both rules are highly suboptimal, while in
the JLN economy, welfare costs measured as a percentage of consumption under the
respective optimal rule are much lower.
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CHAPTER 4
The Taylor Principle and (In-) Determinacy in a New
Keynesian Model with hiring Frictions and Skill Loss
The idea that skill loss among the unemployed might generate a relationship between
the actual and the natural unemployment rate is an old one. In fact, Phelps (1972)
himself emphasized this mechanism when developing the concept of the natural rate of
unemployment. In this chapter, we introduce skill loss among the unemployed along the
lines of Pissarides (1992) into a New Keynesian model with hiring frictions developed
by Blanchard and Gali (2008). We assume that workers who remain unemployed for
one quarter or longer lose a fraction of their skills per quarter of their unemployment
spell. The share of those unemployed for more than one quarter a¤ects the willingness
of rms to create jobs as rms are matched with di¤erent types of workers according
to their share in the job seeking population. Our goal is to investigate the e¤ects of
introducing skill loss on macroeconomic stability and unemployment persistence under
varying monetary policy rules and degrees of skill loss. As far as we are aware, this
question has not been addressed so far within a state-of-the-art general equilibrium
framework.
Our key results are as follows. Firstly, for su¢ ciently high levels of skill loss, a
nominal interest rate feedback rule with a coe¢ cient on ination exceeding one does
not guarantee determinacy if the quarterly skill loss percentage is large enough. If the
central bank responds only to ination, the coe¢ cient on ination has to be less than
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one. This does not depend on whether the central bank responds to current, expected
future, or lagged ination.
Secondly, let us denote the level of skill decay which switches the determinacy
requirement on the coe¢ cient on ination in the interest feedback rule to less than one
as the "critical level." We nd that the critical level of skill decay will be implausibly
high if we adopt what Blanchard and Gali deem an "American" calibration of labour
market ows, i.e. a high job nding probability and a high job destruction rate. By
contrast, if we adopt Blanchard and Galis "continental European" calibration, with
little hiring and ring, the critical skill loss percentage will be a lot lower, about 2.5%
per quarter.
Thirdly, if skill loss is above the critical level, responding to the output gap (as
dened in the New Keynesian literature) in addition to ination decreases the determi-
nacy region further. Considered jointly, these results suggest that indeterminacy is a
realistic scenario in Europe, but not in the United States. Estimates of interest feedback
rules suggest that the Federal Reserve, as well as the Bundesbank and the ECB respond
more than one-for-one to ination and pay some attention to the output gap as well.
At the same time, an active monetary policy will be associated with indeterminacy at
low and plausible levels of skill decay -larger than or equal to 2.5%- but implausibly
high levels of skill decay in the United States.
Finally, if monetary policy induces indeterminacy, sunspot shocks can a¤ect the en-
dogenous variables. Under the continental European calibration, with skill loss above
its critical level and the ination coe¢ cient in the interest feedback rule larger than
one, a one quarter adverse sunspot shock has very persistent e¤ects on unemployment.
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Thus in the model developed in this chapter, endogenous, highly persistent unemploy-
ment uctuations will arise under an active monetary policy if the labour market has
"European" ow characteristics, but not if it has American characteristics. Given that
indeterminacy is a realistic scenario in Europe, the model may be able to shed light on
the fact that we observe highly persistent unemployment uctuations in many European
countries but not in the United States.1
Our results can be compared to an evolving literature showing that under certain
circumstances, an active monetary policy does not guarantee determinacy. For instance,
Batini et al. (2006), using several estimated variants of a standard DSGE model,
consider the determinacy properties of an ination forecast based rule. They nd that
this rule becomes increasingly prone to indeterminacy as the forecast horizon increases
from two to four quarters. Levin et al. (2003) investigate which ination and output
gap forecast based rules robustly induce determinacy across four macroeconometric
models and the canonical New Keynesian model. They nd that only rules with an
ination forecast horizon not exceeding one year, an explicit response to the current
output gap and a substantial degree of policy inertia robustly guarantee determinacy
across all ve models.
A particular branch of this literature focuses on models in which monetary policy
has some indirect or direct e¤ect on the supply side. These papers regularly nd that
some sort of restriction on the ination coe¢ cient in the interest feedback rule and/or
1It might seem puzzling that this chapter in contrast to chapters two and three focuses so much on
determinacy issues. The chief reason for this is simply that in the models used in the previous chapters,
the problem of indeterminacy never arose as long as the coe¢ cient on ination in the interest feedback
rule of the central bank exceeded one. By contrast, in the model developed in this chapter, plausible
calibrations of the parameters a¤ect the requirements that the interest feedback rule has to meet.
Similarly, sunspot shocks only become relevant when there is indeterminacy, which is why they where
absent from the previous chapters. Furthermore, as mentioned above, given an active monetary policy,
small values of skill decay do induce indeterminacy and thus endogenous persistent unemployment
uctuations under some calibrations of labour market ows but not under others. This allows drawing
conclusions on why persistent unemployment uctuations occur in Europe but not in the United States.
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some response to output are necessary to ensure determinacy. For instance, Kurozumi
and van Zandweghe (2008) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) nd, in a New Keynesian
model with capital, that an interest feedback rule where the interest rate only responds
to expected ination limits the permissible ination responses to an extremely small
range above but very close to one. With such a rule, higher future ination increases
the ex-ante real interest rate and thus the expected future capital rental via the no
arbitrage condition. This in turn increases expected ination. Kurozumi and van
Zandweghe (2008) also show that even a modest response to current output (as opposed
to the output gap as used in this chapter) substantially widens the permissible range.
A response to the lagged interest rate above a certain threshold has a similar e¤ect.
Du¤y and Xiao (2008) qualify their results by showing that in the presence of capital
stock adjustment costs, even a modest response to expected future output is enough to
guarantee determinacy.
Surico (2008) considers a New Keynesian model with a cost-channel along the lines
of Ravenna andWalsh (2006), where the nominal interest rate has a direct positive e¤ect
on ination since rms have to borrow working capital to pay wages. He shows that,
if the interest rate responds to current ination, determinacy requires an upper bound
on the ination coe¢ cient, which, however, is too high to form a relevant constraint
for monetary policy. Tuesta and Llosa (2009) investigate the same model with a purely
forward-looking rule and show that determinacy is unattainable if the central bank
responds only to expected ination.
All of the cited results have in common that the determinacy problem caused by a
monetary policy rule responding to ination alone is never caused by the active response
to ination per se, but to the timing subscript of ination in the interest feedback rule.
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By contrast, in the model proposed here, it is the Taylor principle itself -the idea that
an increase in ination should sooner or later cause an increase in the real interest
rate- which creates scope for self-fullling prophecies if quarterly skill loss among the
unemployed is above the critical level.
The change in the determinacy requirement appears to be caused by a change in
the long-run relationship between marginal cost and unemployment from negative to
positive if skill decay crosses the threshold. Thus if skill decay is above the critical level,
a persistent increase in unemployment will ultimately increase marginal cost and thus
ination. If the central bank responds more than one-for-one to ination, this would
increase the real interest rate, which lowers demand and thus validates the increase in
unemployment: Hence we have a self-fullling prophecy.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 discusses some empirical evidence
for skill loss among the unemployed while section 4.2 derives the model. Section 4.3
analyses determinacy in the absence of skill loss, i.e. in the original Blanchard and
Gali (2008) model. Section 4.4 derives the marginal cost equation in the presence of
skill loss and shows how the e¤ect of unemployment on marginal cost is a¤ected by the
introduction of skill loss. Section 4.5 analyses determinacy in the model with skill loss.
Section 4.6 discusses the response of the model under the European calibration to an
adverse sunspot shock and an averse technology shock. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.1. Evidence for Skill Loss
Direct, quantiable evidence for skill loss during unemployment is di¢ cult to obtain.
An idea of the size of skill decay over time can be gained from the literature on wage
loss upon worker displacement. This literature has produced evidence based on panel
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regressions showing that the wage upon reemployment depends negatively on the du-
ration of the unemployment spell. Skill decay during unemployment is usually seen as
one of the factors causing this relationship, although the evolution of reservation wage
due to other factors (for instance depletion of an unemployed persons wealth) would
be expected to have an impact as well. Evidence along these lines include Addison and
Portugal (1989) for American male workers displaced and reemployed between 1979
and 1984, Pichelmann and Riedel (1993) for Austrian workers between 1972 and 1988,
Gregory and Jukes (2001) for British male workers between 1984 and 1994, Gregg and
Tominey (2005) for male youths and Gangji and Plasman (2007) for Belgian workers.
Their ndings on the e¤ect of a one-year unemployment spell on the real wage are -39%,
-24%, -11%, -10% and -8% respectively.2 Pichelmann and Riedel (1993) explicitly ask
whether the earnings penalty arising from duration diminishes during the two years
following the unemployment spell and nd that it does not. Gregg and Tominey (2005)
nd that the wage penalty associated with a year of youth unemployment is still present
at age 42.3
Furthermore, Nickell et al. (2002) look at three four year periods from 1982 to
1997. They ask how the earnings loss is changed if the unemployment spell exceeded
6 months and nd an additional permanent earnings loss between 6.8% and 10.6%.4
To which extent these numbers reect skill depreciation depends on the movement of
2For Addison and Portugal (1989), we have calculated the annual earnings penalty using the lower
coe¢ cient on log(duration) in their two preferred specications (Table 3, columns 5 and 6), p. 294.
Duration is measured in weeks. For Pichelmann and Riedel (1993), we had to resort to the same
procedure, see p. 8 in that paper for the results. Their coe¢ cient estimates for the e¤ect on the real
wage is reported in table 2, p. 8. The results of Gregory and Jukes (2001) are reported on page F619,
while the results of Gangji and Plasman (2007) are reported on page 18, table 2.
3See Gregg and Tominey (2005), p. 502 and pp. 505-506.
4See Nickel et al. (2001), p. 17.
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the reservation wage in general and in particular its responsiveness to the respective
workershuman capital evolution.
There is also evidence suggesting that unemployed workers become less attractive
employees as their unemployment spell lengthens. Jackman et al. (1991) cite various
studies showing that morale and motivation decline the longer a person remains un-
employed.5 The stylised fact that the probability of an unemployed person of leaving
unemployment increases with the unemployment duration (see for instance Machin and
Manning (1999)6) is also seen by some as evidence for skill loss among the unemployed.
It is, however, a priori unclear whether this represents "true" duration dependence, i.e.
the worsening of an individuals employment probability over time, or merely individual
heterogeneity, possibly unobserved. In the latter case di¤erent individuals have di¤erent
hazard rates of leaving unemployment as a result of di¤ering individual characteristics,
such as their education. The individuals with higher hazard rates will leave the unem-
ployment pool quickly, implying that the average hazard rate of a cohort of unemployed
falls as the unemployment spell lengthens. However, Jackman et al (1991) argue that
in the presence of pure individual heterogeneity, and under certain assumptions about
its nature, the ratio of the average hazard rate and the hazard rate of new entrants into
unemployment would have to be constant as the average hazard rate moves up or down.
They nd that for British data, the average hazard rate declines in fact much more than
the hazard rate of new entrants. Van den Berg and van Ours conrm this result using
other "eyeball" tests 7 and a more formal non-parametric estimation method8. Using
the same method, they also nd negative duration dependence for the United States.9
5See Jackman, Layard and Nickell (1991), p. 259.
6See Machin and Manning (1999), p. 3100.
7van der Berg and van Ours (1994a), p. 23.
8See Van der Berg and van Ours (1994b), p. 442.
9Van der Berg and van Ours (1996), p. 123.
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The model discussed below does not actually model duration dependence (although it
could be extended to do so). However, overall, we view the evidence above as indicating
that workers are less e¢ cient at work the longer they have been unemployed.
4.2. The Model
In this section we add skill loss along the lines of Pissarides (1992) to the Blanchard
and Gali (2008) model. We rst go through the optimisation problems of households
and rms and then show what the expressions for marginal cost and the Phillips Curve
look like in the absence and in the presence of skill loss.
4.2.1. Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of representative and innitely lived house-
holds. A household consists of a continuum of members who supply labour to rms.
They might be employed or unemployed. The household derives income from wage
payments, bond holdings, and rmsprots. It allocates its income to buying a CES
basket of consumption goods and a risk-less bond to maximise
Et
1X
t=0
logCt
where Ct denotes consumption, subject to the budget constraint
NtWt +
Bt 1
Pt
(1 + it 1) + Ft  Ct + Bt
Pt
where Pt; Nt; Wt, Bt, it and Ft denote the price level, hours worked by the members of
the household, the real wage, bonds, the nominal interest rate and the prots of rms.
Consumption is governed by the usual rst order condition
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1Ct
= [1 + it] Et

1
1 + t+1
1
Ct+1

where t denotes the ination rate.
4.2.2. Firms
There are two types of rms. Final goods rms indexed by i produce a di¤erentiated
product using the intermediate good Xt (i) in the linear technology
Yt (i) = Xt (i)
They produce the varieties in the CES basket of goods consumed by households. The de-
mand curve for variety i resulting from the household spreading its expenditures across
varieties in a cost minimising way is given by ct(i) = Ct

pt(i)
Pt
 
; where ct(i); pt(i) and
Pt denote consumption and price of variety i and the price level of the consumption
basket, respectively. We will assume that nal goods rms face nominal rigidities in
the form of Calvo (1983) contracts, i.e. only a randomly chosen fraction 1  ! of rms
can re-optimise its price in a given period. They accordingly maximise
Et
" 1X
i=0
(!)i
Ct
Ct+i
Ct+i
"
pt (j)
Pt+i
1 
 mct+i

pt (j)
Pt+i
 ##
where mct denotes real marginal costs. The price index evolves according to
P 1 t = (1  !) (pt (j))1  + ! (Pt 1)1 
where pt (j) denotes the price set by those rms allowed to reset their price in period
t. Taking rst order approximations of both the nal goods rst order condition and
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the law of motion of the price index and combining the resulting equations yields the
familiar New Keynesian Phillips curve relating ination in period t to expected t + 1
ination and period t marginal costs. The marginal cost of the nal goods rms equals
the real price of the intermediate good, P
I
t
Pt
:
Intermediate goods rms operate under perfect competition and are owned by house-
holds. As is common in the matching literature, we assume that a xed fraction  of
jobs is destroyed each period. This can be thought of as an idiosyncratic productivity
shock and implies that even with constant employment, there are constantly ows in
and out of employment. Thus employment of rm j evolves according to
Nt (j) = (1  )Nt 1 (j) +Ht (j)
Where Ht (j) denotes the amount of hiring in rm j. Aggregate hiring is accordingly
given by
(4.1) Ht = Nt   (1  )Nt 1
Note that the lower is ; the more Ht will depend on the change as opposed to the level
of employment.
The Intermediate good rms employ labour to produce intermediate goods Xt (j).
Following Pissarides (1992), we assume that the productivity of a newly hired worker
is the product of exogenous technology APt and the skill level of worker of type i A
i.
Thus the productivity prodit of a worker of type i is given by
prodit = A
P
t A
i
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We follow Pissarides (1992) by making the following assumptions. Ai equals one if
he is short term unemployed, i.e. if he lost his job in period t. Unemployed workers
loose a fraction s of their skills per quarter if they remain unemployed for one quarter
or longer. Skill decay continues for the duration of the unemployment spell. We assume
further, following Pissarides (1992), that the unemployed regain all their skills after one
quarter of employment, that intermediate goods rms meet workers according to their
share among job seekers and that they hire any worker they meet.10 Finally, when rms
decide whether to hire or not they know the state of exogenous technology APt but not
which type of worker they are going to meet.
We denote the average skill level of the newly hired as ALt :The productivity of a
newly hired worker expected by the rm when deciding whether to hire is denoted by
At and is accordingly given by
(4.2) At = APt A
L
t
ALt is given by
(4.3) ALt =
1X
i=0
iss
i
t
where s = 1   s and sit denotes the share of those unemployed i periods among job
seekers. Note that ALt < 1 if s > 0 and equal to one if s = 0: We will refer to A
L
t as
the average skill level in period t rather than the expected skill level to avoid confusion
when we refer to EtALt+1:
10See Pissarides (1992), pp. 1371-1391. In contrast to Pissarides, skill loss does not stop after one
quarter in our model.
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The shares of the various groups among the number of job seekers, denoted as Ut;
are given by
(4.4) sit =
Nt 1 i
i

j=1
(1  xt i)
Ut
where xt denotes labour market tightness, dened as the ratio between aggregate hiring
Ht and Ut, i.e.
(4.5) xt =
Ht
Ut
We interpret labour market tightness xt as the probability of an unemployed person
to move into employment in period t. For instance, s2t is calculated as follows: Nt 3
workers loose their jobs in period t   2. A fraction xt 2 moves right back into em-
ployment while a fraction (1  xt 2) remains unemployed and keeps looking for jobs
in period t   1. Of those Nt 3 (1  xt 2) workers, a fraction (1  xt 1) does not nd
a job during t   1 and is still unemployed at the end of that period. Dividing those
Nt 3 (1  xt 2) (1  xt 1) unemployed by Ut then gives the share of those unemployed
for two periods among job seekers in period t.
Ut consists of those who did not nd a job at the end of period t-1 and those whose
jobs were destroyed at the beginning of t:
(4.6) Ut = 1 Nt 1 + Nt 1 = 1  (1  )Nt 1
As in the Blanchard Gali model, we assume that the real wage is rigid. We assume
that the wage of a worker depends on his individual productivity in exactly the same
way as in Blanchard Gali (2008): The wage W it of a worker who has been unemployed
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for i periods is given by W it = 
0  APt Ait1  ; with 0    1: This means that there
are ve di¤erent wage levels. Accordingly, the real wage the rm expects to pay when
it decides to hire is given by
(4.7) Wt = 0
 1X
i=0
i(1 )s s
i
t
! 
APt
1 
Note that for S = 0; this collapses to Wt = 0
 
APt
1 
as in Blanchard Gali. This is
the wage a rm expects to pay when it decides whether to hire. 0 is backed out to
support a desired steady state combination of x;  and n: This is shown in appendix
C.2. For future reference, we denote the skill dependent part of the real wage as
(4.8) WLt =
 1X
i=0
i(1 )s s
i
t
!
As in Blanchard and Gali (2008), we assume that every hire generates a cost Gt
which is proportional to the productivity of a newly hired worker
(4.9) Gt = AtB0xt
where B0 denotes a constant. The intuition behind (4:9) is that if hiring is high relative
to the number of job seekers, it takes on average longer to ll a vacancy. Since posting
a vacancy is costly, hiring costs increase in xt:11
The intermediate goods rms will hire additional workers until the hiring costs of
an additional worker equal the present discounted value of the prots generated by this
worker. However, unlike in the Blanchard and Gali model, we have to take account of
11Hence equation (4:9) can be viewed as a short cut to a model which would specify a matching
function and thus allow to derive the expected time necessary to ll a vacancy and hence the expected
cost of lling a vacancy. See Blanchard and Gali (2008), p. 8.
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the skill level of the workforce hired in period t as well as their wage schedule change
in period t+1, as all hired workers who remain employed upgrade to the full skill level
after one quarter. Thus we have
(4.10) Gt =
P It
Pt
APt A
L
t  Wt + Et
" 1X
i=1
(1  )i iuC (Ct+i)
uC (Ct)

P It+i
Pt+i
APt+i  W 0t+i
#
where P
I
t
Pt
denotes the real price of intermediate goods while i uC(Ct+i)
uC(Ct)
denotes the
stochastic discount factor of the representative household. The terms P
I
t
Pt
APt A
L
t   Wt
and Et
" 1X
i=1
(1  )i i uC(Ct+i)
uC(Ct)

P It+i
Pt+i
APt+i  W 0t+i
#
represent the ow prot generated
in period t (when the worker has just been hired) and the present discounted value of
prots generated in period t+1 and after, respectively. Note that due to our assumption
that the worker regains all his skills after one period, the expression for the ow prot
in period t is di¤erent from the expression for the ow prot in period t + 1 and
after. Rewriting this equation as a di¤erence equation, noting that the real price of
intermediate goods rms equals the marginal cost of nal goods rms (hence P
I
t
Pt
= mct)
and that with log utility, uC(Ct+i)
uC(Ct)
= Ct
Ct+i
, we have
mctA
P
t A
L
t = Wt +Gt(4.11)
  (1  )Et

Ct
Ct+1
 
Gt+1 +mct+1A
P
t+1  W 0t+1  
 
mct+1A
P
t+1A
L
t+1  Wt+1

The left hand side represents the real marginal revenue product of labour, which de-
pends on the period t average skill level among applicants. Clearly, an increase in the
quality of the average period to job seeker ALt will reduce period t marginal cost. The
right hand side features the period t real wage Wt and the period t hiring costs Gt,
and, with a negative sign, the present expected value of hiring costs saved (Gt+1) by
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hiring the worker in t rather than t+ 1. While an increase in hiring cost today means
increasing production is more costly, an increase in future expected hiring costs will
induce intermediate goods rms to shift hiring into the present, thus lowering the price
of intermediate goods and thus marginal cost.
In addition, the right hand side also includes the present expected value of the t+1
di¤erence between the real prot generated by a fully skilled worker (with productivity
APt+1 and real wage W
0
t+1) and a t+ 1 newly hired worker (with productivity A
P
t+1A
L
t+1
and real wage Wt+1). This represents an additional benet of hiring today rather than
tomorrow not present in the Blanchard Gali model. For further reference note that this
benet decreases in ALt+1 and increases in Wt+1 and mct+1: Thus an expected higher
t+1 skill level will increase marginal cost in period t (since it reduces the benet from
hiring today), while a higher expected average real wage for the t+1 newly hired and
a higher expected t+1 price of intermediate goods (i.e. higher t+1 marginal cost) will
decrease it.
While At is the relevant level of productivity at the margin, the average productivity
of the whole workforce after adding the newly hired will be di¤erent because those
employees who remained in employment from t-1 to t are all fully skilled. The average
productivity level AAt is then given by
(4.12) AAt = A
P
t

sNt A
L
t +
 
1  sNt

where sNt denotes the share of the newly hired in period t employment, which is given
by
(4.13) sNt =
Ht
Nt
=
Nt   (1  )Nt 1
Nt
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To set up the production function, we have to use AAt Nt for gross output. Hence the
production function becomes
(4.14) Ct = AAt Nt  B0xt APt ALt Ht = AAt Nt  B0xt APt ALt (Nt   (1  )Nt 1)
4.2.3. Marginal Cost and Phillips Curve the Absence of Skill Loss
The assumption of hiring costs made by Blanchard and Gali has interesting conse-
quences for the Phillips Curve, which we would like to highlight next. It is well known
that monopolistic competition and Calvo pricing as found in the nal goods rms lead
to, up to rst order, the familiar New Keynesian Phillips curve relating ination to
expected future ination and marginal costs (a lower case variable with a hat denotes
the percentage-deviation of this variable from its steady state, unless otherwise stated):
(4.15) t = Ett+1 + cmct;  = (1  !) (1  !)
!
Concerning marginal cost, in appendix C.5 we show that combining log-linear ap-
proximations of equations (4:11) to (4:14) combined with log linear approximations to
(4:5) ; (4:6) and (4:1) allows one to express the percentage deviation of marginal cost
from its steady state as
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cmct =  aL1baLt + wL1 bwLt + aL2EtbaLt+1   wL2Et bwLt+1   p0baPt   p1EtbaPt+1(4.16)
+h
0
0bnt + h0Lbnt 1 + h0FEtbnt+1   hcEtcmct+1
where
hc =  (1  )
 
1  AL
AL
; g = B0x
h0F =   (1  )

gM

  00X

h
0
0 =

gM

 
1 +  (1  )2 (1  x)+  (1  )01   00X
h0L =  

gM


(1  ) (1  x)   (1  ) 01X
aL1 = 1  gM +  (1  )
AL (1  g)
AA   Ag X
aL2 =  (1  )

1  gM + A
L (1  g)
AA   Ag X

wL1 =
M
AL
W; wL2 =  (1  )
M
AL
W
p0 = 
0 +  (1  )X; p1 =  (1  ) M (
0  W )
AL
X = gM +
1  AL  M (0  W )
AL

0
0 =
AL (1  g (1 + ))
AA   Ag

0
1 =
(1  )  (1 +  (1  x))ALg +  1  AL
AA   ALg
0 = 1  gM   (1  ) M
AL
W
Smaller case variables with hats denote the percentage deviation of a variable from its
steady state and M denotes the steady state mark-up of nal goods rms.
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We consider rst the case of no skill loss, i.e. s = 0: In this case we have AL =
AA = 1; 0 = W and baLt = bwLt : This yields
cmct = h0bnt + hLbnt 1 + hFEtbnt+1   p0bat(4.17)
h0 =

gM

 
1 +  (1  )2 (1  x)   (1  ) gM (1   0)
hL =  

gM


(1  ) (1  x)   (1  ) gM1
hF =   (1  ) gM



  0

0 =
1  g (1 + )
(1  g)
1 =
g (1  ) (1 +  (1  x))
(1  g)
Hence marginal cost depends positively on current employment but negatively on lagged
employment. An increase in bnt increases labour market tightness and thus marginal
cost, while an increase in bnt 1 reduces the amount of hiring necessary to achieve a given
amount of employment in period t and thus reduces marginal cost. Marginal cost also
depends negatively on Etbnt+1; as higher t+1 employment in implies higher hiring costs
in that period, thus increasing the benet of creating jobs today and correspondingly
lowering the price of intermediate goods.
Note that the e¤ect of lagged and lead employment, relative to the e¤ect of current
employment, increases the less "uid" the labour market is, i.e. the lower the separation
rate  and the steady state job nding rate x for a given level of employment.12 Assume
for instance, for the sake of example, that we have N = 0:9 and, unrealistically x = 0:9;
implying a separation rate of  = 1: In this case, we have hL = hF = 0: In this scenario,
12Note the following steady state cross coe¢ cient restriction between ; x; and N :  = x(1 N)N(1 x) ; for
values of x  N and N < 1:
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all workers are red at the beginning of the period. This implies that hiring and hence
the cost of hiring depend only on Nt and that the cost of hiring in the future is irrelevant
for job creation today because no job lasts longer than one period anyway. As we lower
the job nding rate and by implication ; the values of hL and hF increase.
Using the relationship bnt = but (1 u) (where but denotes the percentage point, not the
percentage deviation of unemployment from its steady state) and (4:15) ; we arrive at
the Phillips Curve:
t = Ett+1   0but + Lbut 1 + FEtbut+1   p0bat(4.18)
0 =
h0
1  u; L =
 hL
1  u ; F =
 hF
1  u
For future reference, we note that in the Blanchard Gali model we always have
0  L  F > 0:13 This means that a "permanent" increase in unemployment (i.e. an
equal sized increase in but; but 1 and but+1) reduces ination because the e¤ect of current
unemployment dominates the e¤ect of lagged and lead unemployment.
The fact that lead as well as lagged unemployment have positive e¤ects on price set-
ting, and thus ination through their e¤ect on marginal costs, clearly distinguishes the
Phillips Curve in the Blanchard and Gali model from its counterpart in the canonical
New Keynesian model. The presence of a lagged unemployment term in the Phillips
Curve is commonly associated with (partial) labour market hysteresis. In the Blan-
chard and Gali model the e¤ect of lagged unemployment works through the e¤ect on
13This is easily shown: 0   L   F = 1 u (h0 + hL + hF )
= 1 u
gM


1 +  (1  )2 (1  x)  (1  ) (1  x)   (1  )

> 0: using the fact that that 1    =
N x
N(1 x) , this can be simplied to (1   N)x2 + (N   x)N (1  ) > 0: This holds for all permissible
values of x;  and N since the maximum value x can take without violating   1 is N:
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price setting. Jackman et al. (1991) jointly estimate a wage and a price setting equa-
tion featuring both the level and the change in the unemployment rate for 19 OECD
countries, and nd that the change in the unemployment rate has a positive e¤ect on
the real wage employers are willing to pay (given the change in the ination rate and
the level of unemployment) in all countries except for the United States.14 This implies
that lagged unemployment has a negative e¤ect on the real wage employers are willing
to pay and thus boosts ination.
The di¤erence between the United States and other, mostly European OECD economies
concerning the role of lagged unemployment found by Jackman et al., is at least quali-
tatively reected by (4:18) if the "American" and "European" calibrations of Blanchard
and Gali are adopted, respectively. The two parameterisations are displayed in table
4.1. The two calibrations di¤er in that in the United States, steady state unemploy-
ment is lower and the labour market is more uid, with a high steady state job nding
probability x of 0.7, which (given u) backs out a high separation rate of 0.12. In con-
tinental Europe, unemployment is higher, with u = 0:1; and there are less ows in
and out of unemployment, with x = 0:25 which backs out a separation rate  of only
0.04. The calibration of x is based on American and European evidence on the average
monthly job nding rate. Furthermore, Blanchard and Gali (2008) set  = 1 since this
is consistent with estimates of matching functions. They set B0 = 0:12, which implies a
fraction of hiring costs in GDP of about one percent under the American calibration ,
and correspondingly a lower fraction under the continental European calibration since
14See Jackman et al (1991), pp. 401-408.
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x is lower.15 Plugging these parameters into (4:18), we get
t = 0:99Ett+1   0:083but + 0:02but 1 + 0:056Etbut+1   bat ["American"]
t = 0:99Ett+1   0:143but + 0:063but 1 + 0:079Etbut+1   bat ["Continental European"]
The weight of lagged unemployment relative to the coe¢ cients on current and lead
unemployment is clearly higher under the continental European calibration than under
the American one, as found by Jackman et al. The reduction in  and x as we move from
the American to the continental European calibration increases all three coe¢ cients but
the proportional increase is clearly the biggest for lagged unemployment.16
Parameter "American" "Continental European"
 0.99 0.99
 0.08 0.08
 6 6
M 1.2 1.2
 1 1
x 0.7 0.25
u 0.05 0.1
 0.12 0.04
B0 0.12 0.12
g 0.084 0.03
Table 4.1. Blanchard and Galis Calibration
4.3. Determinacy in the Blanchard and Gali Model
We now explore under what conditions the Taylor principle ensures determinacy
in the Blanchard Gali model. For that purpose, we rst write our model as a system
15See Blanchard and Gali (2008), p.27.
16This is due to the fact that the absolute value of the coe¢ cient on bnt 1 in the equation relatingbxt to bnt 1 and bnt equals (1 )(1 x) : The coe¢ cient on bnt; which equals the coe¢ cient on bnt+1 inbxt+1; depends only on 1=: Once we substitute out bxt and bxt+1 in the marginal cost equation, this is
multiplied with (1  ) as the e¤ect of future expected hiring costs depends on the likelihood that a
job survives. Thus as  and x both decrease, we will see a bigger increase of the coe¢ cient on lagged
employment (lagged unemployment) than on lead employment (lead unemployment).
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in t; but;bct;bit and bat and close it by adding an interest feedback rule. The full model
consists of
t = Ett+1   0but + Lbut 1 + FEtbut+1   p0bat(4.19)
bct = bat   c0but   c1but 1; c0 = 0
1  u; c1 =
1
1  u
bct = Etbct+1   bit   Ett+1
bat = abat 1 + et; et i:i:d:   0; 2
bit = t + ubut;   0; u  0
The second equation is a log-linear approximation to equation (4:14) in the absence
of skill loss. These equations can be reduced to system of three rst order di¤erence
equations with variables t; but and an auxiliary variable buLt = but 1 and the forcing
process bat :
(4.20)
0BBBBB@
Ett+1
Etbut+1
buLt+1
1CCCCCA = A
0BBBBB@
t
but
buLt
1CCCCCA+ bbat
where A is a 3x3 coe¢ cient matrix and b is a 3x1 coe¢ cient vector. This system has
one predetermined endogenous variable, buLt , and two endogenous jump variables, t
and but: To check for determinacy, we can thus apply proposition C.2 from Woodford
(2003) to matrix A.17 This is done in appendix C.1. The result is summarised in the
following proposition:
17See Woodford (2003), p.672-673.
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Proposition 1. Consider the system described by (4:19) equilibrium is determinate
if and only if    u (1 )0 L F > 1 and a set of other conditions discussed in the
appendix are met, which however hold under reasonable restrictions on the parameters.
Proof: appendix C.1
The interpretation of this condition is analogous to the one derived in Woodford
(2003) for the canonical New Keynesian model, since it also says that in the long run,
a one-percentage-point increase in ination should trigger an increase in the nominal
interest rate of more than one.18 In this chapter, if ination increases permanently by
one percentage point, this will increase the nominal interest rate directly by  and
indirectly through the reduction in unemployment, which amounts to (1 )
0 L F , times
the coe¢ cient on unemployment in the interest feedback rule, u (which is restricted
to be negative). Hence it su¢ ces for determinacy to set  > 1:
4.4. Marginal Cost and Phillips Curve in the Presence of Skill Loss
The main di¤erence between (4:16) and (4:17) is the presence of the  aL1baLt +
aL2EtbaLt+1 + wL1 bwLt   wL2Et bwLt+1 term, the  p1EtbaPt+1 term and the  hcEtcmct+1 term in
(4:16) The intuition for the impact of these on marginal costs was already provided in
section 3.2. In this section we will express both the period t skill level of the average job
seeker and the skill dependent real wage as a function of past employment alone. We
also characterise the implied relationship between marginal cost and unemployment,
and how the long run relationship between marginal cost and unemployment is shaped
by the skill loss percentage s and the job nding probability x:
To fully determine marginal cost, we will express both the skill level and the skill
dependent component of the real wage as a function of past employment. In appendix
18Woodford (2003), p. 254.
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C.3 we show after linearising (4:3), (4:4) and (4:6), (4:5) ; and (4:1), we can express
the percentage deviation of the average skill level from its steady state baLt as weighted
innite sum of past employment rates
(4.21) baLt = 1X
i=1
ani bnt i; ani = 1u (1  x)i  i 1s   is
and analogously for bwLt (using (4:8) instead of (4:3))
(4.22) bwLt = 1X
i=1
wni bnt i; wni = 1u (1  x)i (1 )(i 1)s   (1 )is 
For both equations, the coe¢ cients on past employment ani and w
n
i are zero for s = 0
and larger than zero for s > 0: Higher past employment means that the unemployment
spell of the average job seeker will be shorter. This increases the average skill level and
by implication also increases his real wage.
Furthermore, both ani and w
n
i decrease in the steady state job nding probability
x. If people move quickly out of unemployment, the e¤ect of t  i employment on the
average skill level in period t is lower since the additional worker employed in period t i
had a high probability to nd a job in period t i+1 or after that anyway. Analogously,
the e¤ect of employment on the skill-dependent part of the real wage declines as well.
For the marginal cost of rms, what matters is not merely the direction of the e¤ects
of past employment on labour productivity and the real wage of the newly hired, but
also their relative magnitude. We would also like to know how the latter depends on
s and x. Furthermore, what matters for our reasoning below will be the derivatives
of the joint e¤ects of past employment on the skill level and the real wage rather than
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the derivatives of the individual ani coe¢ cients. They are summarised by the following
proposition. 19
Proposition 2. Let an =
1P
i=1
ani and w
n =
1P
i=1
wni :Then a
n = 1 x
u
1 s
1 (1 x)s , w
n =
1 x
u
1 1 s
1 (1 x)1 s and a
n > wn if and only if  > 0 and s < 1: Furthermore,
@an
@s
=
1 x
u
x
(1 (1 x)s)2
> 0 and @w
n
@s
= 1 x
u
(1  ) x s
(1 (1 x)1 s )2
> 0. @a
n
@s
> @w
n
@s
if s is close to
1 and  > 0: Furthermore, @a
n
@x
=   1
u
1 s
(1 (1 x)s)2
< 0 and @w
n
@x
=   1
u
1 1 s
(1 (1 x)1 s )2
< 0.
Finally, @a
n
@x
> @w
n
@x
if and only if s is close to one and  is su¢ ciently large. Proof:
appendix C.4.
This proposition says that for positive skill loss and real wage rigidity, the joint
e¤ect of past employment levels on the quality of the average job seeker will always
dominate the joint e¤ect of past employment levels on the real wage. Furthermore, an
increase in the quarterly skill-loss percentage will increase both the joint e¤ect of past
employment on the quality of the average job seeker and the real wage. However, if
skill loss is small and there is real-wage rigidity, an increase in the quarterly skill-loss
percentage will have a larger impact on the joint e¤ect of past employment on the
average skill level than on the e¤ect of employment on the real wage.
Under qualitatively the same conditions, an increase in the job nding probability
will reduce the joint e¤ect of past employment on the quality of the average job seeker
by more than the e¤ect of past employment on the average real wage. These conditions
are easily fullled for reasonable calibrations and in any case for the calibrations we
will employ below.
The above implies that in the presence of real wage rigidity ( > 0)
19As we show in appendix C.3, for s > 0, the relative magnitude of the ani and w
n
i coe¢ cients and in
the case of @a
n
i
@s
and @w
n
i
@s
also the sign will depend on i.
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 with positive skill loss (s > 0) a "permanent" increase in unemployment
(decrease in employment) increases the ratio between the (average) wage of the
newly hired and their average productivity, while a decline in unemployment
(an increase in employment) decreases this ratio. More formally, for a given
increase in unemployment baL <  bwL
 the size of the increase of the ratio between productivity and the real wage
increases in s: Hence if s is higher,  bwL  baL will be higher as well.
 the size of the increase in the gap between productivity and the real wage
decreases in x. Hence if x is higher,  bwL  baL will be smaller.
We now turn to the meaning of all this for the relationship between unemployment
and marginal cost. Note that aL1 > a
L
2 and w
L
1 > w
L
2 if ;  > 0; as will be the case for
reasonable calibrations. Hence we can obtain from (4:16) that a permanent increase in
the average skill level will lower marginal cost and an increase in the (skill dependent
component of) the real wage will increase it. This is because the gain from hiring today
rather than tomorrow originating from the skill appreciation is uncertain and is being
discounted. The same is true for the e¤ect of the factors a¤ecting this gain on marginal
cost.
Furthermore, as can be obtained from their denitions, aL1   aL2 and wL1   wL2 will
be quite close for sensible calibrations. We have seen that if unemployment increases
permanently, both baLt and baLt+1 decline by a larger amount than bwLt and bwLt+1 if  > 0:
This means that unemployment increases marginal cost via this channel, the more so
higher the degree of skill loss s: Thus we would expect an increase in s to make the
link between unemployment and marginal cost less negative.
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We now turn to characterize the e¤ect of unemployment on marginal costs and how
this e¤ect depends on s more rigorously. First, we quasi-di¤erence (4:21) and (4:22),
which yields
baLt = (1  x)1u (1  s) bnt 1 + sbaLt 1

bwLt = (1  x)1u  1  1 s  bnt 1 + 1 s bwLt 1

Substituting these equations into (4:16) and using bnt =  but1 u yields
cmct =  abaLt + w bwLt   0but + Lbut 1 + FEtbut+1(4.23)
 hcEtcmct+1    (p0 + ap1)baPt
baLt = (1  x)  (1  s) but 1u (1  u) + sbaLt 1

bwLt = (1  x)   1  1 s  but 1u (1  u) + 1 s bwLt 1

a = 
 
aL1   aL2 (1  x) s

w = 
 
wL1   wL2 (1  x) 1 s

0 = 

h
0
0 + (1  x)

aL2
(1 s)
u
  wL2 (
1 1 s )
u

1  u
L =
 h0L
1  u ; 

F =
 h0F
1  u
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Setting cmct+1 = cmct = cmc; but+1 = but = but 1 = bu, baLt = baLt 1 = baL and bwLt = bwLt 1 =
bwL and ignoring exogenous technology, we can write
cmc =  

0   F   L1   a (1 s)(1 x)u(1 u)(1 (1 x)s) + w
 (1 
1 
s )(1 x)
u(1 u)(1 (1 x)1 s )

1 + hc
bu
=  bu(4.24)
 =
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F  

(1 x)
u
(1 s)(aL1 aL2 )
(1 (1 x)s)  
(1 x)
u
(1 1 s )(wL1  wL2 )
(1 (1 x)1 s )

(1 + hc) (1  u) 
  gives the e¤ect of a "permanent" increase in unemployment on marginal cost.
Most conveniently, substituting the denitions of h
0
0; h
0
L and h
0
F yields
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F =
gM


1 +  (1  )2 (1  x)  (1  ) (1  x)   (1  )
which happens to be exactly the same as h0 + hL + hF ; is thus always positive and
independent of s:Hence in  only the term in the squared brackets and hc actually
depend on skill loss. The term in the squared bracket will be zero if there is no skill loss
(s = 1), implying that  > 0 and thus a negative e¤ect of a "permanent" increase in
unemployment on marginal cost.
With positive skill loss, the squared bracket represents the "skill loss channel" from
unemployment to marginal cost. The rst term gives the decline of the skill level of
the average applicant caused by the decline in bn associated with the increase in bu (note
that (1 x)
u
(1 s)
(1 (1 x)s) = a
n) times the net e¤ect of a permanent skill level decline on
marginal cost (
 
aL1   aL2

). The second term gives the decline of the skill-dependent
real wage caused by the decline in bn associated with the increase in bu (Note that
(1 x)
u
(1 1 s )
(1 (1 x)1 s )
= wn) times the net e¤ect of a permanent skill decline in the skill
dependent real wage on marginal cost (-
 
wL1   wL2

).
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As s grows, we would expect the squared bracket to grow as well if the real wage
is rigid. As was pointed out above, an increase in s means that the gap between
productivity and the real wage shrinks at a faster rate as unemployment increases.
This would lower . To check our intuition, we take the derivative of  with respect to
s and arrive at the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Let  be as in (4:24) and let s close to zero. Then @@s < 0 if
 > B
0xM(1 )
1 B0xM(1 (1 )) : Proof: appendix C.6.
20
Accepting the restriction on s; the condition for @@s < 0 is easily fullled for the
calibrations adopted in this chapter since B0xM (1  ) is a small number, while
1 B0xM (1   (1  )) is very close to one.21
Thus an increase in s indeed makes the e¤ect of unemployment on marginal costs
less negative. This raises the possibility of  turning negative as s increases. To put
it di¤erently, an increase in unemployment would then cause an increase rather than a
decrease in marginal cost, and, by implication, ination. This has consequences for the
determinacy properties of the interest feedback rule of the central bank which we will
come back to in the following section.
We are also interested in how a change in x for a given unemployment rate will
a¤ect  and @
@s
: It is easy to show that in the absence of skill loss, @
@x
> 0. Hence in the
20A more general proof without restrictions on s would have been desirable but struck us as impossible
due to the complexity of the expression resulting from @@s :
21One might wonder why the condition in the proposition does not simply say  > 0. For better
understanding, not rst that this is merely a su¢ cient not a necessary and su¢ cient condition. As can
be obtained from appendix C.6, the necessary and su¢ cient value of  would be lower. Furthermore,
it can obtained from (4:11) that even if there is no real wage rigidity and thus Wt would move by
the same percentage as ALt the e¤ects of a decline or increase in the average skill level would not be
neutral. This is because the t+1 ow prot associated with hiring in t mct+1APt+1  W 0t+1 does not
depend on the skill level of the average applicant. Thus a permanent decline in ALt a¤ect mct in some
way even if there is no real wage rigidity. The resulting e¤ect can be obtained from (4:24) by setting
 = 0 in the squared bracket:
  
aL1   aL2
   wL1   wL2  (1 x)u (1 s)(1 (1 x)s) :
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absence of skill loss, the e¤ect of a permanent increase in unemployment on marginal
cost will be more negative. This is due to the reasons discussed earlier. Introducing
skill loss adds two opposing forces of a change in x on both  and @
@s
: On the one
hand, as was shown above, an increase in x will lower in absolute value the negative
e¤ect of past unemployment on the skill level an and, to a lesser extent, the e¤ect of
past unemployment on the real wage wn. On the other hand, an increase in x given u
will increase , implying that the gain associated with the skill appreciation of a worker
hired today becomes more uncertain. This is reected in the fact that both aL2 and w
L
2
decrease as  increases, thus reducing the e¤ect of the baLt+1 and bwLt+1terms in (4:16) :
Concerning the e¤ect on of a change of x on @
@s
; we are able to prove the following
proposition:
Proposition 4. Let  be as in (4:24), s close to zero and  close to 1. Then
@2
@s@x
> 0 if x < 4 u 
p
u2+8u
4
Proof: appendix C.622
This condition holds a for a wide range of reasonable calibrations of x and u; includ-
ing those considered in this chapter. Hence an increase in the job nding probability
x reduces the e¤ect of s on : To put it di¤erently, if the job nding probability is
higher, increasing s will still weaken the (negative) link between marginal cost and
employment, but to a lesser extent than in a less uid labour market.
The model developed above features multiple links between unemployment and mar-
ginal costs. To sum up what we have learned, a permanent increase in unemployment
has the following four e¤ects on marginal cost in period t:
22Again this is a su¢ cient condition not a necessary and su¢ cient one, which can be obtained from
appendix C.6. For instance, the condition reported has  set equal to zero. In fact the maximum value
of x increases in :
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(1) The increase in period t unemployment lowers period t hiring costs (-h
0
0= (1  u)),
which tends to lower marginal cost. The strength of this channel increases in
the job nding probability x.
(2) The increase in period t+1 unemployment lowers period t+1 hiring cost, which
tends to increase marginal cost ( h0F= (1  u)). The strength of this channel
decreases in x.
(3) An increase in period t   1 unemployment increases period t hiring costs by
increasing the amount of hiring necessary to reach a given level of employment
(h
0
L= (1  u)). The strength of this channel decreases in x.
(4) An increase in period t to t 1 unemployment increases baLt   bwLt and baLt+1  
bwLt+1. The net e¤ect of this is to increase marginal cost. ( (1 x)u(1 u) (1 s)(aL1 aL2 )(1 (1 x)s)  
(1 x)
u(1 u)
(1 1 s )(wL1  wL2 )
(1 (1 x)1 s )(1 u)
> 0 if s > 0): The strength of this channel increases
in the skill loss percentage s and decreases in x.
Note that e¤ects 1-3 are already present in the model without skill loss, while the
fourth e¤ect arises from the introduction of skill loss among the unemployed.
Note that like in chapter two, we endogenise total factor productivity of the marginal
worker. Introducing skill decay among the unemployed renders it a positive function
of past employment and thus of past levels of aggregate demand. Thus just as with
endogenous growth, lower aggregate demand today implies productivity will be lower
than it otherwise would have been, implying that ceteris paribus marginal costs will be
higher as well.
4.5. Determinacy in the Model with Skill Loss
We now investigate which policy rules guarantee determinacy in the presence of
skill loss. The rst question we are interested in is whether  > 1 is still a su¢ cient
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condition to establish determinacy for varying levels of skill loss. Thus we consider
current, forward and backward looking rules where the interest rate responds only to
ination. We are dealing with the following system:
t = Ett+1 + cmct (M1)
cmct =  abaLt + w bwLt   0but + Lbut 1 + FEtbut+1 (M2)
 hcEtcmct+1    (p0 + ap1)baPt
baLt = (1  x)  (1  s) but 1u (1  u) + sbaLt 1

(M3)
bwLt = (1  x)   1  1 s  but 1u (1  u) + 1 s bwLt 1

(M4)
bct = baPt + cLbaLt   c0but   c1but 1 (M5)
cL =
AL (1  g)
AA   ALg ; c

0 =

0
0
1  u; c

1 =

0
1
1  u
bct = Etbct+1   bit   Ett+1 (M6)
baPt = abaPt 1 + et; et i:i:d:   0; 2 (M7)
bit = Ett+j;   0;   1  j  1 (M8)
(M5) is derived in appendix A.7. Unfortunately, unlike in the original Blanchard/
Gali model, we cannot establish the conditions for determinacy analytically.23 Therefore
we solve the model numerically using the software Dynare and perform a grid search
for values of s between 0 and 0.07 (step size: 0.005) and values of  between 0 and 3
23The model with skill decay has three forward looking variables and three state variables. This
implies that we can not apply the conditions derived by Woodford (2003) which we used to derive
the determinacy conditions for the Blanchard and Gali model. As far as we are aware, there is no
straightforward way to analytically determine the eigenvalues of a 5x5 system.
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(step size: 0.1). All other parameters are set to meet Blanchard and Galis "Continental
European" calibration as reproduced in table 4.1. We then repeat the grid search for
the "American" calibration.24 The determinacy regions for the current looking rule are
graphed in gures 4.1 and 4.2. The area between the two lines denotes the determinacy
region in both graphs (including the points situated on these lines). For the European
calibration, for values of s  0:025; the standard requirement on  to guarantee
determinacy is reversed: A unique equilibrium now requires   0:9: The determinacy
regions for the backward and forward looking rules (not shown) are almost identical.
In particular, under the Continental European calibration, the drop of the maximum
value of  to 0:9 for s  0:025 carries over. This suggests that it is not the timing of
the active response to ination but the active response to ination per se which induces
indeterminacy.
By contrast, for the American calibration,  > 1 does guarantee determinacy for
the whole range considered here. The determinacy regions for the current, forward
and backward looking policy rule are completely identical. Experimentation suggest
that for the current looking rule, the   0:9 requirement only becomes relevant at
s  0:225:
The intuition for this result can be gained by showing how the e¤ect of a "per-
manent" increase in unemployment on marginal costs depends on s: As can be seen
from (4:24) ; in the absence of skill loss this e¤ect is negative since h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F > 0:
However, as we have shown in the previous section, @
@s
< 0. Thus as we increase s;
 will ultimately turn negative. Figure 4.3 plots  against s for both the European
(broken line) and the American (solid line) calibration. Note that under the continental
24Note that the following results discussed below also hold if we use the same lower unemployment rate
under the American calibration as under the European calibration. For a given job nding probability,
this implies a lower job destruction rate.
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Figure 4.1. Continental European Calibration: Determinacy Region
European calibration, the level of skill loss for which this expression turns negative is
the same for which the determinacy requirement switches to   0:9, i.e. 0.025. Thus
if marginal costs, and thus ination, increases in response to a persistent increase in the
unemployment rate, the central bank should lower the real interest rate. This policy
lowers the real interest rate, hence increases demand therefore does not validate the
increase in unemployment. By contrast, with   1; there is scope for sunspot equi-
libria if s exceeds its respective critical value: A persistent increase in unemployment
will ultimately lead to an increase in ination and (as   1) the real interest rate,
irrespective of whether the central bank responds to lagged, current or expected future
ination. This lowers demand and thus validates the increase in unemployment. In the
next section, when we display the impulse response function to a sunspot shock, we
show that this is in fact exactly what happens.
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Figure 4.2. US Calibration: Determinacy Region
This leaves the question why this critical value is so much higher for the American
than for the continental European calibration. The chief reason for this is that due to
the more uid labour market associated with the American calibration, for s = 0; 
is a lot higher than under the continental European calibration: The intuition for that
was discussed in section 4.2.3: The higher the job destruction probability ; the lower
is the e¤ect of lagged and lead unemployment on period t marginal cost. The reason is
that with higher ; period t hiring and thus period t hiring cost depend less on period
t  1 employment since more jobs are destroyed as we move from period t  1 to period
t: Similarly, the possibility to save hiring costs by moving job creation from t + 1 to
t is also reduced since fewer jobs survive from period t to t + 1. Hence the e¤ect of
t + 1 hiring costs and thus period t employment on marginal cost is reduced as well.
Furthermore, we have shown in the previous section that if x is higher, the e¤ect of s
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on  will be less ( @
2
@s@x
> 0). Therefore under the American calibration,  decreases a
little less as s increases than under the European calibration.
We now check whether interest rate smoothing would help to restore determinacy.
Therefore we replace M8 by bit = (1  i)t + ibit 1 and perform a grid search over
, i and s; with  = [0; 3] ; i = [0; 1] and s = [0; 0:07] : The determinacy
requirement on  remains almost una¤ected.
25 In particular, determinacy requires
  0:9 if s  0:025 independently of the degree of interest rate smoothing. This
result is in line with the intuition given above as even with interest rate smoothing, if
 > 1; an increase in ination ultimately increases the real interest rate.
25Only for  = 0:8 and  = 0:9 does smoothing make a di¤erence in that for s = 0:02; the maximum
value for  increases to 2.3 and 2.5, respectively. For 
s  0:025; the maximum value of  th drops
to 0.9, as for all other degrees of smoothing.
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We investigate next whether responding to the output gap in addition to ination
helps to restore determinacy under the European calibration. As is standard in the
New Keynesian literature, we dene potential output Y nt as the output level including
hiring costs at which nal goods rms charge their desired mark-up, implying that
marginal cost is at its steady state. The associated unemployment rate is denoted as
unt : As marginal cost is a¤ected by both lead unemployment and lead marginal cost,
when deriving unt ; we will further assume that if unemployment is at its natural level
in period t, it will be expected to be at its natural level in period t+1 as well.26 Thus
we are dealing with the following system:
26The following results are broadly robust against relaxing this assumption.
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t = Ett+1 + cmct
cmct =  abaLt + w bwLt   0but + Lbut 1 + FEtbut+1   hcEtcmct+1
  (p0 + ap1)baPt
baLt = (1  x)  (1  s) but 1u (1  u) + sbaLt 1

bwLt = (1  x)   1  1 s  but 1u (1  u) + 1 s bwLt 1

bct = baPt + cLbaPt   c0but   c1but 1; cL = AL (1  g)AA   ALg ;
c0 =

0
0
1  u; c

1 =

0
1
1  u
bct = Etbct+1   bit   Ett+1
baPt = abaPt 1 + et; et i:i:d:   0; 2
bunt = FEtbunt+1 + Lbut 1 + abaLt + w bwLt   p0baPt   p1EtbaPt+10
byt = baPt + yLbaLt   y0but   y1but 1; yL = ALAA ; y0 = ALAA (1  u) ;
y1 =
 
1  AL (1  )
AA (1  u)
bynt = baPt + yLbaLt   y0bunt   y1but 1
bit = t + y (byt   bynt ) ; ; y  0
The equation for bunt was derived by setting cmct = cmct+1 = 0 and but+1 = bunt+1 in the
marginal cost equation, while the equation describing the deviation of output including
hiring costs from its steady state is derived in appendix C.5. Clearly bunt depends on
past values of actual unemployment as well as its own future value.
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We perform a grid search over ; y and s; with  = [0; 3] ; y = [0; 3] (step
size 0.1) and s = [0; 0:07] : We nd that responding to the output gap extends the
determinacy region if s < 0:025 but reduces it if s  0:025: For example, gure 4.4
plots the lowest value of  compatible with determinacy against y for s = 0: Clearly
the lower bound of  declines as y increases. By contrast, gure 4.5 plots the highest
value of  compatible with determinacy for the case of s = 0:025: The upper bound
of  is declining, thus reducing the determinacy region.
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Figure 4.4. Continental Europe, s = 0; lower Bound of the Determinacy Region
Intuition for this result can be gained from the e¤ect of actual unemployment on
natural unemployment. It is easy to see that byt bynt =  y0 (but   bunt ). Hence the output
gap depends positively on bunt : Solving bunt forward (ignoring the exogenous productiv-
ity process) yields bunt = 1P
i=0

F
0
i 
Lbut 1 + abaLt   w bwLt  : Let us again assume for
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Figure 4.5. Continental Europe, s = 0:025; upper Bound of the Deter-
minacy Region
simplicity that but+i = bu: We then have
bun = L + a (1 s)(1 x)u(1 u)(1 (1 x)s)   w (1 
1 
s )(1 x)
u(1 u)(1 (1 x)1 s )
0   F
bu
If @bun
@bu < 1; then an increase in unemployment increases natural unemployment less than
one for one. It thus lowers the output gap and tends to lower real interest rate. This
should stabilise unemployment. By contrast, if @bun
@bu > 1; an increase in unemployment
will increase bun more than one for one and thus tend to increase the real interest rate.
In this case responding to the output gap is actually destabilising. Moreover, note that
@bun
@bu > 1, 0  F   L  a (1 s)(1 x)u(1 u)(1 (1 x)s) +w (1 
1 
s )(1 x)
u(1 u)(1 (1 x)1 s )
< 0; implying that
 < 0: As was shown above, this will be true if s  0:025: Hence responding to the
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output gap will tend to destabilise the economy precisely when responding more than
one for one to ination tends to destabilise the economy as well.
If natural output tracks actual output too closely for the output gap to be a stabil-
ising argument in the policy rule, then perhaps the deviation of unemployment from its
steady state (rather than its natural) value will help to achieve determinacy. Thus we
consider the policy rule bit = t + ubut and conduct a grid search over s;  and u,
with  = [0; 3] ; u = [0;   3] (step size 0.1) and s = [0; 0:07] : It turns out that re-
sponding to unemployment has a strong stabilising e¤ect. Setting u =  0:1 guarantees
determinacy for   0:2 if s  0:02 and for the full interval of  for 0 < s  0:035.
For higher values of s the upper bound of  again begins to decline. For u =  0:2;
determinacy is guaranteed for the full interval of  as long as s  0:055: Finally,
for u   0:3; the equilibrium is determinate for any combination of  and s: Thus
a modest response to unemployment restores determinacy and in doing so is robust
against variations in s:
Let us assume that our model in its respective calibrations of u; x, and  indeed
captures major di¤erences between the continental European and the US economy.
Furthermore, note that the value of s for which the value of  begins to be bounded
above under the American Calibration seems implausibly high. With s = 0:225; a
worker would have lost about 64% after one year of unemployment. By contrast, the
critical value of s for the continental European calibration seems a lot more plausible.
It would imply a skill loss of about 9.6% after one year of unemployment. Note also
that estimates of interest feedback rules suggest that the Federal Reserve as well as the
Bundesbank and the ECB respond more than one for one to ination and pay some
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attention to the output gap as well.27 Hence we conclude that indeterminacy is a far
more realistic scenario in Europe than in the United States.
Moreover, in the 1970s many central banks moved away from a "Keynesian" mon-
etary policy which focuses on stabilising unemployment to a policy which aggressively
targets ination but pays little attention to unemployment. Within the model pro-
posed here, with s  0:025; this move would cause no determinacy problem with a
uid American labour market but would induce indeterminacy if labour market ows
were low as in continental Europe. In the next section we will investigate the dynam-
ics of unemployment and ination for the European calibration with s  0:025 and
 > 1:
4.6. Dynamics under Indeterminacy
The previous section showed that a policy rule which increases the nominal interest
rate more than one for one with ination might quite likely imply indeterminacy if
the ow - characteristics of the labour market are "continental European" in the sense
that there is little hiring and ring and there is some skill loss among the unemployed.
This renders indeterminacy a realistic scenario for the continental European calibra-
tion. Since there is an innite number of stable equilibria, self-fullling prophecies can
generate endogenous uctuations of unemployment and other endogenous variables. In
this section we investigate the response of the model under the continental European
calibration and with skill loss being at the critical level of 0.025 to a sunspot shock and
a non-correlated technology shock. The main focus of the discussion is to illustrate that
the responses of unemployment, marginal cost, ination and the real interest rate to
27See for instance Clarida et al. (1998), Orphanides (2001) and Clausen and Meier (2003) for reaction
function estimates for the Fed and the Bundesbank and Gorter et al. (2008) and Sauer and Sturm
(2003) for estimates for the ECB.
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the sunspot shock are perfectly in line with the intuition given in the previous section
for why s  0:025 (and thus  < 0) combined with  > 1 induces indeterminacy
To solve the indeterminate model, we follow a solution method proposed by Lubik
and Schorfheide (2003). Their method builds on an approach by Sims (2002). Sims
proposed to solve linear rational expectation (RE) models by solving for the vector of
expectational errors t = qt Et 1qt, where qt is a vector of variables over which agents
form expectations. Thus the linear RE model is cast in the following form
(4.25)  0yt =  1yt 1 +	"t +t
where "t denotes an i.i.d vector of structural shocks and all variables with a t and t-1
subscript are observable at time t, and all variables with a t-1 subscript are predeter-
mined. Any system of rst order di¤erence equations can be brought into this form by
replacing Etqt+1 with yt = Etqt+1 and the adding an equation reading qt = yt 1 + t:
Thus there will be an expectation error for each forward-looking variable. Note that all
variables on the right hand side except for t are either predetermined or exogenous.
The system has a stable solution if there exists a vector t as a function of the
exogenous shocks "t to eliminate the explosive components of yt. The solution is a
unique solution if the vector of structural shocks "t uniquely determines the vector of
expectational errors t. The solution will not be unique if the number of expectation
errors exceeds the number of explosive components in yt:28 This opens the door for
sunspot shocks to a¤ect the endogenous variables. Lubik and Schorfheide suggest to
interpret these shocks as belief shocks that trigger reversion of forecasts of the endoge-
nous variable. Suppose that due to a sunspot the expectation of qt between t and t-1
28See Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), pp. 276-277.
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is revised by vt: Hence
qt = (Et 1qt + vt) + et
where the term in brackets denotes the revised forecast and et is the error associated
with this revised forecast.29 Thus (4:25) can be written as
(4.26)  0yt =  1yt 1 +

	 
2664 "t
vt
3775+et
If the solution is unique, vt will not appear in the solution.
We then assume that the e¤ects of the sunspot shock vt and the structural shock
"t to the forecast error are orthogonal to each other. This is a standard assumption in
the literature on indeterminate linear rational expectations models. It means we are
restricting our attention to a subset of the set of solutions of the indeterminate model.
This solution can be picked up easily by casting M1 to M8 in the form of (4:26).
We thus have yt =

xt x
u
t x
mc
t x
n
t x
c
t baPt t but cmc0t bunt bct baLt bwLt bit
0
,
"t = et and vt =

et v

t v
u
t v
mc
t v
n
t v
c
t
0
with xqt = Etqt+1, the v
q
t denoting the
belief shock associated with the forecast of the t+1 value of variable q and cmc0t = mct:
The matrices  0,  1; 	 and  are to be found in appendix C.7.
Note that the way the model is written, we have ve belief shocks - one for each
forward looking variable. However, the e¤ects of those shocks on the forecast errors, and
thus on the endogenous variables, will not generally be independent from each other.
For instance, if there is one stable root too many, as is the case under the calibration
we are dealing with, there is one degree of freedom. That means we can choose the
value of one endogenous variable and then the stable solution for the remaining ones
29See Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), p. 279.
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will be pinned down as well. For instance, it will be possible to reproduce the dynamics
produced by vt with a suitable value of v
u
t ; v
mc
t ; v
n
t or v
c
t :
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Figure 4.6. European Calibration, -2% Consumption Belief Shock - but
and bct
We assume that the central bank responds only to ination and set  = 1:5:When
looking at the impulse response of the technology shock, we set a = 0:
We rst consider the e¤ects of a -2% belief shock to consumption, i.e. vc0 =  0:02:
Figure 4.6 displays the deviation of unemployment from its steady state (in percentage
points) and output net of hiring costs (in percent), i.e. consumption. Unemployment
increases by about 0.9 percentage point, while consumption declines by a bit less than
0.9% and then declines somewhat further. The increase in unemployment is very persis-
tent: after 10 years, unemployment is still about 0.72 percentage points above its steady
state while after 25 years (100 quarters) it still exceeds its steady state by 0.51%.
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Figure 4.7. European Calibration, -2% Consumption Belief Shock - In-
ation and cmct
Figure 4.7 shows that cmct falls by 0.06% on impact and then starts increasing
and turns positive in quarter 13. Since we have chosen a value of s such that  is
smaller than zero (see Figure 4.3, the "Continental Europe" line), we would expect
the persistent increase in unemployment to ultimately turn marginal cost positive.
However, as long as the history of high unemployment is short, the skill loss among
job seekers has not yet su¢ ciently built up to turn marginal cost positive. In terms
of the four e¤ects of an increase in unemployment on marginal cost listed at the end
of section ve, e¤ect number four has not yet gained enough momentum such that the
joint positive impact of e¤ects 2, 3 and 4 dominate the negative impact of e¤ect 1. To
illustrate how the dynamic of the skill decline matches with sign change and dynamic
of cmct, consider how the skill level evolves in response to a "permanent" change in
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the unemployment rate:
baLt = an  (1  x)t ts   1 bu(1  u)
where an is the e¤ect of a permanent increase in employment on the skill level of the
average applicant and can be obtained from proposition 2. Note that for t ! 1;
as (1  x)t ts ! 0; this expression gives the e¤ect of a permanent increases in un-
employment on the skill level. In Figure 4.8, we plot baLt (as dened in this equa-
tion) as a percentage of the change of baL1 after an innite number of periods, i.e. 
1  (1  x)t ts
  100: The curve is rather steep at the beginning but then attens
out. With an unemployment history of twelve quarters, which happens to be the case
in quarter 13, the decline in baLt has reached 97.7% of its total and the rate of change has
decreased to about 0.5 percentage points. Thus cmct turns positive after the decline
in the skill level resulting from the increase in unemployment has almost reached its
maximum. Note also that the dynamics of cmct and baLt are similar in that the rate
of increase of cmct is at its highest during those rst 13 quarters but then gradually
declines.
Ination declines to -0.08% on impact but turns positive in quarter four. It then
keeps rising until it reaches a maximum of 0.01% in quarter 17. Ination is pushed
faster above zero because it responds not just to current but also to expected future
values of marginal costs. Correspondingly, we would expect the ex ante real interest
rate to ultimately increase as well. Figure 4.9 shows that (it   Ett+1) declines on
impact but begins to increase in quarter two and begins to exceed its steady state value
in quarter 5 and then remains persistently above it. The persistent increase in the real
interest rate validates the initial decline in consumption and the associated increase in
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Figure 4.8. Skill Decline following a permanent Unemployment Increase
- Percentage of total Drop
unemployment. Hence the response of unemployment, marginal cost ination and the
real interest rate is just as we would expect from our discussion of why indeterminacy
occurs for s  0:025 (and thus  < 0) combined with  > 1:
We now turn to why the responses of unemployment and the other endogenous
variables to the sunspot shock are so persistent. A highly persistent response of the
endogenous variables to a sunspot shock in a linear indeterminate model is not un-
common.30 Formally speaking, this might be due to the eigenvalues being continuous
in the models parameters. In that case, increasing or decreasing a parameter critical
for determinacy until indeterminacy arises would result in a new stable eigenvalue just
below one. For instance, increasing s from 0 to 0.025 while holding  constant at 1.5
monotonously decreases the modulus of the smallest (in modulus) unstable eigenvalue
30See Clarida et al. (2000), pp. 172-174 and Weder (2000), pp. 292-293.
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from 1.015 to 0.9929. This new stable eigenvalue has a larger modulus than all other
stable eigenvalues and will thus govern the persistence of the system, implying a highly
persistent response of the economy to shocks.
We suspect that the economic intuition for the very slow return of unemployment to
its steady state is related to the value of  (recall that the e¤ect of a permanent change
in unemployment on marginal cost is given by  ) implied by s = 0:025; which equals
-0.00016. This is not only negative but also close to zero. Hence a given persistent
decline in unemployment causes only a small decline in marginal cost and ination.
Hence the resulting decline in the nominal and the real interest rate will be small as
well, implying only a small increase in aggregate demand. Hence only a small decline
in unemployment is validated.
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Figure 4.9. European Calibration, Consumption Belief Shock: Ex-ante
real Interest Rate
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We now turn to the e¤ects of a non-correlated technology shock of -2%, i.e. e0 =
 0:02: Figure 4.10 shows that unemployment and consumption both decline by about
1%, but in quarter 2 unemployment increases to about 0.65 percentage points above
its steady state value. Unemployment and consumption then display a similar degree
of persistence as in response to a consumption belief shock. Figure 4.11 shows that
ination and cmct both increase on impact. Both turn negative in the next period due
to the increase in unemployment. cmct turns positive in quarter 15 due to the fact that
unemployment persistently increases, while ination again turns positive faster. This
then ultimately implies an above-steady-state real-interest rate.
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Figure 4.10. European Calibration, -2% Technology Shock
Thus both shocks can potentially trigger extremely persistent increases in unem-
ployment under the continental European calibration if skill loss exceeds its critical
level and the central bank reacts more than one-for-one to ination. This is clearly a
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Figure 4.11. European Calibration, -2% Technology Shock - Ination and cmct
very interesting result given the persistent increase in unemployment in many Western
European countries since the end of the 1970s.
4.7. Conclusion
This chapter adds skill loss among the unemployed as an additional labour-market
friction to the model of Blanchard and Gali (2008) and shows the implications of this
modication for determinacy. We assume that an unemployed person loses a set fraction
of her skills during every quarter of her unemployment spell but regains all her skills
after one quarter of employment. Firms that decide to hire meet workers according to
their shares in the market. We rst show that in the Blanchard and Gali (2008) model,
a coe¢ cient on ination larger than one in an interest feedback for the nominal interest
rate guarantees determinacy.
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We then show that the introduction of skill loss increases the (positive) e¤ect of past
unemployment on marginal costs. An increase in past unemployment rates increases
the share of the longer-term unemployed and thus worsens the quality of the pool of
job seekers. If the quarterly skill-loss percentage is increased to or above a critical level,
the combined positive e¤ects of lagged and lead unemployment exceed the negative
e¤ect of current unemployment. In such a scenario, if the central bank responds only
to ination, determinacy requires a coe¢ cient on ination in the feedback rule smaller
than one. This holds regardless of whether the central bank responds to current, lagged
or expected future ination.
We also show that the critical skill loss percentage is much lower, and a lot more
plausible, if the ow characteristics of the labour market are "Continental European"
(Blanchard and Gali (2008)) in the sense that there is little hiring and ring going
on. By contrast, under and an "American" calibration of inow and outow rates, the
implied critical skill loss percentage is implausibly high. This is largely due to the fact
that even in the original Blanchard and Gali model lagged and lead unemployment
matter a lot more for marginal costs under the continental European than under the
American calibration.
Furthermore, neither interest rate smoothing nor responding to the output gap
(as commonly modelled in the New Keynesian literature) help to restore determinacy
under the continental European calibration if skill loss is above its critical level. As
empirical estimates of interest-feedback rules frequently nd that the Federal Reserve
and Bundesbank as well as the ECB respond more than one-for-one to ination, this
might mean that indeterminacy and thus sunspot-driven dynamics are a much more
likely phenomena in continental Europe than in the United States. By contrast, a
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modest response to unemployment guarantees determinacy for the full range of skill-
decay percentages and ination coe¢ cients in the interest feedback rule we consider.
Finally, we compute the response of the model under the European calibration with
skill loss above its critical level and the coe¢ cient on ination larger than one in the
interest-feedback rule to an adverse sunspot shock and an adverse non-correlated tech-
nology shock. It turns out that the response of unemployment is extremely persistent.
Thus this admittedly quite stylised model potentially contributes to explaining the per-
sistent increase in unemployment observed in continental Europe since the late 1970s.
It also suggests the following story: The shift of monetary policy away from a "Keyne-
sian" approach towards aggressive ination targeting might have been unproblematic
in the uid labour market of the United States but might have been a source of insta-
bility and persistent unemployment uctuations in Western continental Europe with
its much less uid labour market. Hence the model developed here is able to match the
rst three of the ve empirical ndings listed in the conclusion to chapter one.
Finally, note that like in chapter two, we endogenise total factor productivity of
the marginal worker. Just as with endogenous growth, lower aggregate demand today
implies productivity will be lower than it otherwise would have been, implying that
ceteris paribus marginal costs will be higher as well. However, in contrast to the sticky
price endogenous growth model developed in chapter two, the model developed in this
chapter, once calibrated to match continental European features, generates unemploy-
ment uctuations endogenously as a result of multiple stable equilibria. Furthermore,
these uctuations are also more persistent than those created by the cost push shock
in chapter two.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
In Chapter one we conduct a critical survey of the mainstream approaches aiming
to explain the medium run evolution of unemployment in advanced OECD economies,
and why unemployment has persistently increased in many European countries but not
in the United States. We conclude that the existing approaches are wanting and that
a new approach towards explaining medium run swings of unemployment is called for.
We also conclude that such a theory should shed light on the following set of empirical
ndings:
 the medium run swings in unemployment we observe in OECD countries, par-
ticularly the increase in unemployment in several Western continental Euro-
pean countries since the mid of the 1970s. The theory should generate medium
run swings without relying on changes in labour market institutions.
 the time series evidence showing that there is high endogenous unemployment
persistence, or even unit root behaviour, in a number of Western continental
European countries, but much less persistence in the United States. This
means that a temporary shock in Europe increasing unemployment today will
have a lasting e¤ect on unemployment long after it occurred.
 the time series evidence showing that structural breaks in unemployment seem
to be predominantly located during recessions. This suggests that aggregate
demand contractions may have long lasting e¤ects on unemployment.
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 the evidence saying that a major disination seems to have been a necessary
condition for a major increase in the NAIRU. There is also evidence that the
change in ination over a ten year period is negatively related to the change
in the NAIRU during that period.
 the evidence saying that the amount of monetary easing during a recession is
negatively related to the subsequent change in the NAIRU.
The models developed in this thesis go some way towards achieving these goals
and in addition yield a set of other insights. In chapter two, we introduce endogenous
growth via a capital stock externality into a New Keynesian model with unemployment.
Unemployment arises due to e¢ ciency wages. We refer to this model as the "New
Growth economy" and to an otherwise identical model without endogenous growth as
the "JLN economy". We calibrate the models to German data and hit the economy
with a cost push shock which generates disination whose size is at the lower end of
what was observed in many OECD countries at the beginning of the 1980s. In the New
Growth economy, this one quarter shock causes a persistent and substantial increase in
unemployment, lasting for 10 to 20 years in an order of magnitude of one percentage
point or more. The drop in investment during the disination implies a slowdown in
labour productivity growth, which, in conjunction with rigid real wage growth, increases
the NAIRU. The model thus also contributes to explaining the productivity slowdown
observed across advanced OECD economies from the 1970s to the 1980s. Furthermore,
the amount of monetary easing during the recession associated with the disination
turns out to be negatively related to the subsequent increase in the NAIRU.
The model also contributes to explaining the cross-country di¤erences in unem-
ployment evolution. Varying the size of the cost push shock generates a relationship
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between the change in the ination rate and the change in the NAIRU over a ten year
horizon similar to the relationship observed in the data. We also shed light on why
unemployment has increased by less in the United States, by drawing on empirically
observable di¤erences in monetary policy and wage setting. The di¤erences in wage
setting can be related, if coarsely so, to features of the labour market such as union
density or the benet system. Thus the chapter also supports the view that, as sug-
gested by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), it is both "shocks and institutions" which are
at the heart of explaining the evolution of unemployment across time and the di¤erences
across countries.
While the main focus of this thesis is a positive one, chapter three investigates the
consequences of introducing endogenous growth for optimal monetary policy. We search
for a simple optimal rule which maximises the households welfare in the two JLN and the
New Growth economy. The main result is that in the JLN economy, the optimal simple
rule features a large ination coe¢ cient and a much lower output coe¢ cient, just as
conventional wisdom would suggest. By contrast, in the presence of endogenous growth,
this hawkish monetary policy is no longer optimal. The optimal ination coe¢ cient is
the lowest in the grid, while the coe¢ cient on the output gap is higher than in the JLN
economy. This result is qualitatively robust against a variety of changes to the baseline
scenario, i.e. variations to the degree of real wage rigidity and nominal price stickiness
as well as the introduction of a transaction cost for consumption, the later of which
implies a transaction demand for money.
Chapter four sheds light on some of the ndings above in a di¤erent way. It adds skill
loss among the unemployed to a New Keynesian model with hiring frictions developed
by Blanchard and Gali (2008). An unemployed person looses a xed fraction of her
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skills during every quarter of her unemployment spell but regains all her skills after
one quarter of employment. We nd that if skill decay exceeds a threshold level (about
2.5% per quarter), a nominal interest rate feedback rule with a coe¢ cient on (current,
expected future or lagged) ination exceeding one induces indeterminacy. The change
in the determinacy requirement appears to be related to a change in the long run
relationship between marginal cost and unemployment from negative to positive if skill
decay exceeds the threshold level.
Furthermore, the threshold skill decay percentage is implausibly high if we adopt
Blanchard and Galis (2008) "American" calibration of labour market ows, i.e. a
high job nding probability and a high job destruction rate. By contrast, if we adopt
their "continental European" calibration, the critical skill loss percentage is low and
plausible. This result is robust against adding the lagged interest rate or the output
gap to the policy rule. By contrast, a modest response to unemployment guarantees
determinacy for the full range of skill decay percentages and ination coe¢ cients. Thus
under the European calibration with skill decay above the threshold and an active
monetary policy with no response to unemployment, there is indeterminacy and thus
scope for sunspot driven uctuations. Indeed, a contractive one quarter consumption
sunspot shock which lowers output and increases unemployment on impact increases
unemployment extremely persistently.
Empirical estimates of interest feedback rules frequently nd that both the Federal
Reserve and ECB respond more than one for one to ination, as did the Bundesbank.
The model of chapter four suggests that in continental Europe with its not very uid
labour market, such a policy will induce endogenous persistent swings in unemployment.
This suggests that shift of monetary policy away from a "Keynesian" approach towards
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aggressive ination targeting was unproblematic in the uid labour market of the United
States but was a source of instability and persistent unemployment uctuations in
continental Europe.
There are numerous possible extensions to the research conducted in this thesis. We
restrict ourselves a selected few. At the moment, the analysis in chapter two focuses
on replicating the persistent increase in unemployment in response to the disinations
of the 1980s by hitting the economy with a cost push shock. It would be interesting to
extend the focus to the 1990s when unemployment remained high in some European
countries like France, but started declining in others like Spain. This would quite likely
require considering other shocks as well, for instance scal policy shocks to model the
e¤ects of a policy aimed at reducing the decit and the debt to GDP ratio to meet
the Maastricht criteria or demand shocks like the breakdown of the European exchange
rate mechanism at the beginning of the 1990s. Given the ability of endogenous growth
to generate persistence in real variables, it would be interesting to estimate the model
to rigorously check the extent to which endogenous growth reduces the persistence in
the exogenous driving processes needed to generate a given degree of persistence in the
endogenous variables. Estimation would also allow one to pin down which shocks are
most important in explaining movements in unemployment, assuming that the model
is reasonably correctly specied.
The model in chapter four makes very strong predictions about the determinacy
requirements on the policy rule, but, as models making strong predictions sometimes
go, it is at the same time highly stylised. An obvious extension to make it less so would
be to assume a production function featuring capital. On the one hand, since the mar-
ginal product of labour would then be decreasing as employment increases, this would
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make the relationship between unemployment and marginal cost more negative. On
the other hand, a persistent decrease in employment and the associated reduction in
the productivity of the average applicant would increase the capital to e¤ective labour
ratio, inducing rms to lower their capital stock. Our prior would be that the two
e¤ects would o¤set each other but this needs to be rigorously checked. Furthermore, it
would be interesting to see whether the indeterminacy results carry over to a more so-
phisticated modelling of wage determination, like e¢ ciency wages or Nash bargaining.
This might also increase the scope for institutional features of the labour market, like
the generosity of unemployment benets, to a¤ect the determinacy results, and thus
might enhance the ability of the model to relate cross-country di¤erences in unemploy-
ment dynamics to the "level" of institutions interacting with an unsuitable monetary
policy. Finally, it would be interesting to relax assumption that recovery of skills after
reemployment takes only one quarter since, since this might be overly restrictive. For
instance, Gregg and Tominey (2005) nd that the wage penalty associated with a year
of youth unemployment is still present at age 42.1
We leave all these extension to future research.
1See Gregg and Tominey (2005), p. 502 and pp. 505-506.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1. Derivation of the Real Wage Phillips Curve
The rms rst order conditions with respect to the real wage and e¤ort are
nt(i)  n = t1
wt(i)
t = (1  )mct
Yt(i)
et(i)
Combining those with the rst order condition with respect to labour yields et(i) =
1. Substituting this back into the e¤ort function (2:4), we note that, as the rms wage
depends only on aggregate variables which are the same for all rms, it must indeed
hold that wt(i) = wt . Substituting for log bt and rearranging then yields
(1 + 3) logwt = (5 (1  6)  4) logwt 1 + 1   0 + 57   2f (nt)
  (56 + 8) log

1=

Yt 1
nt 1   n  ns

Subtracting (56 + 8) logwt 1 on both sides and dividing by (1 + 3) then yields
logwt =
1   0 + 57
1 + 3
  2
1 + 3
f (nt) +
5 + 8   4
1 + 3
logwt 1(A.1)
 (56 + 8)
1 + 3
log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

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Hence with the coe¢ cient restrictions imposed above, the wage depends positively
on the past real wage and non-managerial employment. It will be above its market
clearing level and thus there is unemployment in the economy.
Note that the last term in brackets is in fact the private sector labour share. If
this were constant in the steady state, as it would be at a constant employment level,
equation (A:1) could be solved for a long run real wage if 5+8 4
1+3
< 1: As mentioned
above however, the economy is growing in the steady state. Therefore the real wage
must grow in the steady state as well. Thus a wage setting function simply relating
the wage level to employment would not be consistent with a stable employment level.
The easiest way to deal with the issue therefore is to set 5+8 4
1+3
= 1. This does
not seem too restrictive; it simply says that an increase in the log of the time t real
wage in the economy (including rm i) has in absolute value the same net e¤ect on
e¤ort (remember we have 1 + 3 > 0) as an increase in the exogenous reference as
represented by logwt 1, log bt and log (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns)) : Thus we arrive at a real
wage Phillips Curve with a labour share term:
logwt   logwt 1 = a+ b  f (nt) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

;(A.2)
with a =
0   1 + 57
1 + 3
, b =   2
1 + 3
> 0 and c =  (56 + 8)
1 + 3
< 0
A.2. Determination of the Overhead Labour Force
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), we assume that in the steady state, all
economic prot generated by the monopolistically competitive rm goes to the overhead
sta¤. This is justied because setting up production is impossible without overhead
labour and the rms prot is thus essentially equal to the collective marginal product
of its overhead sta¤. We assume that the overhead sta¤ splits this prot equally. Hence
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the rm ends up with zero prots, which eliminates any incentive for market entry.
Christiano et al. (2005) also assume a xed cost of production to eliminate prots
among monopolistically competitive rms, although they do not specify the origin of
the cost.1
For simplicity, we assume the amount of overhead workers required to enable pro-
duction is such that the real wage for overhead and non-overhead workers will be exactly
the same in the steady state. These assumptions allow for a straightforward way to
determine the amount of overhead and non-overhead workers as a function of total
employment. Zero prot requires
  1

Y   wn = 0
where  1

is the share of rmsprots in output. Substituting wt = (1   ) 1 Ytn ns n
gives, after some manipulation
  1
1   =
n
n  ns   n  s
This is the ratio of overhead labour to productive labour, which we call s: Solving for
n then gives
n =
s
1 + s
(n  ns)
A.3. Normalised Version of the New Growth Model
As we are dealing with two growth models, we have to stationarise all variables which
would otherwise be trended in order to be able to solve the model. This appendix applies
this normalisation to the New Growth model. The resulting equations are those which
1See Rotemberg and Woodford (2004), p. 17, and Christiano et al. (2005), p. 15.
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have been solved and simulated. We dene Ct
Kt
; habt 1
Kt
Yt+wtns
Kt
; It
Kt
and wt
Kt
as Dt; Habt 1;
Ft; Rt and Ht; while the gross capital stock growth rate
Kt+1
Kt
  1 is dened as gkt+1:
We directly apply the normalisation to the equations of the aggregate demand block:
(A.3) Ft = Dt +Rt +
'
2
(t   t 1)2 (Ft  Htns) +Htns
Consumption (remember habt 1 = jCt 1; thus Habt 1 = j
Dt 1
1+gkt
1= (Dt  Habt 1)(A.4)
= Et

(1 + it) =
 
(1 + t+1) (Dt+1  Habt)
 
1 + gkt+1

(A.5)
Habt = j
Dt
1 + gkt+1
Investment:
Et
 
1
(Dt+1  Habt)
 
1 + gKt+1
  rkt+1 + qt+1 (1  )
!
(A.6)
=
1
Dt  Habt 1 qt
1
Dt  Habt 1 qt
2664

1  
2

Rt
Rt 1
 
1 + gkt
  (1 + g)2
  Rt
Rt 1


Rt
Rt 1
 
1 + gkt
  (1 + g)
3775(A.7)
+Et
2664 1Dt+1 Habt qt+1
Rt+1
Rt
 
1 + gkt+1
2


Rt+1
Rt
 
1 + gkt+1
  (1 + g)
3775
=
1
Dt  Habt 1
233
From (2:24) we have
(A.8) gkt+1 =   +Rt
 
1  
2

Rt
Rt 1
 
1 + gkt
  (1 + g)2!
The rental on capital becomes:
(A.9) rkt = mct (Ft  Htns)
Substituting (A:9) into (2:28) and multiplying by K

1 
t
K

1 
t
yields
(A.10) mct =
(Ft  Htns)

1  Ht
X
where X = A
1
1  (1  )1.
The wage setting function lnwt = lnwt 1 + a + b (nt   n) + c log

wt 1(nt 1 n ns)
Yt 1

can be rewritten as (using equation (2:8)) lnHt = a + b (nt   n) + ln

wt 1
Kt 1(1+gkt )

+
c log ((1  )mct 1) = a+ b (nt   n) + ln

Ht 1
(1+gkt )

+ c log ((1  )mct 1)
(A.11) Ht = exp(a+ b (nt   n)) Ht 1 
1 + gkt
 ((1  )mct 1)c
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Employment: from Outputt = AKt((nt   n  ns)1)1  + wtns; we have
(A.12) Ft = A((nt   n  ns)1)1  +Htns
The Phillips Curve and the Policy rule do not contain any trended variables and
therefore does not need to be normalised. However, we will substitute the real prots
stochastic discount factor by its denition, i.e. t;t+1 = 
u0(Ct+1 Habt)
u0(Habt 1)
=  Ct Habt 1
Ct+1 Habt ;
which gives
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

+ 
'
2
(

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2
)2
(A.13)
+
Dt  Habt 1
Ft
'Et

Ft+1
Dt+1  Habt

Pt+1
Pt
 

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

Pt+1
Pt

= 0(A.14)
Replacing Pt+i
Pt 1+i
= 1 + t+i gives
(1  ) + mct   ' ((t   ut)  t 1) (1 + t   ut) + '
2
((t   ut)  t 1)2(A.15)
+
Dt  Habt 1
Ft
'Et

Ft+1
Dt+1  Habt (t+1   (t   ut)) (1 + t+1)

= 0(A.16)
For natural output, natural employment and the natural real wage we have
 1 =
(F nt )

1  Hnt
X
(A.17)
F nt = At((n
n
t   n  ns)1)1  + nsHnt
Hnt = exp(a+ b (n
n
t   n))
Ht 1 
1 + gkt
 ((1  )mct 1)c(A.18)
235
given last periods wage/ capital ratio Ht 1 and this periods capital stock growth rate
gkt (which was also determined in the t-1 by the then investment decision). The output
gap gpt is then calculated as
(A.19) gpt =
Outputt  Outputnt
Outputnt

Kt
Kt

=
Ft   F nt
F nt
A.4. Steady State Relations
This Appendix shows how to calculate the steady state values for the system de-
veloped in Appendix I. We will rst derive a steady state relation between the level of
employment and the steady state growth rate for the New Growth Economy.
First apply the fact that in the steady state, gKt = g to (A:7) which yields q = 1:
We then apply this to (A:6) which yields
(A.20) 
 
rkt+1 + (1  )

= (1 + g)
In the New Growth economy, we now replace the capital rental with equation (A:9)
and, after using (A:12) and noting that in the steady state we have mc =  1; arrive
at
(A.21) g =



(1  ) +  1A((n  n  ns)1)1 
  1
This is the steady state growth rate which is borne out by the marginal product of
capital in the endogenous growth economy. It is easily veried that it is increasing and
concave in employment. It is straightforward to show that in the steady state, the real
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wage implied by the desired mark-up grows at the same rate as output and the capital
stock by using mct =  1 and rkt = r
k on (2:28). This yields
(A.22) wt = Kt1

 1A(1  )1 
(rk)
1=(1 )
Hence in the steady state, the real wage has to grow at the same rate as the capital
stock. This means that equation (A:22) is actually the dynamic, endogenous growth
version of the familiar macroeconomic textbook price setting function: It gives the real
wage growth rate compatible with marginal costs remaining constant and at its long
run level. Unlike the textbook price setting function, this real wage growth rate is not
constant but increases in employment: A higher steady state employment level implies
a higher marginal product of capital, which triggers higher investment and thus faster
capital stock- and thus productivity growth. Accordingly, the steady state levels of
employment an the growth rate are determined by the intersection of (A:21) with the
wage setting function (2:11), (making again use of the fact that mc =  1 in the steady
state).
In practice, we choose a desired steady state employment rate (here 0.96) and then
compute the wage setting function intercept a to support this value, given g, b and 
and n:
Having determined g and n; the determination of the steady state values of Ft; Dt; Rt; Ht; rkt
and it is now straightforward. For F we have
(A.23) F = A((n  n  ns)1)1 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from the production function. For Rt; we have from the capital accumulation equation
in (A:8)
(A.24) R = g + 
D can then be determined as a residual via
(A.25) D = F  R
H is computed using the cost-minimisation rst order condition for labour (2:8)
(A.26) H = (1  ) 1 F
n  n  ns
rk is computed via
(A.27) rk =  1A((n  n  ns)1)1 
The steady state value of it is computed from (A:4)
(A.28) i =
1 + g

  1
Note that this is also the intercept of the interest rate rule i of the central bank.
A.5. Normalised Version of the JLN Economy
Most of the equations from Appendix II just carry over to the JLN economy. How-
ever, there are a few changes related to the production function and the marginal cost
equation. The aggregate production function is nowOutputt = AKt (TFPt1 (nt   n  ns))1 +
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wtn
s: Dividing both sides by Kt gives
(A.29) Ft = (lt1 (nt   n  ns))1  +Htns
where lt is dened as TFPtKt . This variable evolves according to
(A.30) lt =
1 + gTFP
1 + gKt
lt 1
In the JLN model, it convenient to normalise the real wage with respect to TFPt rather
than with respect to Kt, while all the remaining normalisations carry over to the JLN
model. Denoting wt
TFPt
as Hnct ; we have from (2:27) ; after making use of (2:25)
(A.31) mct =
F
(=(1 ))
t H
nc
t
A1=(1 ) (1  )1
Concerning the capital rental, we employ the JLN expression for Ft to have
(A.32) rkt = mctAl
1 
t ((nt   n  ns)1)1 
The normalised wage setting equation becomes
(A.33) Hnct = exp(a+ b (nt   n))
Hnct 1
(1 + gTFP )
((1  )mct 1)c
All the remaining equations are just the same as in the New Growth version. The
computation of the steady state values in the neoclassical model is slightly di¤erent.
The steady state growth rate (of output, consumption, the capital stock, the real wage)
is now given by the parameter gTFP rather than being endogenously determined, which
means we have g = gTFP : Hence we can compute the steady state real interest rate
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from (A:28), while we compute rk from (A:20). From (A:33), we have the steady state
employment rate. Setting mct =  1in (A:32) then gives the steady state value for lt
as
(A.34) l =
1
(nt   n  ns)1

rk
A
1=(1 )
which allows us to compute F from (A:29). Rearranging (A:31) then yields Hnc:
A.6. Construction of the Dataset
This appendix explains the construction of the dataset for Ft; Dt; Rt and Ht. The
German federal statistical o¢ ce ("Statistisches Bundesamt") supplies annual data for
the capital stock in constant prices of the year 2000.2 Thus we had to construct quarterly
observations for the capital stock. We decided on the following method. We rst
calculated the annual change. Then we allocated the total changed to the four quarters
according to the share these quarters had in real gross xed investment. This yields a
beginning of the quarter value for the capital stock.
Our data on real output, consumption and investment expenditure was preferably
also to be in prices of 2000. However, the Statistisches Bundesamt only supplies chained
indices for these variables.3 We therefore used nominal GDP, consumption and invest-
ment 2000 to recursively calculate our series in absolute numbers. As the indices for post
and pre reunication years have di¤erent bases, we used the ratio of unied Germany
to Western Germany from 1991 to downscale the index for each variable.
Furthermore, as the total labour force in our model is normalised to one, Output,
consumption and investment are essentially expressed in per capita terms in our model,
2See statistisches Bundesamt (2006b), table 3.2.19.1.
3See Statistisches Bundesamt (2006a), table 2.3.2, Statistisches Bundesamt (2007a), table 2.3.2, Sta-
tistisches Bundesamt (2006b), table 3.3.1 and Statistisches Bundesamt (2007b), table 2.1.1.
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as is the capital stock. Hence case of Ft; Dt and Rt; the number of inhabitants cancels
out and we can divide real GDP by our capital stock measure, and accordingly for Dt
and Rt. By contrast, Ht is computed by multiplying the real wage as measured in the
previous section times the average number of hours worked across the sample and then
dividing by the capital stock. We tried a linear trend for hours worked instead but this
would have turned our measure of Ht non-stationary.
The null of stationarity is rejected at the 5% level for Dt and Ft using the KPSS
test.4 After removing the years 70 to 72, we are not rejecting the null of stationarity
anymore at the 10% level for these variables. For Ht, the null of stationarity is not
rejected at the 5% level for the full sample: For Rt; the unit root can be rejected over
the entire sample at the 5% level using an ADF test, as is the case for gt and the
savings rate. The same holds for the nominal interest rate, and so we do not detrend
this variable either. We do detrend the ination rate, because the null of stationarity
is rejected for this variable using a KPSS test.
A.7. Estimation of the Wage Setting Function
We estimate the real wage growth function using German data ranging from 1970q1
to 2000q4. Our dataset includes Western German data up to 1991q4 and following
that data for the unied country. All data is taken from a publication of the Ger-
man "Statistisches Bundesamt", all of which has been seasonally adjusted.5 When
estimating the function, we replace the employment rate with one minus the un-
employment rate. As a measure for labour costs, we use the "Arbeitnehmerentgeld"
per employee, which is employee compensation including the full tax wedge. This is
4Following Hobijn et al. (2004), we use the Newey-West bandwidth selection procedure in combination
a Quadratic Spectral (QS) window. See Hobjn et al., p. 486 and p.500.
5See Statistisches Bundesamt (2006a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2007a).
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deated using the GDP price index since we are interested in a measure of labour
costs. We use the real wage divided by productivity as a measure of the labour
share. This is a standard procedure in estimations of this type of wage equation.6
Denoting the unemployment rate as U, we aim to estimate the following equation:
 logwt = a + bf (Ut) + c log (wt 1=(GDPt 1=Nt 1) + d92Q1, where Nt denotes the
total number of employees d92Q1 denotes an intercept dummy equalling one in 1992q1
and zero everywhere else. The latter is to account for reunication. We allow f (Ut) to
take two di¤erent forms: Ut and log(Ut).
Note for both specications we use Newey-West serial correlation consistent stan-
dard errors because the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation rejects the hy-
potheses of no serial correlation at the 5% for a postulated maximum degree of autocor-
relations of 1 and 4. With respect to the dynamics of the residuals, both specications
are almost identical. The estimation result is reported in table A.1, where WG denotes
the change in log real wages, REALWH denotes the real wage and PRODH denotes
real GDP per employee. Note that according to standard criteria of model selection
(adjusted R2; AIC and SIC), the specication featuring the log of the unemployment
rate dominates the specication with the level. The standard error of regression is
smaller as well and the coe¢ cient on log(Ut) is more e¢ ciently estimated, even after
accounting for the di¤erent dimensions of the variables.
6Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), p. 486 and OECD (1997), p. 21 and OECD(1997), p. 21.
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Dependent Variable: WGH
Method: Least Squares
Date: 06/24/09   Time: 16:15
Sample (adjusted): 1970Q2 2000Q4
Included observations: 123 after adjustments
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.059858 0.021068 -2.841159 0.0053
LOG(U) -0.003268 0.000738 -4.425339 0
D92Q1 -0.054809 0.000942 -58.18199 0
LOG(REALWH(-1)/PRODH(-1)) -0.071423 0.027284 -2.6178 0.01
R-squared 0.356794     Mean dependent var 0.003606
Adjusted R-squared 0.340578     S.D. dependent var 0.010246
S.E. of regression 0.00832     Akaike info criterion -6.70834
Sum squared resid 0.008237     Schwarz criterion -6.616887
Log likelihood 416.5629     F-statistic 22.00353
Durbin-Watson stat 2.460618     Prob(F-statistic) 0
Table A.1. Wage Setting Function, Estimate I
Dependent Variable: WGH
Method: Least Squares
Date: 06/24/09   Time: 16:22
Sample (adjusted): 1970Q2 2000Q4
Included observations: 123 after adjustments
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.06101 0.022333 -2.731817 0.0073
U -0.103018 0.021799 -4.725811 0
D92Q1 -0.055994 0.001092 -51.27665 0
LOG(REALWH(-1)/PRODH(-1)) -0.09415 0.030879 -3.048977 0.0028
R-squared 0.35073     Mean dependent var 0.003606
Adjusted R-squared 0.334362     S.D. dependent var 0.010246
S.E. of regression 0.008359     Akaike info criterion -6.698957
Sum squared resid 0.008315     Schwarz criterion -6.607504
Log likelihood 415.9859     F-statistic 21.42762
Durbin-Watson stat 2.415394     Prob(F-statistic) 0
Table A.2. Wage Setting Function, Estimate II
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1. Second Order Approximation to St as a Function of t
We want to take a second order approximation to St to see which forces drive mean
price dispersion. From the law of motion of the price index we have

p
1 
t =
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
Substituting this into the law of motion of St, given by
St = (1  !)  p
 
t + !

1 + t
(1 + t 1)


St 1
we have
St = (1  !) 
 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 
 1
+ !

1 + t
(1 + t 1)


St 1
Thus we have expressed price dispersion as a function of ination alone. We now
take a second order approximation to this expression. We thus have to calculate @St
@t
;
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@2St
(@t)
2 ;
@St
@t 1
; @St
@t 1#t
; @St
@St 1
and evaluate them at  = 0 and S = 1: The derivatives are
@St
@t
= (1  !) 
   1
 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 1
 1
( !)
1  ! (   1)
 2
t (1 + t 1)
(1 )
+!

(1 + t)
(1 + t 1)

 1
St 1
1
(1 + t 1)

=  !
 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 1
 1
(1 + t)
 2 (1 + t 1)
(1 )
+!
(1 + t)
 1
(1 + t 1)

St 1
=  ! + ! = 0
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@2St
(@t)
2 =
 !
1  
 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 2 
 1
( !)
1  ! (1 + t)
 2 (   1) (1 + t) 2 (1 + t 1)(1 )
 !
 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 1
 1
(   2) (1 + t) 3 (1 + t 1)(1 )
+!
(1 + t)
 2
(1 + t 1)

St 1 (   1)
=
!2
1  ! (1 + t)
2 4 
 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 2 
 1
(1 + t 1)
(1 )
 ! (   2)
 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 1
 1
(1 + t)
 3 (1 + t 1)
(1 )
+!
(1 + t)
 2
(1 + t 1)

St 1 (   1)
=
!2
1  !   !
2 + 2! + !2   !
=
!2
1  ! + ! =
!
1  !
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#2St
#t#t 1
=  ! (1 + t) 2 (1 + t 1)(1 ) 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 2 
 1
( !)
1  ! (1 + t)
 1  (1  ) (1 + t 1)
(1 ) 1
   1
 !
 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 1
 1
(1 + t)
 2  (1  ) (1 + t 1)(1 ) 1
 ! (1 + t)
 1
(1 + t 1)
+1
St 1
=   !
2
1  ! (1 + t)
2 3 (1 + t 1)
2(1 ) 1
 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 2 
 1
 ! (1 + t) 2  (1  ) (1 + t 1)(1 ) 1 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 1
 1
 !2 (1 + t)
 1
(1 + t 1)
+1
St 1
=   !
2
1  !   ! (1  )  !
2
=  !
2{
1  !   ! =
 !
1  !
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@St
@t 1
= (1  !) 
   1
 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 1
 1
( !)
1  ! (1  ) (1 + t 1)
(1 ) 1
 ! (1 + t) (1 + t 1)  1 St 1
= (1 + t 1)
(1 ) 1 !
 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 1
 1
 ! (1 + t) (1 + t 1)  1 St 1 = !   ! = 0
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@2St
(@t 1)
2 =
!
   1
 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 2 
 1
( !)
1  ! (1 + t)
 1 (1 + t 1)
(1 ) 1  (1  )
+ [ (1  )  1] (1 + t 1)(1 ) 2 ! 
1  ! (1 + t) 1 (1 + t 1)(1 )
(1  !)
! 1
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=
2!2
1  ! + 
2!   22!   ! + ! + 22!
=
2!2
1  ! + 
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2!
1  !
#St
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= !
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
= !
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@St
@St 1@t 1
=  ! (1 + t) (1 + t 1)  1 =  !
A second order Taylor expansion to St will be of the following form (noting that #St#t =
#St
#t 1
= 0 if evaluated at the zero ination steady state)
St  S + @St
@St 1
dSt 1 +
@St
@t
dt +
@St
@t 1
dt 1 +
1
2
@2St
(@t)
2 (dt)
2 +
1
2
@2St
(@t 1)
2 (dt 1)
2
+
@2St
@t@t 1
(dtdt 1) +
@St
@St 1@t
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@St
@St 1@t 1
(dt 1dSt 1)
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dSt 1 +
@2St
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(dtdt 1) +
1
2
@2St
(@t)
2 (dt)
2 +
1
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@2St
(@t 1)
2 (dt 1)
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@2St
@t@t 1
(dtdt 1) +
@St
@St 1@t
(dtdSt 1) +
@St
@St 1@t 1
(dt 1dSt 1)
We now take the unconditional expectation of St:Note thatE (dtdSt 1) = E (dt 1dSt 1) =
0 because as can be seen from above, up to rst order, St follows a deterministic au-
toregressive process of the form dSt = @St@St 1dSt 1. This implies that up to rst order,
the variance of St is zero as and will be its covariance with t and t 1: Hence we write
ESt = S + !EdSt 1 +
1
2
!
1  !E (dt)
2 +
1
2
2!
1  !E (dt 1)
2   !
1  !E (dtdt 1)
ESt = S +
1
2
!
(1  !)2

1 + 2

E (dt)
2   !
(1  !)2E (dtdt 1)
ESt = 1 +
1
2
!
(1  !)2

1 + 2

E (dt)
2   !
(1  !)2AC (dt)E (dt)
2
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B.2. How the Elasticity of Money Demand a¤ects the Output Cost of an
Interest Rate Increase
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The rst term is clearly positive but will be very small as it involves i
2
; and the in-
terest rate will be quite a small number. The second fraction will be negative as the
rst term in the numerator (32"mii
2  
1 + i
2
(v2   1)) is negative and the second term
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4i
 
1 + i

v2 < 12i
 
1 + i

for values of v2 smaller than 3 (or v < 1:73), which seems
reasonable. The second fraction would be expected to be one order of magnitude higher
than the rst due to the i
2
multiplying the rst fraction.
In our calibration, we have i = 0:018626929 and v = 1:06; while for "mi we have -5.11
and -2.93. This yields @l
@it@"mi
=  0:075010667 < 0 and @l
@it@"mi
=  0:066545052 < 0:
Hence a more negative elasticity of money demand increases the output costs of an
interest rate rise, and thus the costs of an increase in ination.
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APPENDIX C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1. Determinacy in the Blanchard and Gali Model
We show in this section that, for reasonable calibrations, the condition stated in
proposition one ensures determinacy in the Blanchard Gali model. Woodford (2003)
derives conditions for determinacy for a linear rational expectations model of the form
0BB@ Etzt+1
xt+1
1CCA = A
0BB@ zt
xt
1CCA+ bet
where A =
0BBBBB@
1+
F 
c0
+F =c0
0+F
c1+u c0
c0
+F =c0
  L+
c1
c0
+F =c0
 +1
F+c0
 (c1 c0+u)+0
F+c0
c1 L
F+c0
0 1 0
1CCCCCA ; b =
0BBBBB@
 F a
c0
+
+F =c0
 (1 a) F =c0+
F+c0
0
1CCCCCA
where zt is a 2x1 vector of endogenous jump variables, xt is single endogenous prede-
termined variable and et is a vector of disturbances. This is exactly the kind of system
we are dealing with. The rational expectations equilibrium will be determinate if and
only if the matrix A has exactly one eigenvalue inside the unit circle, i.e. with modulus
smaller than 1 and the two other eigenvalues outside the unit circle. If the characteristic
equation is written in the form
3 + A2
2 + A1+ A0 = 0
Woodford shows that it will have two roots outside and one root inside the unit circle
if and only if
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either (Case I)
1 + A2 + A1 + A0 < 0 and
 1 + A2   A1 + A0 > 0
or (Case II)
1 + A2 + A1 + A0 > 0
 1 + A2   A1 + A0 < 0
A20   A0A2 + A1   1 > 0
or (Case III) the rst two conditions of Case II and
A20   A0A2 + A1   1 < 0
jA2j > 3
As would be expected, some of the resulting expressions will be quite complicated
functions of the deep parameters. We therefore do not aspire to give a completely
general proof. Rather, we will make the assumption throughout that g is a very small
number. g = Bx, and B will be calibrated to such that the fraction of total hiring costs
in GDP Bx does not exceed a small fraction of GDP (Blanchard and Gali set them
equal to 1% of GDP for the "American" and even less for the continental European
calibration). In Blanchard and Gali, it comes out as 0.03. This also implies that 1 < 0,
and both c1 and 1 will be small. Furthermore, we will assume that F   L > 0,
which will be the case if F   L = Mg (1 )1 u



[1  x  ] +  [1 + 0]

> 0 . This
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condition holds for values of x and associated values of  which are not too small. For
the calibration considered in this chapter, F   L > 0 for x  0:015 and  = 0:0017;
both of which is far below empirically reasonable values for these parameters.
Our rst task is to derive the characteristic equation. To make the algebra easier,
we rst write our matrix A in a more general form:
A =
0BBBBB@
1+
F 
c0
+F =c0
0+F
c1+u c0
c0
+F =c0
  L+
c1
c0
+F =c0
 +1
F+c0
 (c1 c0+u)+0
F+c0
c1 L
F+c0
0 1 0
1CCCCCA =
0BBBBB@
a11 a12 a13
a21 a22 a23
0 1 0
1CCCCCA
The characteristic equation is then given by
3 + ( a11   a22)2 + ( a23 + a11a22   a12a21)+ a11a23   a21a13 = 0
Hence we can determine A2; A1 and A0 as
A2 =  a11   a22 =  c0 (1 + )  F   0 +  (c1 + u)
F + c0
A1 =
  (1 + ) c1 + L + c0   u + 0
F + c0
A0 =
c1   L
F + c0
We rst look at the second condition of Case I. We have
 1 + A2   A1 + A0 > 0
implying
2
1  u
(1   0) (1 + )
0 + L + F
  1 > 
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or
2
1  u
(g (1  ) (1 +  (1  x)) + g (1 + )  1) (1 + )
0 + L + F
  1 > 
This condition will never be fullled by positive values of  under the assumptions
made.
Thus we conclude that Case 1 is not relevant and turn to Case 2. The rst condition
implies
(C.1)    u
(1  )
0   L   F > 1
The second condition is implied by the fact that the second condition of Case 1 is
violated, while the third condition implies
 [ L [F   L]  c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L] + Lu](C.2)
+c1

1   + c0
 
1  2  F + [L + c0 (1  )  F   u] [F + c0] > 0
Not that if F < L; this expression will be monotonously increasing in : Hence in
that case, if (C:2)) holds for  = 1; it will hold for  > 1 as well. Hence we set  = 1
and u = 1(since permissible, i.e. negative values of u make (C:2)) more likely to be
met), which allows us to write the condition as
0 (F   L) + c0 [0   L   F ] + L (L   c1) + c1 (1  )
+c0c1
 
1  2+ c20 (1  )  + c0F (1  ) + c0L   2F   c1F > 0
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This will usually be fullled. Given that c0 slightly larger than 1 and that L and
F are in the same order of magnitude but smaller than 1, and c1 is quite small,
c0L > 
2
F + c1F .
If we assume F L > 0; there is still an issue of (C:2) being violated for su¢ ciently
large values of  since 
2
 has a negative coe¢ cient. We will now show that under the
assumptions already made, if A20 A0A2+A1 1 > 0 becomes violated, we will already
be in a situation where jA2j > 3 and thus Case III kicks in. Let us rst consider the
terms in (C:2) not involving : Those can be written as
c1

1   + c0
 
1  2+F [L   c1]+F c0 (1  )+c0L 2F+c20 (1  ) c0F > 0:
The term  2F is dominated by c0L under the assumptions already made and all the
other terms but  c0F are positive. It is not clear that  c0F is being dominated
by any of the other terms. Therefore, in the next step, we disregard all the other terms
not involving  except for  c0F : If the modied condition is fullled, so will be
(C:2) :Hence we look for which  we have (still for u = 0)
 2L [F   L] +  [ c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L]]  c0F > 0
or
2  
[ c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L]]
L [F   L]  +
c0F
L [F   L] < 0
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The polynomial on the left hand side has two solutions 1 and 2 and the inequality
will be fullled if  lies between. Hence we have
1;2 =
 c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L]
2L [F   L]

s
( c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L])2
42L [F   L]2
  c0F
L [F   L]
Since we now assume F > L; the expression under the root will always be pos-
itive, as will the expression outside of the root. This also implies that we can fo-
cus on the larger of the two solution since
r
( c1L+c0[0 L]+0[F L])2
42L[F L]2
  c0F
L[F L] >
 c1L+c0[0 L]+0[F L]
2L[F L] and thus the smaller solution will be will be negative. Hence
the relevant lower bound is (C:1) The larger of the two roots will be at least as big
as the term outside the brackets. Hence condition (C:2) will still be met under the
assumptions made if
(C.3)  <
 c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L]
2L [F   L]
We now turn to condition jA2j > 3 from Case III to see what it implies for . For the
"large" values of  which are of interest here, A2 will most likely be negative, so we
consider the inequality  A2 > 3; which can be written as
(C.4)  >
 c0 + 2c0   0 + c1
F
+ 3
We would like to check whether at the point (C:3) becomes violated (C:4) is already
met. Hence we are asking whether
 c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L]
2L [F   L] >
 c0 + 2c0   0 + c1
F
+ 3
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holds. This can be written as
 c1LF + c0 [0   L]F + 0 [F   L]F
 2c0L [F   L] + 4c0L [F   L]
 20L [F   L] + c12L [F   L] + 6LF [F   L] > 0
or
 c1LF + c0 [0   L]F + 2c0LF   2c02L   4c0LF
+4c0
2
L + [F   L] (0F + 2L0   6LF )
 c12L [F   L] > 0
or
 c1LF + c0F [0   L   L] + L (2c0L   c0F )
+2c0FL   2c02L   2c0LF + 2c02L
+ [F   L] (0F + 2L0   6LF )  c12L [F   L] > 0
or
 c1LF + c0 [0   L]F + 2c0LF   2c02L   4c0LF + 4c02L
+ [F   L] (0F + 2L0   6LF )  c12L [F   L] > 0
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Note also that
2c0FL   2c02L   2c0LF + 2c02L   c1LF   c12L [F   L]
= 2Lc0 (1  ) [F   L]  c1LF   c12L [F   L]
=  2L [F   L] [c1   c0 (1  )]  c1LF
Thus we can write
c0F [0   L   L] + c0L (2L   F )
+ [F   L] (0F + 2L0   6LF )  2L [F   L] [c1   c0 (1  )]  c1LF > 0
Since (using 0 > F + L) 0F + 2L0   6LF > (F   L)2   L (F   L) =
(F   L) (F   2L)we can write
F c0 (0   L   L) + c0L (2L   F )+
[F   L]2 (F   2L)  2L [F   L] [c1   c0 (1  )]  c1LF > 0
The rst term is clearly positive. The second term will be positive as long as F <
2L. If F   L increases, in that case the rst term would increase and at a larger
rate as both (0   L   L) and F would increase. In this case we would also
see the third term switch from negative to positive, which would otherwise also be
negative. The nal two terms are negative. We believe it is safe to assume that this
condition holds. For values of L and F which are close, F c0 (0   L   L) +
c0L (2L   F ) will be in a higher order of magnitude than [F   L]2 (F   2L) 
2L [F   L] [c1   c0 (1  )] c1LF : For values of F substantially higher than L;
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the order of magnitude of F c0 (0   L   L) will increase and [F   L]2 (F   2L)
would turn positive. Thus the second condition of case III will be satised for values
of  violating (C:2) :
Thus we have shown, under the assumptions made, that    u (1 )0 L F > 1
guarantees the existence of a unique rational expectations equilibrium in the Blanchard/
Gali model.
C.2. Relevant steady State Values in the Model with Skill Loss
As was mentioned in the text, we start by assuming values for u and x: This allows
to write the steady state values of ; si; AL and AA as
 =
ux
(1  u) (1  x)
si = x (1  x)i
AL =
1X
i=0
siis =
x
1  (1  x) s
and
AA = sNAL +
 
1  sNt

= AL + 1  
This allows to back out  by rst noting that in the steady state, we can write (4:11)
as
AL

1
M
  g (1   (1  ))

+ (1  )

1  AL
M

= 0

 (1  ) + W
0
(1   (1  ))

From (4:7), we have
(C.5) W = 0
1X
i=0
sii(1 )s = 
0 x
1  (1  x) 1 s
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and, for WL
WL =
1X
i=0
sii(1 )s =
x
1  (1  x) 1 s
which we use to solve for 0 as
0 =
1=M   g (1  (1  ) ) + (1 )
M
 
1  AL
(1  )  + x
1 (1 x)1 s (1  (1  ) )
C.3. Deriving the Laws of Motion for baLt and bwLt
A log linear approximation to the skill level ALt is given by
(C.6) baLt =
1P
i=0
dsit
i
s
AL
The shares of the various groups of the unemployed are given by
sit =
Nt 1 i
i

j=1
(1  xt i)
Ut
This can be log-linearised as
dsit = s
i
"bnt 1 i   bUt + iX
j=1
 x
1  xbxt j
#
Log linear approximations to xt and Ut are given by bxt j = bnt j (1 )(1 x)bnt 1 j and
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bUt =   (1 )x bnt yields
dsit = s
i
"bnt 1 i + 1  

xbnt 1   iX
j=1
 x
1  x
bnt j   (1  ) (1  x) bnt 1 j

#
= si
"bnt 1 i + 1  

xbnt 1   x
1  x
"
iX
j=1
bnt j

  (1  ) (1  x)

iX
j=1
bnt j 1

##
= si
26664bnt 1 i + 1   xbnt 1   x1  x
26664
iP
j=2
bnt j

+ bnt 1

  (1 )(1 x)

iP
j=2
bnt j

  (1 )(1 x)

bnt j 1
37775
37775
= si
2664 bnt 1 i
h
1 + x(1 )

i
+ 1 

xbnt 1   x1 x bnt 1
  x
1 x

1

  (1 )(1 x)

 iP
j=2
bnt j

3775
= si
2664 bnt 1 i
h
1 + x(1 )

i
  x
1 x

1

  (1 )(1 x)

 bnt 1
  x
1 x

1

  (1 )(1 x)

 iP
j=2
bnt j

3775
= si
"bnt 1 i 1 + x (1  )


 

x2
 (1  x) + x
 iX
j=1
bnt j

#
We now use  = ux
(1 x)(1 u) and (1  ) = 1 u x(1 x)(1 u) to eliminate  in the 1 + (1 )x
and x
2
(1 x) + x: This yields
1 + x
(1  )

= 1 + x
(1  u  x)
(1  x) (1  u)
(1  x) (1  u)
ux
= 1 +
1  u  x
u
=
1  x
u
x2
 (1  x) + x =
x2
ux
(1 x)(1 u) (1  x)
+ x =
x
u
(1  u) + x = x
u
Hence we can write
(C.7) dsit = s
i
"
 x
u
iX
j=1
bnt j + 1  x
u
bnt 1 i#
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Substituting this into (C:6) yields
baLt =
1P
i=0
iss
i
"
 x
u
iP
j=1
bnt j + 1 xu bnt 1 i
#
AL
=
1
AL
"
1  x
u
1X
i=0
iss
ibnt 1 i   x
u
1X
i=0
iX
j=1
iss
ibnt j#
=
1
AL
"
1  x
u
1X
i=0
iss
ibnt 1 i   x
u
1X
q=1
qss
q
qX
j=1
bnt j#
=
1
AL
"
1  x
u
1X
i=0
iss
ibnt 1 i   x
u
1X
q=1
qss
q (bnt 1 + bnt 2 + bnt 3:::+ bnt q)#
=
1
AL
2664 1 xu
1P
i=0
iss
ibnt 1 i
 x
u

1ss
1bnt 1 + 2ss2 (bnt 1 + bnt 2) + 3ss3 (bnt 1 + bnt 2 + bnt 3) ::::::
3775
=
1
AL
266666664

1 x
u
1P
i=0
iss
ibnt 1 i
 x
u
26664
 1P
q=1
qss
q
bnt 1 +  1P
q=2
qss
q
bnt 2
+
 1P
q=3
qss
q
bnt 3 +  1P
q=4
qss
q
bnt 4:::
37775
377777775
=
1
AL
266666664
1 x
u

s0bnt 1 + 1ss1bnt 2 + 2ss2bnt 3 + 3ss3bnt 4::::::
 x
u
26664
 1P
q=1
qss
q
bnt 1 +  1P
q=2
qss
q
bnt 2
+
 1P
q=3
qss
q
bnt 3 +  1P
q=4
qss
q
bnt 4:::
37775
377777775
=
1
AL
26664

s0 1 x
u
  x
u
 1P
q=1
qss
q
 bnt 1 + s1 1 xu   xu  1P
q=2
qss
q
 bnt 2
+

s2 1 x
u
  x
u
 1P
q=3
qss
q
 bnt 3 + s3 1 xu   xu  1P
q=4
qss
q
 bnt 4
37775
=
1
AL
1X
i=1
""
i 1s s
i 11  x
u
  x
u
 1X
q=i
qss
q
!#bnt i#
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Using AL =
1P
i=0
siis =
x
1 (1 x)s and s
i = x (1  x)i we can write
 
1P
q=i
qss
q
!
=
x
1P
q=i
qs (1  x)q = is (1  x)i x
1P
q=0
qs (1  x)q = is (1  x)iAL and thus arrive at
baLt = xu
1X
i=1
""
i 1s (1  x)i
AL
  is (1  x)
# bnt i#
This can be rewritten as
baLt = 1X
i=1
1
u
(1  x)i  i 1s   is bnt i
=
1X
i=1
ani bnt i; ani = 1u (1  x)i  i 1s   is
Thus in the presence of skill loss (s < 1), the deviation of the average skill level from
its steady state depends positively on a weighted sum of past employment rates. The
ani coe¢ cient depend on s and thus 
s :
#ani
#s
=  1
u
(1  x)i  (i  1) i 2s   ii 1s 
For s = 1 (
s = 0); this is clearly positive. Thus the larger the quarterly skill decay
among the unemployed, the larger is the e¤ect of past employment on the skill level.
For s < 1; we have
#ani
#s
R 0, i Q 1
1  s
Hence the e¤ect of s on ani will become negative if i is su¢ ciently large. Furthermore,
#ani
#x
< 0 if s < 1:
To express the component of the real wage depending on the skill of the worker
as a function of past employment rates, we follow an analogous process. A log linear
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approximation to WLt is given by
bwLt =
1P
i=0
dsit
i(1 )
s
WL
Note that the only di¤erence to (C:6) is that s and A
L are replaced by (1 )s andW
L;
respectively. Substituting (C:7) and going through exactly the same process as before
thus gives us
bwLt = 1X
i=1
wni bnt i; wni = 1u (1  x)i (1 )(i 1)s   (1 )is 
and, as with the ani coe¢ cients,
@wni
@s
=  1
u
(1  x)i (1  )

(i  1) (1 )(i 1) 1s   i(1 )i 1s

@wni
@s
> 0 , s = 0
@wni
@s
R 0, i Q 1
1  s
@wni
@x
< 0 i¤ s < 1:
Furthermore, we have @a
n
i
@s
>
@wni
@s
if s = 0 and  > 0:
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We now turn to express baLt and bwLt as a function of their t-1 values and past em-
ployment. For baLt we have
baLt = 1u (1  x) (1  s) bnt 1 + 1u
1X
i=2
(1  x)i  i 1s   is bnt i
=
1
u
(1  x) (1  s) bnt 1 + 1u
1X
i=1
(1  x)i+1  is   i+1s  bnt i
=
1
u
(1  x) (1  s) bnt 1 + s (1  x) 1u
1X
i=1
(1  x)i  i 1s   is bnt i
and thus
(C.8) baLt = (1  x)1u (1  s) bnt 1 + sbaLt 1

Correspondingly for bwLt we have
(C.9) bwLt = (1  x)1u  1  1 s  bnt 1 + 1 s bwLt 1

C.4. On the relative Size of ani and w
n
i ,
@ani
@s
and @w
n
i
@s
if s > 0
In the following we assume s > 0, s < 1:
We have ani > w
n
i if
 
i 1s   is

>

(1 )(i 1)s   (1 )is

or
i <
ln (1  s)  ln (s   s)
  ln s
Note that for this expression is always positive (as it should be).Thus ani will turn
smaller than wni for large enough i.
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The relative size @a
n
i
@s
and @w
n
i
@s
also depends on i. We have
@ani
#s
R @w
n
i
@s
, (1  ) (1 )i 1s
 
(i  1)  1s   i

R i 1s
 
(i  1)  1s   i

Two cases have to be considered: (i  1)  1s   i (i  1)  1s   i Q 0 , i Q 11 s : If
(i  1)  1s   i (i  1)  1s   i < 0, this implies @a
n
i
@s
R @w
n
i
@s
if
1


ln (1  )
ln s
  1

R i
Now given that we look at the case i < 1
1 s ; we ask whether
1


ln(1 )
lns
  1

> i is
implied by that assumption. Thus we ask whether
1


ln (1  )
ln s
  1

>
1
1  s
This is not necessarily fullled but will be met for the range of s used in this chapter
if  > 0:38: Thus if this hold, for i < 1
1 s ; we have
@ani
@s
>
@wni
@s
:
If (i  1)  1s   i (i  1)  1s   i > 0; we have @a
n
i
@s
R @w
n
i
@s
if
1


ln (1  )
ln s
  1

Q i
As for the calibration considered here, with i = 1
1 s we have
1


ln(1 )
lns
  1

> i, this
means that as i becomes equal to 1
1 s ; we have
@ani
@s
<
@wni
@s
:However, it is also clear
that as i increase, we will have i > 1


ln(1 )
lns
  1

and hence @a
n
i
@s
>
@wni
@s
: Thus, for the
minimum value of s considered here  > 0:38; we have three di¤erent cases depending
on the value of i: For su¢ ciently low values of i, we have @a
n
i
@s
>
@wni
@s
. There is then an
intermediate range where 1
1 s < i <
1


ln(1 )
lns
  1

where we have @a
n
i
@s
<
@wni
@s
: Finally,
for i > 1


ln(1 )
lns
  1

; we have again @a
n
i
@s
>
@wni
@s
:
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Since the relative size of ani and w
n
i as well as the e¤ect of an increase in 
s on them
depends on i, it is interesting to look how the combined e¤ect of past employment on
the skill level instead to look at the "net" impact of an increase in past employment on
the real wage and the skill level and how this impact is a¤ected by s: The sum of the
ani and w
n
i is given by
an =
1X
i=1
ani =
1  x
u
1  s
1  (1  x) s
wn =
1X
i=1
wni =
1  x
u
1  1 s
1  (1  x) 1 s
Thus an > wn if 1 s
1 (1 x)s >
1 1 s
1 (1 x)1 s or
 > 0
Hence the combined e¤ect of an increase in past employment on the average skill level
is always higher than the impact on the real wage if there is some real wage rigidity.
Turning towards @a
n
@s
and @w
n
@s
; we have
This then gives
@an
@s
=
1  x
u
x
(1  (1  x) s)2
> 0
@wn
@s
=
1  x
u
(1  ) x
 
s 
1  (1  x) 1 s
2 > 0
Thus the combined e¤ect of past employment on the skill level of the average job seeker
and the average real wage increases in s Furthermore, for some real wage rigidity
( > 0) and values of s not too much smaller than one,
#an
#s
> #w
n
#s
:
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Concerning the e¤ect of a change in x; we have
@an
@x
=  1
u
1  s
(1  (1  x) s)2
< 0
@wn
@x
=  1
u
1  1 s 
1  (1  x) 1 s
2 < 0
We have @a
n
@x
< @w
n
@x
if
2x s + 
1 2
s + 1 + 
2 
s > 2x+ 
2(1 )
s + s + 
 
s
Comparing each of the terms on the left and right hand side, we see that for  > 0; all
terms on the left hand side are greater than corresponding term on the right hand side
except for 2 s , which is smaller than 
 
s :The di¤erence between the two will grow as
s declines and thus at some point the inequality would be violated. However, it can
be checked numerically that for the calibrations employed in this chapter the condition
is easily fullled.
C.5. Derivation of the marginal Cost Equation and the Output Equation
in the Model with Skill Loss
This appendix derives the Phillips Curve and the remaining linearised model equa-
tions. Linearising (4:11) yields
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cmct =   (1 Mg)baPt(C.10)
  (1 Mg)baLt + MALW bwt +Mgbxt
  (1  ) Et
2664 X (bct   bct+1) +

1 AL
AL
 cmct+1 + h1 ALAL   (1 )MAL +MgibaPt+1
  (1 Mg)baLt+1 + MALW bwt+1 +Mgbxt+1
3775
with X = gM + 1 A
L M(0 W )
AL
and g = Bx: From (4:7) and (4:8), we see that the
average wage can be written up to rst order as
(C.11) bwt = (1  )baPt + bwLt
where
(C.12) bwLt = (1  x)1u  1  1 s  bnt 1 + 1 s bwLt 1

Using (C:11) on (C:10) gives
cmct =   (1 Mg)  baLt    (1  )EtbaLt+1(C.13)
+
M
AL
W
 bwLt   (1  ) Et bwLt+1(C.14)
 0baPt    (1  ) 1  (1  )0MAL   0

EtbaPt+1 +Mgbxt
  (1  )Et

X (bct   bct+1) + 1  AL
AL
 cmct+1 +Mgbxt+1
0 = 1  gM   (1  ) M
AL
W
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Linearising (4:14) yields
(C.15) bct = AA
AA   ALgbaAt   AgAA   ALg  baLt + baPt + 00bnt + 01bnt 1
with 
0
0 =
AL(1 g(1+))
AA Ag and 
0
1 =
(1 )((1+(1 x))ALg+(1 AL))
AA ALg Linearising (4:12) yields
(C.16) baAt = ALAA baLt + baPt  
 
1  AL (1  )
AA
(bnt   bnt 1)
Substituting this into (C:15) yields
bct = baPt + cLbaLt + 00bnt + 01bnt 1(C.17)
cL =
AL (1  g)
AA   ALg
Substituting (C:17) into (C:13) yields
cmct = aL1baLt + aL2EtbaLt+1 + MALW  bwLt    (1  )Et bwLt+1
 p0baPt   p1EtbaPt+1 +Mgbxt
+ (1  )
2664 X


0
0   
0
1
 bnt +X00Etbnt+1
  (1  ) 01bnt 1   1 ALAL  cmct+1  Mgbxt+1
3775
aL1 = 1  gM +  (1  )
AL (1  g)
AA   Ag X
aL2 =  (1  )

1  gM + A
L (1  g)
AA   Ag X

p0 = 
0 +  (1  )X
p1 =  (1  ) M (
0  W )
AL
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Using bxt = bnt (1 )(1 x)bnt 1 then yields
cmct =  aL1baLt + aL2EtbaLt+1 + wL1 bwLt   wL2Et bwLt+1   p0baPt   p1EtbaPt+1
+h
0
0bnt + h0Lbnt 1 + h0FEtbnt+1   hcEtcmct+1
hc =  (1  )
 
1  AL
AL
h0F =   (1  )

gM

  00X

h
0
0 =

gM

 
1 +  (1  )2 (1  x)+  (1  )01   00X
h0L =  

gM


(1  ) (1  x)   (1  ) 01X
We now substitute (C:8) and (C:9) ; which, after rearranging, yields
cmct =    aL1   aL2 (1  x) sbaLt +  wL1   wL2 (1  x) 1 s  bwLt
 
"
h
0
0 + (1  x)
 
aL2
(1  s)
u
  wL2
 
1  1 s

u
!#bnt
+h
0
Lbnt 1 + h0FEtbnt+1   hcEtcmct+1   p0baPt   p1EtbaPt+1
Using bnt =  but1 u then yields
cmct =  abaLt + w bwLt   0but + Lbut 1 + FEtbut+1   hcEtcmct+1    (p0 + ap1)baPt
a = 
 
aL1   aL2 (1  x) s

w = 
 
wL1   wL2 (1  x) 1 s

0 = 
"
h
0
0 + (1  x)
 
aL2
(1  s)
u
  wL2
 
1  1 s

u
!#
L =
 h0L
1  u ; 

F =
 h0F
1  u
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The equation for output including hiring costs is derived as follows. We have Yt =
AAt Nt. Linearising gives byt = baAt + bnt which, using (C:16) can be written as
byt = baPt + 1AA ALbaLt + ALbnt +  1  AL (1  ) bnt 1
Using bnt =  but1 u gives the equation used in the text.
C.6. Proof of Propositions on signs of @
@s
and @
2
@s@x
Marginal cost is given by
cmct =  hcEtcmct+1+FEtbut+1 0but+L1but 1  abaLt +w bwLt  p0baPt  p1EtbaPt+1
If all variables stay constant over time and ignoring technology, we have
cmc =  

0   F   L1   a (1 s)(1 x)u(1 u)(1 (1 x)s) + w
 (1 
1 
s )(1 x)
u(1 u)(1 (1 x)1 s )

1 + hc
bu
=  
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F +
(1 x)
u2664 aL2 (1  s)  wL2
 
1  1 s
   aL1   aL2 (1  x) s (1 s)(1 (1 x)s)
+
 
wL1   wL2 (1  x) 1 s
 (1 1 s )
(1 (1 x)1 s )
3775
(1 + hc) (1  u) bu
=  
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F +
(1 x)
u2664 (1  s)
aL2 (1 (1 x)s) aL1+aL2 (1 x)s
(1 (1 x)s)
+
 
1  1 s
  wL2 (1 (1 x)1 s )+wL1  wL2 (1 x)1 s
(1 (1 x)1 s )
3775
(1 + hc) (1  u)
bu
=  
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F +
(1 x)
u

 (1 s)(aL1 aL2 )
(1 (1 x)s) +
(1 1 s )(wL1  wL2 )
(1 (1 x)1 s )

(1 + hc) (1  u) bu
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We can express h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F =
gM


1 +  (1  )2 (1  x)  (1  ) (1  x)   (1  )
Using  = ux
(1 x)(1 u) and (1  ) = 1 u x(1 x)(1 u) ; this can be rewritten as
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F =
gM (1  x) (1  u)
ux"
1 + 
(1  u  x)2
(1  x) (1  u)2  
1  u  x
(1  u)   
1  u  x
(1  x) (1  u)
#
=
gM
ux
2664 (1  x) (1  u) +  (1 u x)
2
(1 u)
  (1  x) (1  u  x)   (1  u  x)
3775
=
gM
ux

x (1  x) +  (1  u  x) (1  u  x)  (1  u)
1  u

=
gM
ux

x (1  x)   (1  u  x) x
1  u

=
MBx
u (1  u) [(1  u  x) (1  ) + ux] > 0
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due to the restrictions on the parameters. Furthermore, we have aL1 aL2 = (1 BxM) [1   (1  )]
and wL1   wL2 = MALW [1   (1  )] : Hence we can now write:
cmc =  
MB0x
(1 u) [(1  u  x) (1  ) + ux]
+ (1  x) [1   (1  )]

 (1 s)(1 BxM)
(1 (1 x)s) +
(1 1 s )WM
AL
(1 (1 x)1 s )

u (1 + hc) (1  u) bu
=  bu
 =
2664 MBx

(1 u) [(1  u  x) (1  ) + ux] +
(1  x) [1   (1  )]

 (1 s)(1 B0xM)
(1 (1 x)s) +
(1 1 s )WM
AL(1 (1 x)1 s )

3775
u (1 + hc) (1  u) 
We will now show that @
@s
> 0 and thus #
#s
< 0 if s is not too far away from 1. A
more general proof seems impossible. We have
@
@s
=
  @hc
@s
 (1 + hc)
(1 + hc)
2
+
 (1  x)
u (1  u)
266666666666666664
[1   (1  )]
(1 + hc)
266666666666666664
(1 B0xM)[(1 (1 x)s) (1 s)(1 x)]
(1 (1 x)s)2
+Mh
  s (1  )W +
 
1  1 s

#W
#s
i
AL
 
1  (1  x) 1 s

   1  1 s W
2664 #A
L
#s
 
1  (1  x) 1 s

 AL (1  x) (1  )  s
3775
(AL(1 (1 x)1 s ))2
377777777777777775
377777777777777775
It is easily shown that @hc
@s
=   (1  ) @AL
@s
1
(AL)2
< 0: For  > 0; this implies that
  @hc
@s
(1+hc)
(1+hc)
2 > 0: Furthermore, since the range of values of s are those for which  is
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positive, or "just" negative, we can safely write #
#s
> 0 if
(1 B0xM)x
(1  (1  x) s)2
+MALW
h
  s (1  ) +
 
1  1 s

#W
#s
1
W
i  
1  (1  x) 1 s

   1  1 s W h#AL#s 1AL  1  (1  x) 1 s   (1  x) (1  )  s i 
AL
 
1  (1  x) 1 s
2 > 0
Further simplifying this yields
(1 BxM)x
(1  (1  x) s)2
+
MW
h
 x (1  )  s +
 
1  (1  x) 1 s
  
1  1 s
 
#W
#s
1
W
  #AL
#s
1
AL
i
AL
 
1  (1  x) 1 s
2 > 0
Using W = 0WL,
We now set s = 1: This gives W = 
0 = 1
M
  g [1   (1  )] and,  1  1 s  = 0
and
 
1  (1  x) 1 s

= x, means that our inequality becomes
(1 B0xM)   1
M
 B0x [1   (1  )]M (1  )
x
> 0
Or
 >
B0xM (1  )
1 B0xM (1   (1  ))
This is easily fullled under the calibrations considered in this chapter.
For the case of s = 1; we now show that
@2
@s@x
< 0 if  is close to one (as we assume
in the chapter) and the other parameters have a calibration of "reasonable" magnitude.
This means that the e¤ect of the skill level on  is weakened if the labour market
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becomes more uid. For s = 1 and  = 1 we have (noting that
@hc
@s
=  (1 u x)
(1 u)x
@
@s
= 
 (1  u  x)
(1  u)x
+

u (1  u)2
2664 [(1  x  u) (1  ) + ux]h
(1 B0xM)
x
  (1  )
h
1
x
 MB
h
(1 )(1 u)+x(u+ 1)
(1 x)(1 u)
iii
3775
= A1 + A2 where
A1 = 
 (1  u  x)
(1  u)x
=
MB0
(1  u)3 u

(1  )  1  2u  2x+ u2 + 2ux+ x2+ ux  ux2   u2x
A2 =

u (1  u)2
2664 [(1  x  u) (1  ) + ux]h
(1 B0xM)
x
  (1  )
h
1
x
 MB0
h
(1 )(1 u)+x(u+ 1)
(1 x)(1 u)
iii
3775
Di¤erentiating this with respect to x gives
@2
@s@x
=
@A1
@x
+
@A2
@x
@A1
@x
=
MB0
(1  u)3 u [ 2 (1  ) (1  u  x) + u (1  2x  u)]
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@A2
@x
=

u (1  u)2266666666664
( + u  1)
h
(1 B0xM)
x
  (1  )
h
1
x
 MB0
h
(1 )(1 u)+x(u+ 1)
(1 x)(1 u)
iii
+ [(1  x  u) (1  ) + ux]2664  B
0Mx (1 B0Mx)
x2
  (1  )h
 1
x2
  MB0
(1 u)
h
(u+ 1)(1 x)+(1 )(1 u)+x(u+ 1)
(1 x)2
ii
3775
377777777775
=

u (1  u)22664 ( + u  1)
h
(1 B0xM)
x
  (1  )
h
1
x
 MB0
h
(1 )(1 u)+x(u+ 1)
(1 x)(1 u)
iii
+ [(1  x  u) (1  ) + ux]
h
 1
x2
  (1  )
h
 1
x2
  MB0u
(1 u)(1 x)2
ii
3775
Note that
(1 B0xM)
x
  (1  )

1
x
 MB0

(1  ) (1  u) + x (u+    1)
(1  x) (1  u)

=
(  B0xM)
x
+ (1  )MB0

(1  ) (1  u) + x (u+    1)
(1  x) (1  u)

=
(  B0xM) (1  x) (1  u) + x (1  )MB0 [(1  ) (1  u) + x (u+    1)]
x (1  x) (1  u)
and that
 1
x2
  (1  )
 1
x2
  MB
0u
(1  u) (1  x)2

=   
x2
+
(1  )MBu
(1  u) (1  x)2
=
  (1  u) (1  x)2 + x2 (1  )MBu
x2 (1  u) (1  x)2
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Thus
@A2
@x
=

u (1  u)2
26666664
(+u 1)
x(1 x)(1 u)
2664 (  BxM) (1  x) (1  u)
+x (1  )MB0 [(1  ) (1  u) + x (u+    1)]
3775
+
h
(1 x u)(1 )+ux
x2(1 u)(1 x)2
   (1  u) (1  x)2 + x2 (1  )MB0ui
37777775
We can then write
@2
@s@x
=
@A1
@x
+
@A2
@x
=

u (1  u)3266666666666664
MB0 [ 2 (1  ) (1  u  x) + u (1  2x  u)]
+ (+u 1)
x(1 x)2664 (  B0xM) (1  x) (1  u)
+x (1  )MB0 [(1  ) (1  u) + x (u+    1)]
3775
+
h
(1 x u)(1 )+ux
x2(1 x)2
   (1  u) (1  x)2 + x2 (1  )MB0ui
377777777777775
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As can be easily checked, setting  = 1 makes @
2
@s@x
more positive. Thus if @
2
@s@x
< 0
for  = 1; then @
2
@s@x
< 0 for  < 1 as well. Hence @
2
@s@x
< 0 if
MBu (1  2x  u)
+
u [(  B0xM) (1  x) (1  u) + x2 (1  )MB0u]
x (1  x)
+
u
   (1  u) (1  x)2 + x2 (1  )MB0u
x (1  x)2 < 0
MB0 (1  2x  u)x (1  x)2
+

(  B0xM) (1  x) (1  u) + x2 (1  )MB0u (1  x)
  (1  u) (1  x)2 + x2 (1  )MB0u < 0
MB0 (1  2x  u)x (1  x)2
+(  B0xM) (1  x)2 (1  u) + x2 (1  )MB0u (1  x)
  (1  u) (1  x)2 + x2 (1  )MB0u < 0
MB0 (1  2x  u)x (1  x)2
 MBx (1  x)2 (1  u)
+x2 (1  )MB0u (1  x) + x2 (1  )MB0u < 0
(1  2x  u) (1  x)2   (1  x)2 (1  u)
+x (1  )u (1  x) + x (1  )u < 0
 2x (1  x)2 + x (1  )u (1  x) + x (1  )u < 0
 2 (1  x)2 + (1  )u (1  x) + (1  )u < 0
 2  x2   2x+ 1+ (1  )u (1  x) + u (1  ) < 0
 2x2 + 4x  2 + (1  )u  x (1  )u+ u (1  ) < 0
 2x2 + x (4  (1  )u) + 2u (1  )  2 < 0
x2   x (4  (1  )u)
2
  u (1  ) + 1 > 0
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The polynomial on the left hands side has two solutions and the inequality will hold for
values of x to the left of the smaller solution or to the right of the larger one. We have
x1;2 =
4  (1  )u
q
(1  )2 u2 + 8u (1  )
4
Since the root will be larger than (1  )u; we have x1 > 1; which is outside the
permissible range for x: For x2; we have
x2 =
4  (1  )u 
q
(1  )2 u2 + 8u (1  )
4
Clearly x2 increases in : Thus the larger , the larger is the maximum value of x
consistent with @
2
@s@x
< 0: Setting  = 0; we have
x2 =
4  u pu2 + 8u
4
Thus for x < x2 = 4 u 
p
u2+8u
4
; which is easily fullled for the range of parameters we
consider in this chapter; we have @
2
@s@x
< 0 and thus @
2
@s@x
> 0:
C.7. Model Equations in the Form required by Sims(2000) Code
We rst use the interest feedback rule to substitutebit out of the Euler equation (not
the policy rule employed here is bit = t + ubut). We can then write the system in
the form
 0yt =  1yt 1 +

	 
2664 "t
vt
3775+et
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with yt =
26666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
xt
xut
xmct
xnt
xct
baPt
t
but
cmc0t
bunt
bct
baLt
bwLtbit
37777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
;  0 = [ 
1
0  
2
0]
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 10 =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 0 0 0 0 0
0  F hc 0 0  (p0 + ap1)
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0  1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 1 0 0 0  1 0
0 0 0 F 0   (p0 + ap1)
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
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 20 =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 1
0
0
0
0
(1  )
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 a
  w 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
c0 0 0 1  cL 0 0
(1  )  u   yy0 0 (1  )yy0 0 0 0  1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0  0 0  a w 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
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 1 =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 L1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0  (1 x)(1 s)
u(1 u) 0 0 0 (1  x) s 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 (1 x)(1 1 s )
u(1 u) 0 0 0 0 (1  x) 1 s 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0  c1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0  L1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
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	 =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
 =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
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